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Executive Summary 
 
In 2008-2009, more than 100,000 Salvadorans, nearly half of them between the ages of 
16 and 24, were unemployed.1 Education, jobs, and opportunities for productive self-
employment are scarce in Salvadoran communities where economic conditions are poor. The 
relationship between youth unemployment and criminality has been well established, but it is 
especially complex in developing nations such as El Salvador. Marginalized youth are excluded 
from formal employment,2 in part because they lack the requisite education, life skills, and 
training. Also, employers shun applicants from gang-dominated communities, even those 
without personal criminal histories. Thus, the cycle of poverty and violence, particularly gang 
violence, becomes self-perpetuating.  
During his 2012 opening remarks to Juventour, an annual conference to promote youth, 
President Mauricio Funes stated, “The essence of the work we carry out through government is 
creating opportunities for Salvadoran youth.” The focus on youth is a primary concern for the 
recovery of El Salvador’s continuing state of social and economic distress. In response, 
policymakers began promoting employment-based programming developed for at-risk youth. 
This report explores seven projects that hoped to change the dynamics of youth poverty and 
violence in El Salvador, where the magnitude of the problem has moved the national and local 
governments, international and local nonprofit and charitable agencies, and private enterprise to 
take action.  
Each of the seven programs claimed to have an interest in and impact on improving youth 
employability, although in varying ways. Five approached the challenge with combinations of 
job and/or entrepreneurial skills training, job development and placement services, continuing 
education, and other components intended to prepare youth to support themselves and their 
families. All directly or indirectly attempted to divert at-risk youth from crime and to enable their 
access to legitimate, gainful employment. All, to some extent, included complementary 
components that had wider-ranging impacts—for example, reinsertion into social institutions 
such as family, school, and community. The communities selected for attention by those 
                                                 
1 Nóchez, Mario Ernesto. (2013). “Evaluación Operativa del Programa Inserción Productiva”, FISDL-CSU. 
2 Victor E. Tokman, "The Informal Economy, Insecurity And Social Cohesion in Latin America," International Labour Review 146, 
no. 1‐ 2 (2007): 81-107. 
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programs, mostly rural, some urban, were widely known for their poverty and violence, and for 
the absence of the kinds of recreational, educational, and employment opportunities that would 
allow youth to envision and work toward a meaningful, dignified future.  
The seven programs examined shared some broad long-term goals and certain short and 
medium-term objectives, but their emphases differed in accord with the varying philosophies and 
priorities of each program's organizers and funding agencies. The authors made site visits, 
interviewed stakeholders, and reviewed reports (some of which had been prepared for funding 
agencies) and other public information; few primary sources of data were made available, even 
when requested. The information sources did not support objective comparisons or cost-benefit 
analyses, but it proved useful for understanding approximately what it might cost, for example, 
to prepare youth for finding employment in certain fields (e.g., see section 3), or to provide a 
temporary income supplement to the most vulnerable Salvadorans during an economic crisis, 
along with some skills and advising for pursuing future income generation (e.g., see section 4).  
In some respects, Jóvenes Comprometidos was the program most directly and 
aggressively focused on ensuring youth access to employment. Staff forged working 
relationships with employers to provide trainees with work experience and then to match them 
with actual job openings. The cost of training individuals who found jobs upon graduation 
ranged from an average of $320 per person (for catering) to $630 per person (for accounting 
assistance); recalculated to include only individuals still employed three months after graduating, 
those average costs became $517 and $840 per person.3 
PATI, on the other hand, was the government's emergency response to the economic 
crisis. PATI provided a monthly income supplement ($100 for six months) in exchange for 
community service and attendance at workshops designed to build skills and confidence for a 
future job search. The program was meant to be a one-time effort, relieving the burden on El 
Salvador's most vulnerable individuals through the worst of the financial disaster. The average 
cost per person has been estimated at $817—$600 in direct payments and the rest for other 
programming.4 
Like Jóvenes Comprometidos, Jóvenes Constructores placed significant emphasis on 
directly preparing youth for employment, although it attempted to serve a wider range of at-risk 
                                                 
3 See section 3, "Jóvenes Comprometidos," in this report. 
4 See section 4, "PATI," in this report. 
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youth. In a CRE Final Report, CRS to USAID (June 30, 2014, 42), the cost per youth, including 
technical assistance, averaged $1,210;5 this could be compared, perhaps, with the cost reported in 
that same document (p. 43) of simply feeding and housing an inmate in an over-crowded prison 
for a year, $1,142—a situation which, it is hoped, would be prevented by assisting youth with 
programs such as the ones studied here. The above examples illustrate the range of services and 
some approximate unit costs of program delivery. 
The last two projects studied for this report (Sustainable Cities and Young 
Entrepreneurs), both ongoing, differ from the others in that they are organized primarily by 
private businesses and associations, funded and executed through public-private partnerships. In 
addition, they do not focus on alleviating social ills, but on regional economic viability, with 
beneficial social outcomes becoming a potential side effect. The economic motives and 
constructs are complex. Still, proceeding in a way that encompasses marginalized local 
populations (including at-risk youth, although both projects emphasize that they do not 
characterize individuals as such nor do they target youth exclusively) and that attempts to include 
rather than displace them, these projects have something important in common with the others.  
As with the other five programs, researchers again did not have access to primary source 
documents for those two endeavors, but for purposes of comparison, a FUNDE presentation of 
Project Sustainable Communities estimated that the average per-person cost of providing support 
for some 933 individuals to enhance their earning potential through education, training, advising, 
and other assistance, as needed, averaged $1,211 (pp. 2, 12); that project is ongoing.6 Similarly, 
Project Young Entrepreneurs aims to develop self-employment opportunities for youth by 
encouraging them to finish their educations (averaging $489 estimated annual cost/person), 
teaching life skills for reintegrating with their families and communities (averaging $903 
estimated annual cost/person), and helping them to establish successful entrepreneurships 
(averaging $1,400 estimated annual cost/person).7 
Across the seven programs studied, numbers are consistently identified as "estimated 
averages." Still, they tell us something about the investments needed to achieve the kinds of 
goals those respective programs are pursuing. Much more research is needed to determine the 
                                                 
5 See section 5, "Jóvenes Constructores," in this report. 
6 See section 8, "Project Sustainable Communities," in this report. 
7 See section 9, "Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities," in this report. 
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cost-effectiveness of the various approaches to mitigating the closely related problems of youth 
poverty and violence, and still more is needed to enable meaningful comparisons among them.  
 The programs all began with start-up funding of varying amounts, but long-term funding 
streams were harder to come by. Several projects ended because funding ran out. Those that 
lasted longer tended to rely on partner organizations, including businesses that benefitted from 
the training programs, local governments that provided resources for the programs in their 
municipalities, and volunteerism. Without a sustainable source of funding, the viability of 
projects can be short-lived.  
One of the more important lessons drawn from this study: any program in need of stable 
funding from international, governmental, nonprofit and/or for-profit organizations would do 
well to have clear goals, a well-developed strategy drawn in part from the evidence-based 
successes of others, measurable outcomes measured and indicators that can be tracked, a sharp 
and sustained focus on those goals and measures, and an independent evaluation plan for 
assessing and reporting achievements (and failures, and responses to failure). Not surprisingly, 
programs in which private businesses and associations were active reported better employment 
and also better self-employment outcomes. All, formally or informally, sought in some ways to 
ease impoverishment and reduce violence. Programs that focused more aggressively on business 
alliances and participant employment did so at some cost to those who did not or could not meet 
employers' stringent requirements. Programs that focused more on quality of life, social/cultural 
issues, and life skills as a means of promoting the conditions for economic improvement or 
violence reduction (or both) seemed to make a difference, but forfeited the potential for crossing 
the sustainable "job" or "self-employment" finish line with the majority of their participants. 
Researchers may differ on relative importance and causal relationships of the elements of 
economic and social hardship that the programs were addressing, but there is little disagreement 
that those relationships mattered. It would be worth thinking about what kinds of organizational 
mergers or collaborations might be able to more efficiently and effectively set priorities and 
achieve the desired outcomes. 
Other valuable lessons were learned from the programs’ successes and shortcomings. Our 
interviewees urged future program planners and implementers to know the targeted communities 
and populations well, to engage them in planning from the beginning, and to involve all 
stakeholders in decision-making; to expect to invest (e.g., the cost to prepare a disadvantaged 
  v 
youth for employment could range from about $700 to more than $2,200), but also to remain 
within their resources and capabilities; and to be realistic about security issues and 
knowledgeable about local gangs that might have impact on the program and enrollees. Working 
closely with potential employers turned out to be important, to assure that jobs would be 
available for successful program graduates; at least two programs found success selling 
businesses not on social "goods," but on productivity and the financial benefits of hiring 
screened and trained employees from a previously untapped labor pool. They also found it 
important to plan training based on real market needs, for both jobs and for entrepreneurships. 
Investing in high quality instructors, preferably native to the region, made a positive difference. 
Finally, most programs suffered for having not built in ways to measure and report outcomes by 
collecting and analyzing data that could guide early course-correction and provide the basis for 
reporting and funding requests.  
Some lessons learned were unexpected. Youth employment programs such as these could 
have been narrowly focused on numbers and regimented in their approach, focused on the 
bottom line. Instead, the programs and their recruits were more values-driven (internally, even 
informally in some cases) than data-driven, and most programs were as least as developmental as 
they were disciplined in their approaches.8 Jobs mattered, but apparently they mattered most in 
the context of family, community, and country. 
 
  
 
                                                 
8 Jóvenes Comprometidos was an exception, focusing more narrowly on employment. That was noted by some stakeholders as a lost 
opportunity. 
  1 
Section 1.  Introduction 
 
 
Unemployment is high in El Salvador, especially among youth. Between 2008 and 2009, 
more than 100,000 Salvadorans, nearly half of them between the ages of 16 and 24, were 
unemployed.9 The nation’s youth unemployment rate currently stands at about 10.4%, compared 
with 6.1% for the nation as whole. Almost 25% of youth 15 to 25 years old are not enrolled in 
school nor do they work.10 Furthermore, that youth with high school degrees or less who are 
employed and not in school typically earn very low wages. A 2013 report from the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that young adult Salvadorans earn on average between $169 
and $353 a month.11  
Not surprisingly, chronic youth unemployment and inequality have been linked to high 
levels of delinquency and violence.12 A number of explanations for the relationship between 
crime and unemployment have been proposed. Some have attributed the relationship to the strain 
that youth feel when they are unable to improve their standard of living. In these cases, crime 
and delinquency are the result of individuals trying to meet their economic needs.13 Others have 
argued that crime is a rational consequence to unemployment. Youth, particularly unemployed 
youth, weigh the costs and benefits of criminality against licit behavior and determine the 
relative cost of each.14 Still others have maintained that young adults who are out of school and 
out of work have greater opportunity to commit crime; in other words, those who are in school or 
who are employed have less time, or inclination, to engage in criminality.15 A number of other 
                                                 
9 Nóchez, Mario Ernesto. (2013). “Evaluación Operativa del Programa Inserción Productiva”, FISDL-CSU.  
10 DIGESTYC. (2013, May). Encuesta de Hogares y Propósitos Múltiples 2012. Ciudad Delgado, El Salvador: Gobierno de la 
República de El Salvador Ministerio de Economía, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. 
11  ILO – International Labour Organization. (2013). Diagnóstico del Empleo Juvenil en El Salvador 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/employment/areas/youth-employment/sida/WCMS_234016/lang--en/index.htm.  The minium wagein El Salvador is 
$220/month. 
12 Britt, C. L. (1994). Crime and Unemployment Among Youths in the United States, 1958‐ 1990. American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, 53(1), 99-109. 
13 Britt, C. L. (1994). Crime and Unemployment Among Youths in the United States, 1958‐ 1990. American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, 53(1), 99-109. 
14 Welsh, B. C., & Farrington, D. P. (2000). Monetary costs and benefits of crime prevention programs. Crime. & Just., 27, 305. 
15 Robert D Crutchfield and Susan R. Pitchford. "Work and Crime: The Effects of Labor Stratification." Social Forces 76, no. 1 
(1997):  93-118. 
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explanations have been posited, as well. Regardless of the root causes, the relationship between 
youth unemployment and criminality appears to be strong.16  
This relationship is even more complex in developing nations such as El Salvador where 
the most marginalized are socially excluded from some forms of employment.17 In large part, 
that is because the majority of them lack the requisite education, life skills, and training. Even if 
they were to be prepared for work, however, jobs and opportunities for productive self-
employment are extremely scarce in those communities where economic conditions continue to 
be dismal. As a result, youth commonly drop out of school to work as temporary farm laborers or 
in the informal labor market (e.g., street vending) to supplement their families’ low incomes.18 
For rural youth, such educational and economic disadvantages have been related to the increased 
probability of becoming involved in violence or gang activity.19  
One of the more insurmountable barriers to youth unemployment, even for those few 
youths who do graduate from high school and attempt to obtain legitimate positions, is employer 
discrimination based on applicants' home communities. In other words, applicants are routinely 
rejected solely because of where they live. Gangs dominate in many rural areas, and employers 
refuse to hire residents from such communities for fear of gang infiltration or intimidation. 
Applicants for the most menial positions, regardless of their qualifications, are subjected to 
polygraph tests meant to reveal their home communities and whether they or family members, 
friends, or neighbors have any gang or criminal history. Few of the young applicants from those 
communities can claim not to have such associations, even when they have no personal criminal 
history. During the application process, they suffer the anxiety of having to choose between 
almost certainly being caught in a lie or exposing others, and the prospect of being rejected, in 
either case. Thus, the cycle of poverty and violence becomes self-perpetuating. 
The greatest problem facing Salvadoran youth and young adults today may be the 
nation’s gangs and the violence associated with them. In response, to reduce dependence on 
illicit activity to generate income, some policymakers have strongly emphasized and promoted 
                                                 
16 C. L. Britt, "Reconsidering the Unemployment and Crime Relationship: Variation by Age Group and Historical Period," Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology 13(4), (1997): 405-428. 
17 Victor E. Tokman, "The Informal Economy, Insecurity And Social Cohesion in Latin America," International Labour Review 146, 
no. 1‐ 2 (2007): 81-107. 
18 World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment." See section 6 for additional information. 
19 Idem. 
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employment-based programming. A modest amount of research has examined the impact of 
these programs on criminality. On the one hand, this body of research has shown that a number 
of employment-based strategies are ineffective in reducing criminality. For example, summer 
jobs programs, short-term nonresidential training programs, and job training as a diversion from 
court each have been found ineffective. On the other hand, other programs have been found to be 
promising or even effective. For at-risk youth, Job Corps training as well as training in using 
critical thinking skills have shown promise, as have prison-based vocational programs for adult 
inmates. For ex-offenders, job training has been found to be highly effective.20 
Some academics have pointed out that much of our understanding of the impact of 
employment-based programming has been confined to developed nations. They argue that the 
impact of such programming could be much more pronounced in developing nations because 
skill levels are lower and there is much more opportunity for economic and social growth. 
Recently, a small number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies were conducted to 
examine the effect of employment-based programming on earnings, employment, and 
specifically employment in the formal sector. This small but important body of work suggests 
that some forms of employment programming not only have a significant impact on individual-
level economic activity, but that the impact of the programming is much greater in developing 
than in developed nations. This has led to its proliferation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay, among others.21 These findings suggest that the impact of 
employment-based programming in developing nations might be much more pronounced than in 
developed nations with respect to crime and violence, as well.  
The purpose of this report is to understand the processes of programs that facilitate the 
employment of high-risk populations in El Salvador. As such, this report is not an evaluation of 
employment-based programs in El Salvador as such. Rather it seeks to provide policymakers and 
SolucionES22 with information about the organizational structures and operational strategies used 
                                                 
20 Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What's Promising. (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 
1998). 
21 Orazio Attanasio, Training Disadvantaged Youth in Latin American: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, Center for the Evaluation 
of Development Policies (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008). 
22 SolucionES is multifaceted violence prevention program, implemented by an alliance of Salvadoran non-profit organizations who 
have come together to prevent crime and violence: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el 
Desarrollo Humano (FUSAL), Fundación Crisálida (aka Glasswing), Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social 
(FUSADES), and Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE), with partial funding from USAID/El Salvador. Together, 
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by selected employment-based programs so that they can better understand their implementation 
and potential for effectiveness and sustainability and in consequence design and implement 
programs which help at-risk youth find employment. In doing so, we sought to examine seven 
characteristics of high-risk population employment intervention programs in El Salvador: 
objectives, coverage, impact, inter-institutional coordination, replicability and sustainability, and 
lessons learned. Below, we describe our research methodology, including our case study 
selection process, and present our findings from those seven case studies. The presentation of the 
findings is followed by our discussion of their policy implications and recommendations for 
future programming.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
those organizations bring their widely recognized expertise in education, health, community development, economic development, research, and 
youth leadership and their combined synergy and strengths to the task of preventing crime and violence in El Salvador. SolucionES uses a three-
pronged strategy: (1) Strengthen municipal crime and violence prevention capabilities and actions, (2) increase private sector social investment, 
and (3) research, publish, and disseminate findings to inform decision-making. The current report is one of 10 planned policy-oriented studies.  
SolucionES will use the results of this study to enrich the design of its job preparedness and placement programs focused on at-risk youth. 
  5 
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Section 2. Methodology 
 
 
We examined seven employment-based intervention programs for high-risk youth in El 
Salvador. Programs were eligible for inclusion in the study if they met all of the following five 
criteria. First, the programs had to be relevant to the present study; that, is they had to have been 
focused on generating employment opportunities for youth at risk in El Salvador. Second, the 
programs that focused only on gang members were excluded, at SolucionES’ request. Third, the 
programs had to have been operational within the previous five years. Fourth, the programs must 
have included prevention of violence as a goal or objective. Fifth, the program had to show 
promise for being successfully replicated in other communities or nations, and access would be 
needed to information that could demonstrate how to accomplish that.  
We first conducted an inventory of employment-based violence-prevention programs for 
at-risk youth by reviewing three reports that contained a catalog of programs, projects, and 
initiatives that were closely related to the study objectives. These three reports included (1) 
Service Directory for Young People,1 (2) Final Report of a Study of Programs and/or Projects 
Implemented for Violence and Crime Prevention,2 and (3) Social Corporate Responsibility in El 
Salvador: Practices and Strategies to Prevent Violence and Crime.3 
A total of 16 employment-based intervention programs that focused on at-risk youth were 
identified through these reports, nine of which were excluded because they had worked primarily 
with gangs and gang members. The seven remaining programs accepted our invitation to 
participate in the study. Those programs included (1) USAID Program Improving Access to 
Employment: Jóvenes Comprometidos; (2) Program of Temporary Support to Income (PATI); 
(3) Jóvenes Constructores; (4) Project Enabling Opportunities for Peace and Youth Employment 
                                                 
1 Fundaungo, Directorio de Servicios para Jóvenes, El Salvador 2010: http://www.fundaungo.org.sv/dir_Jóvenes/ 
pdf/directorio_Jóvenes.pdf. 
2 S.G. Méndez Tario, Reporte Final de Investigación Sobre Programas y/o Proyectos Implementados para la Prevención de la 
Violencia y El Crimen, (USAID, 2011). 
3 M. Beneke de Sanfeliú, D. Polanco, and M. Chávez, Responsabilidad Social Empresarial en El Salvador: Prácticas y Estrategias 
Para Prevenir el Crimen y la Violencia (El Salvador: Centro de Investigación y Estadísticas, FUSADES, 2014). 
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(Habilitando Oportunidades para la Paz y el Empleo Juvenil), or (HOPE); (5) Provenes II, (6) 
Project Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and Employment Generation; and (7) 
Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities.  
Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a total of 78 key stakeholders during 
their normal working hours in November 2014. Each organization selected four types of program 
stakeholders to participate in the study: technical staff, promoters, beneficiaries, and personnel 
from that organization’s partners. As shown in table 2.1 below, 8 to 12 stakeholders from each 
project participated in the study. 
 
Table 2.1.  Number of study participants, by program. 
Level Technical Promoters Beneficiaries 
Partner 
Institutions 
Total 
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 USAID Program Improving Access to 
Employment  
2 
  
9 
  
1 9 3 12 
Program of Temporary Support to Income (PATI) 
 
2 1 1 4 
   
5 3 8 
Program “Jóvenes Constructores”. 
 
3 
 
1 5 1 
  
5 5 10 
Project Enabling Opportunities for Peace and 
Youth Employment (HOPE)  
2 
  
10 
   
10 2 12 
Projóvenes II 1 3 2 
 
7 
 
1 
 
11 3 14 
Project Sustainable Communities: 
Entrepreneurship and employment generation’  
2 3 
 
4 2 
 
1 7 5 12 
Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities. 
 
2 
 
1 7 
   
7 3 10 
Total 1 16 6 3 46 3 1 2 54 24 78 
 
The data were collected systematically, but in a way that allowed flexibility for 
discovery. We made an effort to encourage the stakeholders to bring in additional outside 
information not called for by the interview schedule. The interviews and focus groups typically 
lasted one to two hours. We recorded the proceedings by taking written notes with pencil and 
paper and also by using a digital recorder. We read the consent form aloud to participants at the 
beginning of every interview and focus group. A translator was used whenever the interviewer 
did not speak Spanish. The interviews with the stakeholders were comprised of 17 questions (see 
table 2.2).  
 8 
 
Table 2.2.  Stakeholder interview questions. 
 
QUESTIONS 
1 What are the project objectives? What type of violence is prevented by the project?  
2 Is employment promotion a priority for the project? Why? How is it promoted? 
3 
What is the definition of employment, work and/or generation of employment opportunities that 
has been used in the project? 
4 What is the project target population? Define its characteristics (profile) and quantity? 
5 
What is the definition of at-risk population used in the project? Has there been equal 
participation between men and women? 
6 What impact has the project had? What are the tangible effects? 
7 
What would be the success factors of the project? What would be the major difficulties faced by 
the project? 
8 Are there successful stories within the project? Identify and mention some? 
9 
How has it been the coordination with municipalities, organizations and/or institutions linked to 
the employment or self-employment topic? 
10 
How has citizen participation been within the project? Do participants come from other 
organizations or have they become part of them? 
11 
What opportunities and/or difficulties does the current legal and institutional framework of El 
Salvador imply for these kinds of projects? 
12 What activities have been done or planned to guarantee the sustainability of the project results?  
13 
Has the project left installed capacity in municipalities or in other institutions in terms of 
infrastructure, human resource training, monitoring on young people who have been employed, 
equipment, etc.? Specify. 
14 
How will monitoring be given to productive or self-employment initiatives and young people who 
have been employed? 
15 
Is there a mechanism for internal and/or external communication in the project? Has there been 
or will there be any publications on success stories from young people who are employed or self-
employed? 
16 
What actions taken by the project would you propose to be carried out by anyone who works 
with young people at risk? 
17 What things would be done again and what would not be done in terms of the project? 
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We collected a combined total of 119 official documents that related to programs: 17 for 
Projóvenes II, 9 for USAID, 41 for Jóvenes Constructores, 29 for PATI, 4 for Project Young 
Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities, 13 for HOPE, and 19 for Sustainable Communities (see table 2.3). 
Those included final reports, progress reports, Standard Operating Procedures, annual reports, 
interoffice communications, promotional materials, statistics kept by the programs, and others. 
Because no central depository existed for those documents, they were collected as they presented 
themselves. The majority of them were received as a result of having let it be widely known that 
we were seeking any written material related to the history and development of the seven 
projects. Several documents were obtained through Internet searches or found at project-related 
websites.  
The documents were intended to serve as both primary and secondary research materials. 
Official documents produced by the program to express organizational arrangements, including 
directives pertaining to employee and recipient conduct, and/or that could place the organization 
in an historical context, were considered primary sources. Annual reports, progress reports, and 
statistics kept by the program, for example, assisted in constructing the realities of the 
community’s employment-related problems—or at least those realities as documented by the 
program—and illustrated their scope. Accordingly, these documents provided data that 
supplemented information obtained through the interviews and focus groups. 
 
Table 2.3.  Numbers of source documents collected, by program. 
Experiences / Projects / Programs Documents (#) 
USAID Program Improving Access to Employment 9 
Program of Temporary Support to Income (PATI) 29 
Program “Jóvenes Constructores”. 41 
Project Enabling Opportunities for Peace and Youth Employment - HOPE 13 
Projóvenes II 17 
Project ‘Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and employment generation’ 19 
Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities. 4 
Total 
119 
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Using the qualitative analytic strategies outlined by Schatzman and Strauss,4 data analysis 
began early in the research process. From the inception of the study, data were continually 
reviewed and organized both chronologically and categorically. That analytic cycle allowed us to 
continue testing emerging ideas as well as to identify developing patterns, relationships, and 
processes. Additionally, the constant comparative method was used to analyze the data after the 
completion of the project. This process involves unitizing and categorizing information units.5    
Two strategies were employed to ensure that the interpretation of the findings were 
accurate. First, the present study, when possible, attempted to triangulate multiple sources of 
data; that is, we used data from different sources to corroborate and clarify the research in 
question. Second, several experienced researchers were used as peer examiners, periodically 
examining work products to provide a check on researcher bias.  
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Section 3.  USAID Improving Access to Employment (Jóvenes Comprometidos)  
Program:  An Evaluation of a High-Risk Population Employment 
Intervention Project 
 
Ryan Moskop and Lidia E. Nuño 
 
 
USAID's Improving Access to Employment Program Jóvenes Comprometidos served 
nearly 2,000 at-risk Salvadoran youths, training them for jobs and connecting them with 
employment opportunities.1 Originally funded in September 2011, Jóvenes Comprometidos ran 
for two years, ending in September 2013 when the funding expired. We began our review of 
Jóvenes Comprometidos by reading the published literature. Next, we conducted in-person 
interviews with key stakeholders who had participated in the creation and implementation of the 
program, each ranging from one to one-and-a-half hours. We asked the interviewees about the 
availability of unpublished program literature; they provided us with flyers and brochures, and 
several directed our attention to social media outlets, such as the Facebook page and YouTube 
channel created by Jóvenes Comprometidos to publicize and endorse the program. That 
unpublished program literature and those media resources were also reviewed and considered in 
this evaluation. Finally, we invited ten program graduates, then employed in positions acquired 
through Jóvenes Comprometidos, to take part in a focus group in order to contribute their 
experiences and perspectives to the study. The focus group was conducted before normal 
business hours in a San Salvador restaurant.2 Focus group members were both males and 
females, with work experience ranging from less than one month to 2 1/2 years. 
Program Description and Relevance 
Jóvenes Comprometidos was initiated to help solve employment problems in El Salvador. 
                                                 
1 The Improving Access to Employment Program was implemented in December 2009 with funding from the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), CARANA Corporation, and RTI International. The current report focuses on one component of that 
program, the Jóvenes Comprometidos project. 
2 The Pizza Hut restaurant at which we met had employed a number of the program graduates, who suggested this as a convenient and 
comfortable location for them to meet. Employees from Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Wendy's restaurants were present. 
12 
 
The majority of Salvadoran youth, particularly those living in low-income rural areas, were 
unable to find and obtain legitimate work, and those who turned to local gangs for income 
opportunities and companionship were placing themselves at risk for involvement in crime and 
violence. At the same time, Salvadoran employers were finding it difficult to find competent, 
reliable workers, and that was limiting their productivity and profitability. According to the 
program literature and our interviewees, the goal of Jóvenes Comprometidos was to prepare at-
risk youth to fill those employers' unmet labor needs. 
The program was designed for youth about 18 to 26 years old who were neither attending 
school nor employed, with three objectives in mind: (1) to train them in skills that labor markets 
needed, (2) to guarantee every participant an interview for a real job, and (3) to provide the 
opportunity for each program graduate to obtain at least minimum wage employment. In return, 
youth participants committed to obtaining the jobs found for them and to performing those jobs 
so well that employers would come back to the program with more jobs for its trainees.3 
To achieve those objectives, program staff established relationships with potential 
employers, learning what characteristics and skills would be needed to motivate each one to hire 
the young applicants. During a focus group conducted by the staff, potential employers from 
various companies were encouraged to express their wants and needs. From their responses, staff 
developed profiles defining the ideal employee for each company. Those profiles were later used 
to identify youths who would be likely, given appropriate training, to fulfill the employers' 
respective needs.4  
In fact, a set of three separate profiles was created for each employer. The first profile 
included non-negotiable or obligatory characteristics, such as age, level of education, and (for 
some companies) gender preferences; the second listed potentially negotiable or interchangeable 
characteristics and included phrases such as “being considered at high risk for violence”; the 
                                                 
3 USAID reports: El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Atención al Cliente en Restaurantes y su Impacto en el Mercado 
Laboral (September 2013); El Modelo de Formación en Ventas del Programa Jóvenes Comprometidos y su Impacto en el Mercado Laboral 
(August 2013); El Caso Piloto de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Asistentes Administrativos y Auxiliares Contables y su Impacto en el Mercado 
Laboral (September 2013); El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Cajeros en el Mercado Laboral (October 2013); El Modelo de 
Inserción Laboral en el Área de Asistentes de Gerencia en Restaurante y Supermercado y su Impacto en el Mercado Laboral (October 2013); and 
El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área del Profesional del Servicio de Hoteles (Servicio de Banquetes y Ama de Llaves) (October 2013). 
4 Those "needs" included characteristics such as strong values, morals, and ethics; positive attitude; preferred age ranges; career-
oriented mentality and desire to remain with one company; at least a high school education; and, in some instances, a basic knowledge of work in 
the private sector. 
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third specified competencies needed for specific jobs.5 Having determined the potential 
employers' needs, specialized trainings were designed to address them, and at-risk youths were 
recruited who, given that training, would be relatively good matches. According to staff, 
recruiting was accomplished by publicizing the program in newspapers and on radio whenever 
companies were actively hiring, in keeping with the program's pledge to offer interviews and 
work opportunities only where there were actual openings.  
To aid staff in making the best matches for various types of employment, new recruits 
submitted to a psychological evaluation. Based on their results, participants would be offered a 
place in one of the program's training workshops,6 after which they would be offered one or 
more job interviews with specific employers. Depending on the outcome, they would either be 
hired or would continue the job search. A few months after participants had completed the 
program, whether or not they had obtained (or remained in) a job arranged by the program, staff 
would attempt to follow up, checking whether they were employed and, if not, offering 
additional assistance with locating possible openings.  
The program initially intended to serve the population of at-risk youth described above. 
Within that population, interviewees reported, it sought youth who were willing to learn and who 
exhibited certain characteristics:  a positive attitude toward and commitment to work, the 
capacity to maintain trusting relationships, and a desire for personal and professional growth. 
Staff members particularly wanted to help youth who had had demonstrably few opportunities 
for employment, especially those whose families lacked stable work histories. They worked to 
assure that opportunities were offered equally to males and females; men and women 
participated in similar trainings and, unless requested differently by the hiring company, they 
were offered the same types of job interviews. As a practical necessity, however, from the 
population of at-risk youths needing employment, potential recruits tended to be selected in large 
part by how well they matched the characteristics that potential employers had defined as 
desirable. 
                                                 
5 USAID reports (all); see bibliography for complete listing. 
6 Initially, the program offered three workshops:  restaurant customer service, sales, and cashiering. Later, more than a dozen different 
trainings were offered. Each workshop took from one to three weeks to complete. 
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Logic Model 
The Jóvenes Comprometidos concept and program flow may be most clearly understood 
by viewing an annotated graphic representation from an official program evaluation report 
conducted for USAID. The goals, components, concepts, and sequencing of the program are 
illustrated in the logic model, below. The model developed by Cambronero, Midling, and Molina 
(2012) demonstrates the program's overall vision, key components, and anticipated outcomes. 
 
 
Program Effectiveness 
Jóvenes Comprometidos aimed to help young Salvadorans who had gone unrecognized 
as a valuable labor resource to prepare for and find employment, simultaneously helping 
businesses to acquire competent, trustworthy, hardworking employees for positions that might 
otherwise go unfilled. Program stakeholders viewed this not only as a benefit to individuals and 
employers, but to the economy and the entire society. The concept and use of company-specific 
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employee profiles seemed to be a significant key to the program's effectiveness. The profile 
helped staff select those at-risk youths most likely to be hired for the chance to become 
competent at performing a legitimate job, and it reassured potential employers that the program's 
trainees would have the attributes they required. Without those profiles, the majority of those 
young men and women might well have been rejected as prospective employees. On the other 
hand, by focusing on the businesses' desired characteristics, the profiles promoted a selectivity 
that excluded any number of otherwise eligible at-risk youth from program participation.  
Although the focus of the program was economic, for some, it soon became apparent that 
the outcomes could effectively include other significant societal improvements, such as 
reductions in crime and violence. Asked directly about the impact of employment upon rates of 
violence, one interviewee explained that youth often turned to crime and violence in San 
Salvador/El Salvador not only from economic need, but because they were looking for 
excitement; legitimate employment could redirect those succumbing to poverty-laced boredom 
toward more productive activities. Another added that the Improved Access to Employment 
Program and jobs in general gave participants "a different perspective . . . to work and [to have] a 
different vision and leave behind the violence in the country." 
Although we could not confirm their perceptions with objective data, all whom we 
interviewed seemed confident that Jóvenes Comprometidos had been effective in supporting 
productivity and the Salvadoran economy. An interviewee explained that the program was not 
presented to potential employers as a social responsibility, but as a profitable business model. 
One person reported that the program had cut employers' training budgets by as much as 30%, 
lowering new employees' learning curves and reducing turnover. As companies experienced the 
quality of program applicants, they allocated more positions to them.  
The interviewees did not seem prone to idealizing the program's effectiveness. One 
reported that in the first cohort, about half of the participants who obtained jobs failed to survive 
their probationary periods. Another reported that only one of 20 trainees in the program's first 
workshop had been hired. Confronting such dismal outcomes, however, the staff quickly 
regrouped to identify and address the program's shortcomings. Perhaps most importantly, 
Jóvenes Comprometidos modified its training program to make it more specific to employer 
needs, and therefore more effective and efficient. That renewed efficiency was then promoted to 
recruit additional companies to provide more positions for Jóvenes Comprometidos graduates, 
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thus allowing the program to grow. The evolution of program efficiency over time was reflected 
in statistics offered to us by the stakeholders; near the conclusion of the program, we were told, 
70% to 100% of graduate group members were being placed in and maintaining jobs. The 
stakeholders with whom we talked considered the program a success because, according to one, 
the number of program participants who obtained employment (approximately 2,000) had 
exceeded their initial expectations. 
Staff attended to smaller lessons learned from the first cohort, as well. Jóvenes 
Comprometidos began providing a travel stipend to assure that the unemployed youth could get 
to the INSAFORP training center, and when it seemed that some were being deterred by hunger, 
the program began serving a simple lunch that the youths sometimes described as their best meal 
of the day. Attention to such details helped to raise attendance and lower attrition rates. 
Jóvenes Comprometidos may have set the standard for effectiveness in achieving 
employment for participants. From the beginning, the plan was to have a real job opening and the 
opportunity to interview for it for every program graduate. Some time afterward, staff would 
check on the status of those graduates. Reportedly, those follow-up interviews revealed that 
those who did not remain in positions arranged by Jóvenes Comprometidos often were able to 
find other jobs on their own. Outside companies were beginning to recognize the value of 
employing program-trained applicants. One stakeholder commented that in the limited job 
market, Jóvenes Comprometidos trainees stood out due as more employers realized that program 
participation was an asset on a resume—one that was backed up by the professionalism and 
technical skills demonstrated by program graduates.  
Community and Financial Support 
Communities contributed to the effectiveness of Jóvenes Comprometidos in part by 
posting program bulletins in local city halls and at college job fairs and by broadcasting program 
announcements during public radio programs. Several interviewees thought that the level of 
publicity was inadequate in the community, however, and that a greater number of at-risk youth 
would have been reached had the particulars about how and where to qualify and participate 
been better communicated. Some were of the opinion that wider awareness of the program's 
possibilities would have generated better community support. 
Communities supported Jóvenes Comprometidos financially, albeit at varying levels, 
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throughout the life of the program, according to the interviewees. Reportedly, USAID had 
funded the start-up year with a grant, after which INSAFORP7 and local businesses paid the 
majority of the program's expenses. Jóvenes Comprometidos always had intended to become 
self-sustaining after USAID funding was exhausted, they said, or at the least it would be 
transferred to the community and private sector businesses as a modified program that could be 
implemented independently. When in 2013 the USAID-funded program did come to an end, as 
promised, the implementation model and curriculum were given to several community, 
nongovernmental, and governmental organizations. That included INSAFORP, which created a 
Jóvenes Comprometidos training program that continued to use the model to good effect. 
Throughout the interviews, participants explained that at the time, several NGOs were 
promoting other employment-based programs. Few of the interviewees had applied to those, and 
none had actually enrolled or participated in another employment-based program. When asked 
why not, their answers were uniform: Jóvenes Comprometidos had been the first to respond to 
their applications.  
Building on Best (and Avoiding Worst) Practices 
Jóvenes Comprometidos from inception had incorporated evidence-based "best 
practices," but had also been deliberate about recognizing practices that might inhibit 
effectiveness. According to a former staff member, program planners had conducted research to 
determine what had and had not worked well for other agencies when attempting to implement 
similar programs. After meeting with several of those agencies, the staff had brainstormed ways 
of building upon their successes, but also had considered how to avoid their problems. For 
example, most other job training programs were not yet placing trainees in actual open positions, 
nor were they maintaining contact with trainees after sending them out to interview for jobs; 
Jóvenes Comprometidos was able to address both shortcomings in its own planning. 
Program Impact  
Some 2,400 youths became involved with Jóvenes Comprometidos during the two-year 
span of the program. The attrition rate was around 20% to 25%:  More than 1,800 youth 
reportedly completed the program, and nearly all of those were placed in jobs. Seventy percent 
                                                 
7 A publicly financed government agency that supports vocational training.   
18 
 
of those who participated in the program were reported to have obtained steady employment with 
either a program-affiliated employer or another employer found by the graduate (through a 
follow-up program referral or independently). For many, that had been their first real job.  
Impact on Youth 
According to a 2013 USAID report reviewing the success of Jóvenes Comprometidos, 
“youth agree that without any previous work experience, it is difficult to obtain the competencies 
and specific ability required to work in the area.”8 Participating in Jóvenes Comprometidos 
prepared youth for such work opportunities, and also for success beyond the job. Youth we 
interviewed from both groups—those who obtained a job and those who did not—agreed that 
that whether or not they had immediately found jobs, participating in the program had given 
them a sense of security and self-esteem, knowledge about the labor force, mentoring, and a 
vision for a career path.9 The interviewees noted that Jóvenes Comprometidos had shown them 
how to be professional and responsible in the work place, and they were encouraged to treat their 
placements as a first step on a career path rather than as "just a job." Repeatedly, former 
participants whom we interviewed emphasized the short- and long-term influence of the program 
on their careers. They suggested that without it, they might never have obtained legitimate 
employment. Furthermore, the members believed that they would continue to apply skills and 
philosophies learned for the foreseeable future in their professional and personal lives. One 
participant said that "the discipline that we have [learned] is not going to be just for a job; it’s 
going to be for life in general and for the future." The program appeared to have been successful 
at not only increasing employment among at-risk youth, but at helping those youths become 
proactive, productive Salvadorans worthy of the investments being made in their futures. 
As mentioned, the initial Jóvenes Comprometidos employment rate had been deeply 
disappointing, but the numbers rapidly improved as the program refined its recruiting methods 
and training curriculum. According to several staff, the improvement came about in large part 
after a renewed focus on recruiting youth who demonstrated sincere interest in obtaining 
employment and commitment to the idea of beginning a career, not just getting a job. Toward the 
end of the program, 15 to 18 of some 20 trainees from each class reportedly were being hired. 
                                                 
8 USAID, Atención al Cliente. 
9 Ibid. 
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Program graduates in the focus group supported those numbers, reporting that within their 
program groups, on average, about 20 of 25 participants were completing the program, and of 
those, about 18 were attaining and maintaining employment. Jóvenes Comprometidos placed 
many of those young men and women on a path leading out of the very lowest depths of 
disadvantage. Several reported progressing through internal promotions within their companies, 
while others reported finding opportunities for professional growth with other companies, using 
their Jóvenes Comprometidos experience to be promoted within and outside of those companies.  
Impact on Employers 
If youth had benefited from taking part in Jóvenes Comprometidos, so had the 
participating companies. Stakeholders speaking on behalf of those businesses related that the 
program had streamlined the employee selection process and costs related to recruiting and 
training had been substantially reduced. They reported that the program had also resulted in 
lower turnover; youth from Jóvenes Comprometidos left their jobs less frequently than youth 
who had not participated in the program, and the graduates were proving to be dependable 
workers. Sixteen separate training workshops were preparing youth to work as cashiers and 
perishable food handlers (supermarkets), sales persons (retail stores and door-to-door), entry-
level managers (fast-food chains and supermarkets), hotel workers (banquet managers, 
housekeeping), administrative and accounting assistants, microcredit analysts, customer service 
(restaurants and supermarkets), and mechanic's assistants and aircraft ramp personnel. 
Altogether, according to stakeholders, the companies were expressing great satisfaction with the 
quality of the employees produced by the training process. 
Difficulties Associated with Implementation 
Staff members interviewed were asked to name their biggest challenges. The majority 
chose "time." First, all agreed that the two-year timeframe allowed for conducting the entire 
project was rather short. Given its successes, they believed, more time could have allowed them 
to reach more youth. Second, they thought that the one-to-three-week training period was too 
short. In some instances, training was needed outside the classroom; for example, physical 
training course was needed to fulfill requirements set by one hiring agency, but there was no 
time for it. Although staff members found the training period limiting, they were quick to note 
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that it was "adequate," due in large part to its tight focus and the quality of the instructors. 
Based upon conversations with various persons within the program and involved 
peripherally, the profile, including specific competencies for specific jobs, set this program apart 
from its predecessors and competitors—but not without cost. The profile initially was used to 
describe the kinds of participants who could benefit from what the program had to offer and to 
match participants with willing employers. During the focus group, program participants 
emphasized the rigorous process involved in building profiles and the importance of this step to 
the participants in acquiring their positions. According to a former staff member, the profile was, 
however, vulnerable to use by the more savvy companies for funneling certain individuals 
toward their jobs. That could effectively limit who could be placed with them, even before the 
employer had considered all technically qualified applicants.  
According to one interviewee, it was hard to overcome the obstacle created by the fact 
that certain characteristics could instantly disqualify a trainee: "[The companies] are very strict. 
Some companies do not hire you if you have a piercing in your ear or a tattoo."10 The young job 
applicants could alter appearances to meet employer standards, but they could do little about the 
neighborhoods in which they lived. Fearing gang infiltration or harassment, employers often 
rejected applicants from areas known to be dominated by gangs, regardless of qualifications, and 
lie detector tests made it impossible to avoid revealing such information. Our interviewees 
acknowledged that employers could not be forced to hire applicants whom they found 
objectionable. However, one expressed confidence that as such programs establish credibility 
with participating companies, those companies will come to trust the programs to produce 
qualified graduates and will be less apt to disqualify applicants based on such stringent 
requirements. One stakeholder saw evidence of this as Jóvenes Comprometidos neared the end of 
its run: "At the end, [the companies] were more flexible if [potential employees] came from the 
program, because they knew that we were offering the best." 
Replicability 
Jóvenes Comprometidos' infrastructure appeared capable of being both sustainable and 
replicated. Given the need, a similar environment, a funding source, and a detailed description of 
                                                 
10 One interviewee clarified that although a particular employer might disqualify a person based on factors such as appearance or the 
reputation of one's home community, those factors did not bar individuals from program participation. 
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the program, any organization with staff capable of implementing the program might do this. 
Reportedly, other organizations had already adapted portions of the USAID Improving Access to 
Employment program to their own needs.11 Three factors were identified as deserving special 
attention in any effort to replicate the program model:  the use of labor market/employer-driven 
profiles for recruiting, training, and placements; investment in an excellent curriculum and 
instructors; and the use of social media to tell the story. 
Profiles 
Jóvenes Comprometidos was essentially based on the "head hunter" concept, in which 
individuals are identified and pursued to fill open positions based on a personal profile. The 
available literature and our interviews indicated that Jóvenes Comprometidos stressed profile 
creation as a program priority, crucial for the success of participants and the program as a whole. 
If testing and profile-building elements of programs modeled on Jóvenes Comprometidos are 
faithfully replicated, those programs could experience similar success. 
Instruction and Instructors 
One focus group participant said that the instructors were "one of the best parts" of the 
entire program, and several others agreed, saying that the instructors and the content were their 
favorite part of the training. They described the instructors as "charismatic and eager." They 
described the positive attitude that instructors displayed every day as "contagious." It was 
evident that the quality and positivity of the instructors delivering the training were integral to 
the success of these particular participants, and possibly to the program as a whole. 
According to one stakeholder, a large portion of the initial funding provided by USAID 
had been invested in the consultants who created the curriculum and in compensating the 
workshop instructors. To the best of their knowledge, stakeholders said, the instructors all were 
natives of El Salvador who knew not only the occupations they were teaching, but knew the 
environment, culture, and people, as well. Given the unanimity of the stakeholders on this point, 
any program interested in replicating the Jóvenes Comprometidos model should be mindful of 
                                                 
11 Interviewees referred to such adaptations, but did not discuss them in detail. We were informed that certain agencies were using the 
programming (e.g., INSAFORP, the aircraft industry, Don Bosco University, the tourism industry, the National Program of English for Work), 
but were offered no further information. 
22 
 
the importance of quality in its curriculum and instructors. 
Social Media and Success Stories  
When asked about success stories from Jóvenes Comprometidos, stakeholders were quick 
to point interviewers towards social media sites like Facebook and YouTube. There, numerous 
success stories were available for the public to read. Jóvenes Comprometidos had created and 
maintained a website, a Facebook page, and a YouTube channel for disseminating program 
information. According to one interviewee, the Access to Employment Facebook page was 
considered successful when it quickly accumulated more than 60,000 “likes” from the Facebook 
community. Jóvenes Comprometidos became El Salvador’s most viewed NGO Facebook page. 
Focus group participants indicated that they would routinely monitor those Internet outlets as a 
real-time source of information about Jóvenes Comprometidos, informing their friends and 
family about published opportunities advertised by the program.  
The stakeholders' praise for social media was not exclusive to Facebook. They were also 
quick to point out the quality of content on the Jóvenes Comprometidos YouTube channel. One 
participant told us that this channel would adequately present the accomplishments of the 
program and its many success stories to us. Given a second chance at running the program, one 
person added, they would place more emphasis upon using those individual success stories to 
better convey the program's benefits to the private sector, community, and NGOs.  
We did hear one success story directly from the focus group. The individual in question 
had been working in an entry-level position at an airport before being hired for an administrative 
job with Jóvenes Comprometidos. When the program ended, this person used professional 
contacts acquired though working with the program and participating businesses to obtain her 
next job, this time with a local outlet for a major international retailer. With skills acquired in her 
program position and honed through its curriculum, s/he was able to climb the corporate ladder 
there, eventually becoming a human relations administrator, a very good job in the Salvadoran 
labor market. Jóvenes Comprometidos was not only effective at developing its at-risk youth 
participants, it also proved effective as an employer at preparing motivated personnel for higher 
level positions. 
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Sustainability 
The USAID Jóvenes Comprometidos program came to a close in 2013 after only two 
years, as planned, when funding ended. The concepts that guided the model program lived on in 
various other programs, however. Those programs have adopted the model or one quite similar 
to it, according to one stakeholder, and are experiencing success. An interviewee told us that the 
program "left us with a curriculum for [programs within] the aircraft industry, Don Bosco 
University, the tourism industry, and the National Program of English for Work." That assertion 
was supported by another person, who intended to move forward with creating and conducting 
similar programs for different populations of at-risk and gang-involved youth within El Salvador.  
With the Jóvenes Comprometidos model attracting interest from other agencies, its sustainability 
in some form seems assured.  
Cost Effectiveness 
Several USAID reports were reviewed to determine the costs associated with different 
trainings (see table 3.1, below).12 For example, for training workshops for customer service 
positions, the average cost to train a group of 24 youths (including the selection process and 
training) was $7,379. About 14 graduates were employed soon after completing the training, at 
an average cost of $518 each. After three months, about 10 of them remained employed, raising 
the average cost per employed youth to $740.13  
Similarly, for cashier workshops, the average cost to train a group of 17 youths was 
$4,650. About 12 were employed upon completing training, at an average cost of $380 each. 
After three months, about nine of them remained employed, at an average cost of $528 each.14  
The program offered trainings for accounting and administrative assistant positions. The 
costs for the two differed, with accounting training being slightly less cost-effective. For 
example, it cost about $11,979 to train 41 youths for administrative assistant positions. About 24 
                                                 
12 The job training categories described here are a sample, representing only those for which cost data were available from secondary 
sources (USAID reports associated with job types). Mathematical inconsistencies are assumed to be attributable to differences in primary sources 
and/or methodologies used to calculate results.   
13 USAID. El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Atención al Cliente en Restaurantes y su Impacto en el Mercado Laboral 
(September 2013), 39. 
14 USAID. El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Cajeros en el Mercado Laboral (Oct. 2013): 37, http://pdf.usaid.gov/ 
pdf_docs/pa00jhnw.pdf, 37. 
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typically found positions upon completing training, of whom about 16 typically remained 
employed after three months, at an average cost of $748 each.15 On the other hand, the average 
cost to train 38 youths for accounting assistance was $12,605. Upon completing training, about 
20 youths obtained jobs ($630 per employed youth), and about 15 maintained employment after 
three months, resulting in an average training cost of $840 each.16  
Table 3.1:  Average Costs of Preparing At-risk Youth for Employment, by Job Type 
Job Type 
Class 
Size 
(av.) 
Cost per 
Class*   
(av.) 
Youths 
Employed (#)  
(av.) 
 
Initial Cost 
per Employed 
Youth*     
(av.) 
Youths 
Employed (#)    
3 Mos. after 
Training       
(av.) 
Cost per Youth 
Employed 3 Mos. 
after Training*       
(av.) 
Cashier17 17 $4,650 12 $380 9 $528 
Other, 
Restaurant18 
15 $4,992 11 -- 7 $713 
Customer Service, 
Restaurant19 
24 $7,379 14 $518 10 $740 
Admin. Assistant20 41 $11,979 24 -- 16 $748 
Accounting 
Assistant21 
38 $12,605 20 $630 15 $840 
* U.S. dollars. 
Recommendations 
Our interviewees, representative of various roles in Jóvenes Comprometidos, offered 
insights that they hoped might improve future efforts. The program's success was not without 
limitations. The amount of time allotted for developing and implementing the program, for 
example, was thought by many to have been too little; several expressed regret that so many 
                                                 
15 USAID. El Caso Piloto de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Asistentes Administrativos y Auxiliares Contables y su Impacto en el 
Mercado Laboral (September 2013), 41. 
16 Ibid. 
17 USAID, El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Cajeros en el Mercado Laboral, October 2013, 39.  
18 USAID, El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Asistentes de Gerencia en Restaurante y Supermercado y su Impacto en el 
Mercado Laboral, October 2013, 37. 
19 USAID, El Modelo de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Atención al Cliente en Restaurantes y su Impacto en el Mercado Laboral, 
September 2013, 39. 
20 USAID, El Caso Piloto de Inserción Laboral en el Área de Asistentes Administrativos y Auxiliares Contables y su Impacto en el 
Mercado Laboral, September 2013, 41. 
21 Ibid. 
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communities and other potential beneficiaries had missed the opportunity to participate.  
Our interviewees, both individuals and focus group members, unanimously believed that 
the program had been beneficial. Those who were participants had almost no criticisms of 
Jóvenes Comprometidos, and thought that the use of the profiles had been particularly beneficial 
for placing individuals in lasting, meaningful employment. They were genuinely appreciative of 
the opportunities that Jóvenes Comprometidos had afforded them. The following are some of the 
issues that the majority of stakeholders considered important for others to hear. 
Decision to "Start at the End" 
Interviewees unanimously agreed on the success of the program, but could not reach 
consensus on a reason for that success. According to one, the "decision to start at the end" during 
early program planning might have been what separated Jóvenes Comprometidos from less 
successful programs:  identifying real jobs ("the end") and then tailoring recruitment and training 
specifically for them. Indeed, they noted, the profile concept had arisen from observing the 
failures of other employment-based programs that had rapidly saturated the labor force with low-
skill workers for whom there was little demand. 
Maintaining Focus on Target Populations 
Published program literature emphasized that Jóvenes Comprometidos would find 
worthwhile jobs for at-risk youth who completed the program. Whether or not this was 
accomplished depends on one's definition of "at-risk." Prerequisites for participation, such as 
being at risk for involvement with violence and crime and having a high school diploma 
certainly would have excluded a substantial number of otherwise eligible youth. The stricter 
requirements originated with employers who had considerable influence over who was (and was 
not) admitted to the program. Future programs should explore ways around that problem; 
solutions may involve employer education and modifications to employer-driven recruit 
screenings, but they should also include pragmatic approaches to the goal—perhaps, for 
example, lengthening the training period and integrating it with a GED program.  
Although the greater economic and social disadvantage tends to occur in rural areas, 
according to some interviewees, Jóvenes Comprometidos did not serve that population very well, 
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instead placing a larger number of urban trainees.22 Some obvious reasons were proposed (e.g., 
transportation problems, childcare issues) for why that may have been the case, but one 
interviewee argued that rural youth were shunned because employers perceived them as more 
likely to have some gang affiliation, personally or through friends or family members. The 
individuals in question were not necessarily to blame for those perceptions, but they were 
"geographically challenged"—the greater possibility of gang association because of the regions 
in which they lived made employers wary. Youth from the poorer outlying areas were, arguably, 
in greater need of help than their urban counterparts. Nonetheless, particularly as a program that 
had only two years in which to model success, Jóvenes Comprometidos seemed better positioned 
to serve youth from urban areas with less alarming reputations for gang involvement. 
Agency Leadership in Selections for Job Placement 
One of the few criticisms raised by participants interviewed was that Carana should have 
participated earlier in the process of selecting individuals for job placement. Those who felt this 
had not been handled well were particularly concerned that more dedicated participants had lost 
opportunities due to less capable or reliable participants having been put forward as employees. 
Some thought that that outcome, as well as a certain amount of confusion during the placement 
process, could have been prevented, had Carana become involved earlier and emphasized the 
importance of job functions more strongly.23 Related, another person suggested that when 
positions requiring similar profiles became available with more than one business, applicants 
(rather than the program or agency) ought to be able to pick their preferred location; s/he 
expressed gratitude for the program, but wanted planners to know that options, where possible, 
would have also been appreciated. 
Job Training Levels Offered 
We observed that Jóvenes Comprometidos had placed a large number of its Salvadoran 
youth workers in American fast-food franchise operations. There were undoubtedly strategic 
advantages to this, particularly as the program began. Still, those were relatively low-skill jobs, 
                                                 
22 We found no official data that either confirmed or contradicted the interviewees' report. 
23 Carana, on the other hand, believed that not only had it been intensely involved in the selection process from the beginning, but that 
its involvement accounted for the high numbers of participants who obtained employment (Robert Brunn, personal communication). 
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requiring only limited capabilities. As work-based programs mature, the labor markets served by 
those programs should also mature and diversify. One stakeholder informed us that such a 
transition had begun to manifest itself toward the end of the program. More businesses were 
noticing the successes of program-affiliated businesses and began inquiring how they might also 
hire graduates. With sixteen different job/sector types to train for, that growing selection of 
career entry choices promised to increase the number of at-risk individuals who could find in 
Jóvenes Comprometidos a path to a worthwhile future.  
Cost effectiveness is a pivotal factor here, but once underway, programs should not 
overlook the potential value of training for increasingly specialized, high-value trades and skills, 
as well. For Jóvenes Comprometidos, funding was allocated to train individuals for general 
employment. At the right place and time, it could also be a good investment to allocate resources 
for training in more permanent, albeit still entry-level, professional and skill-based positions.  
Program documents and stakeholders declared the importance of building upon an 
individual’s existing skill set and characteristics. Yet the stakeholders we interviewed were 
drawn to the possibility that certifications and specialized skills, such as those in the information 
technology field, were so sought after that companies that avoided hiring, for example, 
individuals from certain regions would embrace those same individuals if they had those skills. 
Work-based programs might explore ways of offering eligible but hard-to-place youth with 
advanced training and employee development. Providing technological skillsets, meaningful 
certifications, and degrees in popular and up-and-coming labor markets, if adequately funded, 
could meet the needs of both employers and at-risk participants.  
Social and Cultural Development 
Stakeholders, including program participants, believed that the kinds of youth 
employment opportunities generated by Jóvenes Comprometidos would reduce the risk of 
becoming involved in crime and violence for Salvadoran youth. A program participant bluntly 
described the youths' perceived trade-off this way: Those who were gainfully employed by 
legitimate employers were less likely to "entertain" themselves with violence and crime as much 
as those who were unemployed; they were not as apt to be looking for ways simply to fill time. 
Some crime is committed out of economic need, but not all crime is. Based upon written and oral 
descriptions of Jóvenes Comprometidos, however, we found no direct efforts to change the 
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growing social norm of violence among Salvadoran youth, such as Project HOPE attempted to 
do with the culture of peace (see section 6). Life skills training that could offer alternatives to 
violence and intentionally reconstruct environments and attitudes to be conducive to peace and 
nonviolence could be integrated into future programs, leveraging the reductions in violence 
attributed to increasing at-risk youth employment opportunities.  
Follow-up after Program Completion 
Some interviewees encouraged the incorporation of a more rigorous follow-up process to 
track graduates' accomplishments. Learning whether or not graduates are successful would 
provide valuable data, and responding to the real-life obstacles encountered by graduates by 
improving program components should lead to higher participant success rates. Follow-up was 
not part of the initial plan for Jóvenes Comprometidos, but reportedly, shortly after it began, 30, 
60, and 90-day contacts with active participants became a requirement. Other interviewees could 
not confirm that schedule, but they agreed that some follow-up had occurred. An interesting 
finding:  As program graduates who had left their program-facilitated positions were contacted, a 
stakeholder related, "we discovered that they would get jobs with other companies on their own." 
The training acquired through the program was apparently proving useful for becoming 
employed beyond those companies directly participating in Jóvenes Comprometidos.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
For this report, we were dependent upon information published in program literature, 
interviews with stakeholders, a participant focus group, and other unofficial and sometimes 
conflicting sources. Although Jóvenes Comprometidos did collect the kinds of objective data 
useful for accurately reporting the number of recruits and of participants who graduated, were 
placed in jobs, remained in those jobs or found other jobs, or that would be needed to measure 
investments and outcomes, or to analyze the program's cost-effectiveness, it was not made 
available for this study.  
Future programs of this type should be designed with an evaluation process, including 
data collection. Analysis and reporting of such data are valuable for managing the program, 
supporting requests for funding, informing the public, and researching and reporting on the most 
cost-effective ways of solving social and economic problems. The lack of such information also 
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affected our ability to report on the distribution of program funds. Interviewees offered some 
anecdotal information about spending, but could not offer reliable documented data.  
Best Practices 
Jóvenes Comprometidos, especially in its second year, embodied several "best practices" 
worthy of replication in future programs. Among them were the following: 
 Invest in training. Settle for nothing less than quality, competency-based courses that 
are designed to prepared trainees for actual jobs, and use instructors who know the 
people, the environment, and the jobs and who are excellent motivators.  
 Form alliances with reliable businesses. Know their needs ("the profile") and recruit 
and train for them. Job placements based on employer profiles position youth for 
success. 
 Aim to make a positive impact on every youth's life, even for those who do not find 
immediate employment. Make opportunities to enhance their self-esteem, service 
focus, commitment to work and community, and verbal expressiveness. 
 Communicate who you are as a program, what you offer, and what is required to take 
part. Use social media to inform the public and to tell your success stories. Be the 
first to respond to inquiries from potential recruits. 
 Lower attrition rates by removing common obstacles. For example, this program 
provided transportation and a simple lunch, or stipends, when recruits could not 
manage such costs, but also could not afford to be late or absent or to come to class 
hungry.  
Areas for Improvement 
Finally, we observed three areas for potential improvement, the first two of which might 
strengthen advantageous community-program relations: 
1. Incorporate conflict-resolution training for community initiatives. 
2. Link job training with other community-level programs. 
3. Lengthen the course of training, and integrate it with GED studies, when including 
youth with less than a high school degree. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of the USAID Access to Employment program Jóvenes Comprometidos was to 
address broad social issues confronted by at-risk youth in El Salvador, at the core of which was 
their inability to attain legitimate employment. Throughout two years of operation, the program 
served more than 1,800 youth participants. Many reported having acquired more than the much-
needed jobs they were initially seeking; they had acquired work and social skills that would help 
them build a future. That success has been largely attributed to "the profile," a strategy for 
recruiting and selecting youth participants and companies who were well matched, and a major 
investment in a quality curriculum, effective instructors, and the use of social media to tell the 
story. One program participant reflected the experiences of many, telling us that "[I have] 
become a new person because of this process." 
The program began with several flaws, despite the research and thought that had gone 
into planning; that in itself could be considered a "lesson learned." Staff tracked their progress 
and reacted quickly when early results were poor. The changes they made led to far better 
outcomes for the classes that followed.  
Jóvenes Comprometidos' was among the most aggressive of the programs studied in 
considering its mission accomplished only when its participants obtained actual employment. It 
also worked more closely than most of those programs (excepting Sustainable Communities and 
Young Entrepreneurs) in forming partnerships with private businesses specifically for the 
purpose of actual job placement. The program's ranking among employment-based programs 
serving at-risk youth is not a question this study can answer. One could conclude from this study, 
however, that the program has much to offer as a model that has engaged both the public and 
private sector in a relatively effective effort to address serious social and economic problems in 
El Salvador. 
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Section 4.  PATI: Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso 
 
Kara V. Hannula 
 
 
In 1998, El Salvador began experiencing a major economic crisis that led to 
drastically rising unemployment rates. Over a decade later, in 2009, new leadership 
assumed the government of El Salvador and made it a priority to reduce the impact of 
that crisis with an initiative called the Global Anti-Crisis Plan.1 The initiative aimed to 
help individuals who lived in high poverty areas and who were in precarious economic 
positions. One program component of the plan, El Programa de Apoyo Temporal al 
Ingreso, or PATI, provided financial support and skills training for those most vulnerable 
members of the population.2 In addition to working toward improving economic 
conditions in El Salvador, the new government leaders developed the Universal Social 
Protection System, an initiative to increase collaboration between various government 
agencies in an attempt to address social problems through nationwide cooperation.3 PATI 
incorporated the goal of this initiative by encouraging participation in the program of 
local governments. A pilot phase of PATI was tested from 2009 to 2010, and then 
between 2010 and 2014, two additional phases were implemented.4 Funding for PATI 
was scheduled to end in December 2014; 5 at the time of this study, no plans were in 
place for program continuation in 2015.  
The information presented in this report was gathered by reviewing official 
program documents and previous program evaluations; interviewing program 
                                                 
1 Mario Ernesto Nóchez, Informe Final: Evaluación de Procesos del Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso (PATI) en 
los Municipios Pilotos (FISDL, 2010). 
2 FISDL, Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI (April 9, 2013): http://www.fisdl.gob.sv/temas-543/programas-
sociales/ pati#.VDl3Lul0wic. 
3 FISDL-CSU, Evaluación Operativa del Programa Inserción Productiva (2013); Nóchez, Informe Final. 
4 FISDL, Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI. 
5 World Bank, El Salvador-Income Support and Employability Project: Restructuring (Washington DC: World Bank, 
2013): http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18082027/el-salvador-income-support-employability-project-restructuring. 
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participants, administrators and fieldworkers; and observing operations at program sites. 
Program Description  
Program Development 
PATI was the new government's response to the Salvadoran employment and 
income crisis. The program evolved in three phases.6 In accord with national government 
initiatives in 2009, the pilot phase targeted rural areas. These were located in 11 
municipalities across El Salvador, especially those severely impacted by Hurricane IDA.7 
In 2010, a national study identified the urban areas in El Salvador with the most extreme 
poverty levels, resulting in the 2010 Map of Urban Poverty. This map was used at the 
start of phase two to identify and target 412 urban areas (referred to as AUPs—
Asentamento Urbano Precari, or precarious urban settlements) within 25 municipalities 
all across El Salvador. In 2012, the third phase of PATI was launched, targeting AUPs in 
10 municipalities.8 In total, 36 municipalities were served by the program, and more than 
500 staff members contributed to the execution of the program. 
PATI, initially funded by loans from El Salvador's national government and the 
World Bank, cost between $19 and $60 million9 per year to operate.10 Once the 
municipalities that were to be involved in the program were identified, those 
municipalities contributed local government funds to support it. In an attempt to continue 
the program, donations and grants were obtained from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID); that funding was pulled in December 201311 because, according 
to one stakeholder, some individuals who had received PATI payments were thought to 
                                                 
6 FISDL-CSU, Estado del Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI: Situación Después de 3 Años de 
Implementación, unpublished internal document (n.d.). 
7 Gloria Morán, “PATI se Extiende a Más Municipios,” Diario Digital ContraPunto (May 2, 2011).  
8 FISDL, Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI. 
9 All monetary amounts reported in this study are U.S. dollars (USD). 
10 International Labor Organization (ILO), Global Jobs Pact Country Scan: El Salvador (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO, 2012): 
http:// www.ilo.org/jobspact/country/country-scans/WCMS_178011/lang--en/index.htm; Robert Palacios, “A Conversation with 
Héctor Silva Arguello,” Inter-American Dialogue (July 6, 2011): http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2697. 
11 El Salvador Noticias.net, “USAID No Financiará Programa PATI en Seis Municipalidades de El Salvador” (September 
6, 2013): http://www.elsalvadornoticias.net/2013/09/06/usaid-no-financiara-programa-pati-en-seis-municipalidades-de-el-salvador/; 
and David Marroquín, “Gobierno Financiará Programa PATI,” Elsalvador.com (September 9, 2013): http://www.elsalvador.com/ 
mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=47859&idArt=8162285. 
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be gang members.12 Afterward, through 2014, El Salvador's national and local 
governments continued to fund the program with money supplied by the World Bank.13 
Program Objectives  
PATI's primary objectives were to temporarily supplement the incomes of those 
experiencing extreme poverty and joblessness and to improve the employability of 
program participants. In addition, the program had two secondary objectives: to improve 
coordination between the national government and local governments, and to enhance the 
capacity of local governments to improve the condition of their communities.14    
Target Population 
PATI prioritized aiding female heads-of-household and youth.15 Individuals from 
16 to 24 years old (or 30 years old, depending on the phase) were preferred, but anyone 
who satisfied the general inclusion criteria was accepted when space permitted. To be 
eligible, an individual needed to be at least 16 years old, to have resided in the targeted 
AUP for at least six months prior to enrollment, and not be formally employed or in 
school; participants, past or present, of in other similar programs were ineligible. Despite 
the prioritization criteria, PATI was highly inclusive and accepted participants of any 
gender, age, physical ability, sexual identity, or history of delinquent activity.16 No 
formal check was made for previous delinquencies, but if it was discovered that an 
applicant had previously violated the law or was a gang member, he or she still was not 
prohibited from participating.17  
As of October 2014, PATI had served 65,825 Salvadorans; 68% of them were of 
the targeted gender (female) and 38% were within the targeted age range (16-30 years). 
Through discussions with program participants, it became clear that many of them once 
                                                 
12 The author was unable to confirm that as the reason that the funding was withdrawn.  
13 Marroquín, “Gobierno Financiará Programa PATI"; World Bank, Restructuring. 
14 FISDL, "Crecimiento Económico para el Siglo 21 (Crecer 21),” Convenio de Donación de Alcance Limitado Proyecto 
Mitigación de los Efectos de la Crisis Financiera Global, Actividad No. 519.0462 (2014); and Youth Employment Inventory, 
“Income Support and Employability Program (PATI)” (n.d.): http://www.youth-employment-inventory.org/inventory/view/663/. 
15 FISDL, Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI. 
16 FISDL, "Crecimiento Económico para el Siglo 21." 
17 Cristian Meléndez, “750 Pandilleros Dentro del Programa PATI,” La Prensa Grafica (July 22, 2013). 
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had been employed, but had either been laid off or their self-employment was no longer 
sustainable. The majority of participants interviewed had completed high school, and 
some had completed additional courses (e.g., cosmetology, secretarial skills).  
Program Structure 
PATI was a six-month program in which participants were given $100 per month 
in exchange for attending vocational training courses and seminars and participating in 
community service projects.18 In the original program design, participants were to spend 
six hours a day, four days a week, in community service.19 The projects were intended to 
improve community conditions and to provide experiential skills training.  
Participants were also expected to spend one six-hour day each week in technical 
skills training and education courses. PATI did not directly help participants find 
employment, but it offered skill development courses and workshops, and occasional 
career counseling, to help them find their own employment or start their own businesses. 
Upon completing the program, participants were informed of other sources of help with 
finding work and of other government aid programs that emphasized securing 
employment. For example, some participants were accepted into USAID’s Improving 
Access to Employment Program (see section 3) after completing PATI. 
Program implementation seemed to vary by location, with local community 
leaders working in concert with executing agencies to tailor PATI to their area's specific 
needs. In practice, it appeared that the schedule of four days per week on community 
service projects and one day per week on skills training was not consistently followed. 
Some participants reported spending their first four months participating only in 
community service projects. As a result, the technical skills training component was 
concentrated toward the end of the six-month program, sometimes resulting in 8 or 10-
hour training days.20  
Citizen Participation 
                                                 
18 FISDL, Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso–PATI. 
19 ILO, Global Jobs Pact Country Scan. 
20 Laura María Cerritos Valle and Claudia Beatriz Ramírez Flores, Sistematización de Taller Evaluación 7o Convocatoria: 
Municipios Ida, Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local; Presidencia Funes Buenos Cambios (2014). 
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Participants were recruited for PATI through local authorities, and recruitment 
methods varied according to municipality. In some, announcements about the program 
were made at local town meetings. In others, flyers were passed around or the program 
was advertised by word of mouth. On occasion, program employees directly visited 
homes in the targeted areas. Some municipalities publicized PATI on their websites.21 
After interested community members signed up, teams from PATI visited the potential 
participants to conduct surveys that were used to determine vulnerability/level-of-need 
scores. The survey included items such as how much access to basic services an 
individual had, whether the head of household had a partner present, and the number of 
children or elderly people residing in the household. Once vulnerability scores were 
determined, individuals were prioritized based on level of need, and those at the top of 
the list were offered positions in the program.  
Typically, between 30 and 90 participants in each municipality would sign up. 
Multiple family members could enroll, as long as each met the inclusion criteria. Once 
they became active, participants were involved in most decision-making, helping to 
choose which courses would be offered, signing up for their preferred courses, and acting 
as project leaders. In general, individuals who started the program completed the 
program. Throughout all phases of the program, the retention rate remained consistently 
above 90%.22 The small number of individuals who prematurely left the program did so 
for various reasons, including lack of desire to perform community service work, moving 
out of the high-risk area, or having found legitimate employment.  
Coordination with Other Organizations 
Many different organizations, government offices, and programs worked together 
to develop and implement PATI. Those contributors included the Secretaria Tecnica de la 
Presidencia, FISDL, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Salvadoran Institute 
for Professional Training (INSAFORP, Instituto Salvadoreno de Formacion 
Professional), the Local Economic Development Unit (ADEL), the National Council for 
                                                 
21 E.g., Alcaldía Municipal de San Martín, Programa PATI (n.d.): http://www.sanmartin.gob.sv/ index.php/pati.html; and 
Alcaldía Puerto de la Libertad, El Salvador, “Proyecto PATI: Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso” (2015): 
http://alcaldialalibertad.com/proyecto-pati-2/. 
22 FISDL, "Crecimiento Económico para el Siglo 21.”  
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Micro and Small Enterprises (CONAMYPE), and mayors from all the involved 
municipalities.23 FISDL was primarily responsible for funding and overseeing the entire 
program, while INSAFORP and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare were 
responsible for managing and implementing the employment-related components.24  
INSAFORP provided technical skills trainings for PATI. INSAFORP is an 
independent organization financed by the private sector through a 1% payroll tax;25 it 
partners with social aid programs in El Salvador, as well as with PATI and Jóvenes 
Comprometidos (see section 3) to offer courses for various programs' participants.26 
Those courses are oriented toward teaching participants skills that will either enhance 
their employability or help them start their own businesses. INSAFORP worked with 
PATI staff and participants and local mayors to customize the courses being offered. 
Participants requested courses teaching skills they hoped to acquire, and mayors 
requested courses based on the economic needs of their communities. Efforts were made 
to link participants with UDEL and CONAMPYPE programs, which helped them start 
their own businesses. PATI was a complex program that effectively leveraged its 
resources by partnering with other established organizations.  
Within-program Coordination and Communication 
One FISDL employee noted that PATI lacked an explicit communication 
mechanism. The program relied on community liaisons to link the main FISDL office to 
various communities; liaisons were responsible for communicating between FISDL and 
local offices and also for helping the local offices to execute PATI initiatives. FISDL 
employees related that the different program offices sent reports to each other to provide 
progress updates. Although not explicitly cited by any program employees, the success of 
the program may in itself be considered some evidence of effective internal 
                                                 
23 FISDL-CSU, Conclusiones del Taller de Evaluación de la 5°Convocatoria Realizado con el Personal Operativo PATI, 
unpublished internal document (2014). 
24 ILO, Global Jobs Pact Country Scan; and INSAFORP, “Programa Apoyo Temporal Ingreso” (n.d.): 
http://www.insaforp.org.sv/ index.php/84-articulos-de-interes/239-programa-apoyo-temporal-ingreso-pati. 
25 World Bank, Competitiveness Enhancement Technical Assistance Project, Report No. T-6679-ES (El Salvador: 
Technical Annex, September 11, 1995): Http://Www-Wds.Worldbank.Org/Servlet/ Wdscontentserver/WDSP/IB/ 
1995/09/11/000009265_3961008060532/ Rendered/INDEX/Multi0page.Txt. 
26 INSAFORP, “Programa Apoyo Temporal Ingreso.” 
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communication practices.  
PATI had developed several methods for communicating with communities about 
the program. For example, a project called Reporters Development trained program 
participants to distribute news and photos representing the program. FISDL's Department 
of Communications disseminated success stories; those were reported at community 
events and in media reports in many municipalities.27 One final unique outlet for 
publicizing the program was the Patimanias, events at which program participants were 
recognized for their achievements. These ceremonies were effective at publicizing the 
achievements that were possible with participation in PATI.28 
Expected Outcomes 
PATI began with four anticipated outcomes: (1) increased financial stability for 
the most vulnerable members of the Salvadoran population, (2) enhanced employability 
for participants, (3) improved coordination between national and local governments, and 
(4) empowered and more effective local governments.29 In addition, however, several 
other unexpected positive outcomes were observed during the first two phases; these 
outcomes later were integrated as formal program objectives or informal expectations for 
phase three. First, program staff reported that community service projects had improved 
the community environment structurally and interpersonally; improving community 
conditions became a formal program objective by phase three, with the expected 
outcomes being improved community environments, increased social interactions, 
increased trust among community members, increased feelings of security in the 
communities, and reduced violence. Second, although not related to an explicit program 
objective, program staff suggested that PATI had improved participants’ self-efficacy, 
and they came to expect that participants would experience improved self-esteem and 
mood and to gain a sense of empowerment as a result of taking part in program activities 
                                                 
27 E.g., Alcaldía Municipal de San Salvador, “Capitalinos se Gradúan del Proyecto Huertos Comunitarios del Programa 
PATI” (May 7, 2014): http://www.sansalvador.gob.sv/ noticias-institucionales/news/noticias/capitalinos-se-graduan-del-proyecto-
huertos-comunitarios-del-programa-pati.html. 
28 FISDL-CSU, Estado del Programa. 
29 Youth Employment Inventory. “Income Support and Employability Program."  
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and trainings.30 PATI's effectiveness in achieving those outcomes is discussed below. 
Program Effectiveness 
Between 2008 and 2009, more than 100,000 Salvadorans, nearly half of them 
between the ages of 16 and 24, were unemployed.31 PATI was initiated to address this 
economic crisis by aiding individuals who were experiencing the highest levels of 
poverty and unemployment. Initially, PATI served 1,346 participants, budgeting an 
average for each of $600 in direct payments over six months and $200 for training.32 The 
program was funded in the amount of  $1,099,10033 to cover their participation in 27 
community projects and 70 training courses, at an average cost per person of $816.57. In 
its final year of operation, 6,420 individuals were served at an average cost of $770 each 
(a total of $3,661,400 in TMC and an additional $200/person for training).34  
To determine whether PATI was effective, met its objectives, and produced the 
expected outcomes, information on program operation was gathered from two sources. 
First, I solicited the personal opinions of program stakeholders and participants 
("interviewees") on the program's effectiveness. Next, I reviewed findings from three 
official evaluation reports:  the first evaluated portions of the pilot phase, the second 
evaluated portions of phase two, the third evaluated the program's overall success. The 
reliance on both personal opinion and formal reports to evaluate program effectiveness 
contributes to the validity of any findings that consistently appear across those various 
sources. In addition, a logic model of the program is provided in appendix A, illustrating 
both the anticipated and observed goals and outcomes of the project. 
Stakeholder Opinions of Impact 
                                                 
30 Ideally, participant insertion in the labor market would increase following participation in PATI, but PATI does not 
claim to directly help with the employment insertion process. Rather, PATI was formed with the intention of providing participants 
with skills to begin a job search. Thus, new employment levels should not be considered as a direct measure of program success. 
31 FISDL-CSU, Evaluacíon Operative. 
32 Evaluación Inserción Productiva-PATI II, 5. Although the effort is made to be consistent when reporting costs and 
benefits, numbers may differ somewhat throughout the study when they have been differently reported by various sources. 
33 Distributed as $807,600 in Conditional Cash Transfers (TMC), $67,500 for municipality administrative expenses, and 
$224,000 for training expenses.  
34 CRE Final Report CRS to USAID (30 junio 2014), 3. Numbers may differ, depending on source. 
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From stakeholder and participant interviews, it appeared that the program had met 
some of its objectives and had produced not only the expected outcomes, but certain 
other unanticipated positive outcomes, as well. The four program participants interviewed 
acknowledged the importance of the income supplement component of the program, but 
they rarely mentioned it as a direct benefit; rather, they focused on the utility of the 
training programs and community service projects. Participants and other stakeholders 
were most focused on how the program had resulted in changes within communities and 
led to personal growth. In addition, stakeholders discussed how the program had 
improved government coordination and increased the capacity of local governments to 
aid community members.  
Community Impacts: Infrastructure, Social Cohesion, and Violence Reduction 
The community service projects were designed to improve community 
infrastructure and appearance, while providing community members with new skills. 
Participants and program staff described how the projects rebuilt and restored buildings, 
cleaned up neighborhoods, and contributed to community beautification through projects 
such as mural painting. Interviewees also described unanticipated benefits, such as 
altered perspectives regarding community cooperation and improved community 
relations. One fieldworker explained how working for the community gave participants a 
sense of ownership in the community; they began caring about their community in ways 
they previously had not. Another related that the major mechanism for change had been 
providing community members with a shared goal and sense of purpose. As a result of 
the program, communities had become more integrated. The program afforded 
participants the opportunity to develop bonds with their neighbors. Program participants 
emphasized how much they valued the many relationships that were developed through 
participation in the program. Overall, the community service component not only 
improved community conditions, but also gave rise to social cohesion.  
Program employees observed that youths in the program had begun treating adults 
in the community with more respect after working with them and learning from them 
during community service projects. These new ways of interacting and the resulting 
social cohesion were thought to have affected delinquency and violence levels within the 
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communities. Although the program was not designed to reduce delinquency or violence, 
both staff overseeing the implementation and follow-up of the program and all program 
participants perceived changes in that area.35 Community members who previously had 
remained largely isolated from one another, or had even engaged in hostilities, began 
developing new and kinder ways of interacting. One program participant believed that the 
violence reduction had not only occurred between community members, but that it had 
actually begun and was concentrated within families. Overall, the reduced violence 
seemed to stem from improvements in communication skills among family and 
community members.  
Three other mechanisms may also have been responsible for some change in 
levels of violence. First, the participants believed that had many of the youth not been in 
the program, many of them could have become gang members. Second, one fieldworker 
suggested that providing productive activities for unemployed non-students, as they 
prepared for employment, had reduced delinquency. Finally, and possibly most 
importantly, the program was thought by some to have altered the values of the 
participants toward tolerance, acceptance, equality, and fairness. One fieldworker 
observed that prior to participating in the program, community members often would be 
hostile toward one another, especially when they did not understand each other’s 
differences. Working together on community projects, those same individuals developed 
respect and empathy and learned to accept each other’s differences. One fieldworker saw 
this change most clearly demonstrated in the quality of interactions between able-bodied 
persons and their handicapped peers.  
One program employee reinforced that observation, explaining how the lack of 
experience in a school environment for many of the program's youth had left them 
initially intolerant of differences.36 The liaison explained that having not been in school 
left some children lacking positive role models and the presence of a positive socializing 
institution in their lives. The situation was bound to leave many living in ignorance, 
                                                 
35 FISDL-CSU, Conclusiones del Taller. 
36 When questioned about the lack of time youth spent in a school environment, the community liaison explained that a 
large proportion of children were not attending school in El Salvador. Children who were enrolled in schools in neighborhoods largely 
controlled by gang members would stop attending due to the legitimate fear of experiencing violence while commuting. 
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lacking social values, and lacking hope for the future. This program could be a vehicle 
for bringing diverse youth into contact with one another and other community members 
and, in doing so, could help to fill the traditional role of the school in socializing and 
instilling positive values in them as members of the larger community.   
Individual Change 
Interviewing stakeholders and program participants, it became clear that not only 
did some individuals benefit in the targeted area (gaining technical skills to improve 
employability), but they also experienced personal growth in terms of improved self-
esteem and altered values.  
Technical skills and enhanced employability.  Engaging in classes offered by 
INSAFORP, PATI participants acquired skills intended either to improve their 
employability or to enable them to start independent businesses.37 A sample of four 
participants (the number interviewed) can hardly be said to represent the experiences of 
65,000 or so participants, but those four interviewees each expressed that they thought 
the technical training would directly helped them with the job insertion process. They 
also noted the usefulness of resume writing and interview skills workshops offered by the 
Ministry of Labor. The trainings were effective at providing participants with marketable 
skills, but perhaps more important, participants gained the confidence needed to navigate 
the labor market and offer their talents and abilities in job interviews. It should be noted, 
however, that at the time of our interviews, none of interviewees had finished the 
program nor had they yet attempted to find employment. Thus, their view that the 
program was effective for increasing their employability was based on expectation rather 
than experience.  
PATI staff noted the absence of any comprehensive formal follow up of program 
participants, making it difficult to determine how many were successfully employed after 
completing the program. One program staff member noted that in a small follow-up 
project of 3,000 participants, over one third (n=1,250) had become self-employed, 
suggesting that a substantial number of participants did use skills developed during the 
program to start their own businesses.   
                                                 
37 FISDL-CSU, Conclusiones del Taller. 
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Community service projects also were effective vehicles for developing skills. For 
example, many participants worked on creating and maintaining small farms, learning 
how to prepare the land and take care of various crops. Farming skills are needed in El 
Salvador; the community liaison mentioned that some areas of El Salvador are 
experiencing food shortages, and providing program participants with farming knowledge 
could not only give individuals a means to generate income, but would help alleviate a 
larger social problem.  
Although most interviewees were positive about the program's usefulness in 
teaching skills that would increase employability, one program employee believed the 
program suffered from a lack of direction and that some of the courses were not aligned 
with local economic needs or provided only a cursory overview of some skill sets, not 
enough to qualify participants for new jobs. The four participants interviewed, on the 
other hand, said that they were satisfied, although again I note that those respondents had 
not yet completed the PATI program.  
Personal growth.  The theme of increasing confidence, self-esteem, and self-
efficacy was common throughout the interviews. The training courses, community 
service projects, and even the structure of the program itself worked together toward that 
end. The technical skills training component gave participants confidence in their ability 
to secure and retain the jobs they desired or to start their own businesses; they began 
pursuing employment options that they previously would not have considered. Thus, the 
skills training component acted as a catalyst for an effective job search or successful 
entrepreneurship by providing the necessary confidence to take action in those directions.  
The community service component was thought to increase self-esteem by 
altering participants’ positions within their communities. All participant interviewees 
remarked on having become or anticipating becoming role models. The youth in the 
program also seemed to experience personal growth through participation in arts and 
culture classes. Finally, PATI promoted active decision-making processes that appeared 
to be another means of empowering program participants. By contributing to decisions 
related to the courses that would be offered and serving as project leaders, participants 
found that they could take initiative and lead others. The practice of acting as a project 
leader was particularly beneficial for women who as a group generally had had little 
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leadership experience. This consistently observed outcome of personal growth in phases 
one and two resulted in slightly altered objectives and expected outcomes for phase three 
of PATI—that is, in phase three, enhancing self-esteem became a more formal program 
objective. 
Government Coordination 
PATI staff members noted that the program had encouraged improvements in 
communication and coordination between the national and local governments and had 
helped to empower local governments to aid their own communities. Program operation 
became decentralized; local government began operating PATI without relying solely on 
national government funding. Additionally, members of local governments and 
communities had been given the power to determine which community interventions they 
needed most, and they could decide how to execute those. For example, throughout the 
progressive phases of PATI, FISDL improved its coordination with INSAFORP. 
INSAFORP also partnered with mayors to provide and update courses that were 
specifically designed to meet the unique needs of each municipality. The improved 
coordination between various government and non-government agencies increased their 
efficiency and should be considered an effective use of program resources.  
Implementation Difficulties 
When asked about difficulties experienced in delivering the program, participants 
offered very little input. They did not identify any challenges and made only two 
recommendations for program improvement: to allow participants to take multiple 
training courses, and to provide more follow up with participants after the program 
ended. Program staff, on the other hand, did offer feedback about challenges they had 
faced involving the development of community projects—specifically, their uncertainties 
about the ideal target population, how to address the needs of the heterogeneous 
participants, and the effects of the difficult economic climate. They noted that the 
development of community projects had initially been challenging, and that even once 
initiated, the projects had not been tracked. Those challenges appeared to stem from 
difficulties with identifying appropriate projects and with coordinating among the 
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multiple agencies involved. As fieldworkers gained experience, they became more adept 
at coordinating, executing, and tracking community projects.  
Depending on whom I was speaking with, the exclusion criteria were either too 
restrictive or not restrictive enough. Some program staff believed that including both 
youth and elderly participants in the program proved challenging. The youth seemed 
apathetic toward community service and were not consistently motivated to participate. 
Further, the extreme range of pre-existing skill levels among the heterogeneous 
participants created problems. For example, including some of the younger participants in 
certain training courses slowed the progress for the rest of the class, and certain 
community service projects were too physically demanding for some elderly participants.  
Finally, the general economic climate of El Salvador created difficulties for the 
program. The exact social problems that PATI intended to address (high levels of poverty 
and economic insecurity) complicated the program's operations. For example, with some 
program participants not having bank accounts, finding ways to pay them initially 
presented a problem.38 Also, the more basic technical skills training had been insufficient 
to equip some participants to begin successful job searches. Besides, PATI was not 
designed to help participants complete their high school educations, and many employers 
were requiring applicants to have at least a high school diploma. 
Formal Evidence of Impact 
Three formal evaluations of PATI were reviewed during this study, each of which 
summarized PATI’s effectiveness during a different time frame. The evaluation of the 
pilot phase39 had identified several weaknesses and suggested areas of improvement for 
the next phase. The evaluators of the pilot phase found that: 
 Not all participants were interested in the courses offered;  
 Some participants were too young to participate in the courses; 
 Program staff needed a more effective method for diagnosing training needs; 
 Training courses were not linked to the economic needs of the municipalities;  
 Training courses were too short;  
                                                 
38 Palacios, “A Conversation."  
39 Nóchez, Informe Final. 
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 The program needed a better developed self-employment component; and 
 Many participants lacked the appropriate background to secure jobs (e.g., high 
school graduate, prior experience, recommendations) and were unable to 
qualify for employment, regardless of having completed the skills training.  
 
Evaluators of PATI's second phase administered surveys to a sample of program 
participants and a control group at three intervals: before starting the program, 
immediately after finishing the program, and 12 months after having finished the 
program.40 Evaluators found that compared with the control group, participants felt more 
prepared to look for employment and establish a business at both points after finishing 
the program, although they were not employed at a higher rate at those intervals, nor 
were they earning higher average incomes, nor did the program appear to have had a 
significant long-lasting effect on their self-esteem.  
The phase-two report suggested that PATI had met its main goal, reducing the 
level of extreme poverty of the most vulnerable. Also, consistent with the findings of the 
first report and the opinions of interviewees, the evaluation suggested that training should 
be more effectively tailored to the unique needs of program participants. Further, the 
evaluators recommended adding different kinds of training programs, such as a life skills 
or basic education modules to help improve employability, self-esteem, and mood. 
A presentation on the final impact assessment of PATI indicated that from 2009 
to 2014, the program had ultimately produced several notable successes.41 PATI 
contributed to an increase in labor force participation among program participants, 
although that increase was observable only for young female participants with at least a 
9th grade education. Seventy-eight percent of those surveyed agreed that the training was 
useful for developing business plans; however, nearly half indicated that the training 
needed improvement. Suggestions included offering longer and more in-depth trainings, 
                                                 
40 Carlos Guillermo Ramos, Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, Ligia Fuentes, and Ana Margarita Montoya, "Proyecto de 
Investigacion: Evaluación del Programa Comunidades Solidarias Desde las Valoraciones de los Actores Claves," Los Casos de Los 
Letona (San Martín), San Agustín y San Francisco Javier (Usulután) (El Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 
2012). 
41 Margarita Beneke de Sanfeliú, “Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social; Investigación y 
Estadisticas,” Evaluación Programa “Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso” (PATI) (2014). 
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providing access to more resources and materials for skill development and community 
service projects, and operating with more flexible hours.  
In addition to its minor successes in the employment component, PATI effectively 
changed community dynamics. Specifically, civil participation (engagement in 
community organizations and occupation of community leadership roles) increased to a 
small degree after participating in PATI; participants involved in community 
organizations increased from 6.8% to 7.5%;42 those holding leadership positions 
increased from 8.5% to 11.3%, and individuals participating in community projects more 
than doubled, increasing from 15.5% to 38.8%.  
The final comprehensive evaluation report concluded that, overall, the program 
appeared to be meeting its main objectives.43 The effect of the financial aid component of 
the program still was visible at one year past program completion—that is, the impact of 
the $100 payments on reducing poverty levels was observed among program participants 
even 12 months after the payments had ceased. Also, the method of targeting participants 
was particularly successful; using the poverty map to geographically target the most 
vulnerable members of the El Salvador population was an effective tactic.  
The evaluators concluded that the major program weaknesses were in the 
technical training component. The content did not adequately teach needed skills, the 
quality of the courses was not high (e.g., too little time was spent for training to produce 
any substantial knowledge), and some participants reported being unprepared to start a 
job search after training ended. This significance of this finding was that the program had 
left the majority of participants without the means to continue to sustain themselves, after 
their participation in the program ended. As an employment program, then, PATI missed 
an important opportunity to serve as a real bridge from impoverishment to gainful 
employment.  
                                                 
42 Although those percentages suggested a small change, the evaluators had not tested for statistical significance. It is 
unlikely that a 0.7% increase in participation indicated a statistically significant change—that is, it is possible that this observation was 
due to chance and not program effects.  
43 Beneke de Sanfeliú, Informe Final;" Margarita Beneke de Sanfeliú, “Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo 
Económico y Social; Investigación y Estadisticas.” Evaluación de Impacto del Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso (PATI): 
Resumen Ejecutivo (2014).  
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Contrary to reports from interviewees, the evaluators also found that participants 
were neither empowered in terms of increased self-esteem nor did they report elevated 
moods after completing the program. It was challenging for participants to be in a high-
support situation for six months, financially and socially, and then abruptly to lose that 
support. Additionally, the report noted that a life skills component had been included in 
earlier versions of the program, although neither prior evaluations nor interviewed 
stakeholders had mentioned that. One final and surprising finding of this report, and one 
that contradicted the reports of interviewees, was that perceptions of safety among 
program participants had decreased. The evaluators were unsure of the cause of this 
change in perception, as they had anticipated that increased social cohesion would lead to 
reduced violence and a sense of security in the neighborhoods participating in PATI; this 
outcome suggests a direction for additional research. Overall, and consistent with prior 
evaluations, the program evaluators recommended more flexibility in terms of the courses 
offered, tailoring those courses to the specific needs of the participants, and placing more 
emphasis on providing more basic education. 
* * * 
When assessing program effectiveness, conclusions differed in accord with the 
source and medium of the information collected. Active participants, staff members, and 
other stakeholders provided highly positive reports of the program’s success when 
interviewed. The formal evaluations I reviewed were much more likely than interviewees 
to provide concrete evidence of claims. One possible reason for that discrepancy is that 
the interviewed participants had not yet completed the program:  Their assessments were 
based on anticipated success in the job market once having completed training, while 
participants surveyed in the evaluation reports had completed PATI and had attempted to 
enter the job market.  
As the final evaluation suggested, perceptions of the program's effectiveness may 
have been less positive among those who had moved on and were attempting to use their 
newly acquired skills to establish a steady income, while no longer receiving the 
supplemental income. The program's support ended abruptly, without a transition or 
follow up, and that may have altered how participants perceived its overall effectiveness. 
Despite those differences, however, PATI had met many of its more important objectives 
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and when it did not, it attempted to adapt its practices to try to meet them better. 
It is important to consider the cost of meeting those objectives. Unfortunately, this 
researcher was unable to locate complete official records of PATI's budget and 
expenditures. Without that data, it was nearly impossible to determine the program's cost-
effectiveness. As mentioned above, various sources offered estimates ranging between 
$19 million and $60 million per year,44 aiding on average about 13,000 individuals per 
year, not all of whom completed the training, although they may have benefitted in other 
ways. Also mentioned above, PATI evaluations indicated that the average cost per 
participant (possibly only for those who completed training) was $800 or less, depending 
on the year, including the stipend, community service projects, and training.45  
Replication  
PATI was a complex and expensive nationwide program; it is unlikely that a 
community organization would be capable of securing the funds necessary to provide 
immediate financial support to a large portion of El Salvador's population or to serve the 
wide of range of individuals, geographically and in terms of diversity, that PATI did. 
Thus, any replication of the program is likely to be carried out, once again, by the 
national El Salvador Government.  
As mentioned above, funding for the most recent phase of PATI expired in 
December 2014.46 The national government may wish to repeat this program should 
another similar economic crisis be experienced in El Salvador. That is, PATI may be a 
useful social aid tool to employ if El Salvador once again finds itself in a situation in 
which large portions of the population are unemployed, living in poverty, and in need of 
immediate financial assistance. However, the national government would need to secure 
the funds necessary to provide the immediate cash hand-outs, and several adjustments to 
program operation would be needed to ensure optimal success. 
                                                 
44 ILO, Global Jobs Pact Country Scan; Palacios, “A Conversation with Héctor Silva Arguello.” Palacios claimed that 
PATI cost $40-$60 million dollars per year, while the ISO website claimed that the budget for two years was $37.7 million. The exact 
budget is unknown and likely differed from phase to phase as the source of funding changed. 
45 CRE Final Report, CRS to USAID, 3. 
46 World Bank, Restructuring. 
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Sustainability 
Two aspects of program sustainability may be examined: the ability to maintain 
the necessary resources for continued operation, and the ability to create long lasting 
change in participants and their communities. According to at least one stakeholder, 
sustainability in any form was not a program priority. Rather, the program set as its goal 
to aid a specific number of individuals; once that goal was met, it was expected that the 
program would be discontinued. Its purpose was to immediately alleviate the financial 
strain on the most vulnerable members of the population caused by national economic 
problems, while providing them with some skills that could be of help in gaining future 
employment.  
Operational Sustainability 
PATI was able to secure funds and human resources needed to operate for five 
years. The program ended in 2014 when the goal of aiding 72,571 members of the El 
Salvadoran population was nearly reached. Funding for the program to continue in 2015 
was not secured, and the high cost of operating PATI certainly limited its sustainability. 
One stakeholder suggested that communities might develop methods for fully funding the 
program at the local level. At the time of this study, in fact, local offices were continuing 
to carry out some forms of the program, relying on their own funds supplemented by 
FISDL.47  
Outcome Sustainability 
PATI offered quick aid to the most at-risk individuals in El Salvador, but without 
effecting long-lasting change. PATI did incorporate employment components that could 
have effected long-lasting change (specifically, increasing students technical skills and 
knowledge), but the training fell short of adequately preparing individuals for obtaining 
real jobs. It appeared that in practice, PATI did not prioritize training programs and 
community service programs that matched real employment opportunities.   
The only evaluation to capture long-term effects had surveyed participants one 
                                                 
47 Had they been able to operate without FISDL’s help, they might have increased sustainability still further; local 
governments could then have executed their respective programs as local conditions warranted. 
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year after program completion.48 That evaluation showed that at the one-year mark, 
participants who had received payments were in a better financial position than members 
of a control group; the proportion of their participants whose incomes continued to 
increase after the program is unknown. Thus, it is unclear for how long and how large an 
effect the financial and training components had on program participants. 
Program staff members acknowledged the lack of activities or mechanisms to 
guarantee the sustainability of project results. After six months of program involvement, 
participants were released without further contact or support; community service projects 
ended, income support ceased, and job training ended without any certain job prospects. 
One program employee acknowledged the value of engaging in projects that community 
members potentially could continue after their official stay in the program. For example, 
starting farms was a valuable and potentially sustainable community service project; 
community members would benefit from such farms well past the termination of the 
program. Choosing community service projects that developed community infrastructure 
would be one method for enhancing the long-term impact of the program, but few of the 
program's community service projects (outside of the farming projects) did so. The 
liaison also noted that had the program focused on developing individuals who could 
become pillars and leaders in their communities, the efforts and goals of PATI could have 
continued to be carried out by those individuals.  
Longer lasting impacts may have been experienced relative to the program's 
secondary objectives. All program staff members interviewed perceived that PATI had 
improved coordination between national and local governments and increased the 
capacity of local governments to address their communities’ needs. PATI provided 
technical assistance and training to municipal officials and technicians, and project 
monitors and municipal coordinators gained experience in developing relationships with 
communities.49 Thus, PATI successfully enhanced the ability of project and government 
employees to work with community members, skills that would certainly be useful 
beyond the life of PATI. 
                                                 
48 Beneke de Sanfeliú, Informe Final.  
49 Valle and Flores, Municipios Ida. 
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Recommendations 
Best Practices 
The interviewees brought attention to several practices that seemed significantly 
related to PATI's successes and that would be beneficial in any future implementation of 
PATI or another social aid program.  
 Locate and directly contact potential participants (the poverty map). Rather 
than waiting for potential participants to seek help, the program used an 
instrument (the poverty map) to identify and approach those individuals;50 in 
this way, the program ensured that it was effectively using its resources to 
help that portion of the Salvadoran population most in need of such help.  
 Maintain an adaptive and flexible operating plan and tailor services to 
communities' respective needs. Local governments were consulted about the 
specific needs of each community, and when evidence indicated that a 
particular practice or workshop was not effective, program staff worked to 
alter that. 
 Empower participants with decision-making and leadership opportunities. 
PATI was effective at empowering participants, engaging them in making 
program decisions and appointing them to leadership roles. For example, 
rotating participant leaders led community service projects in which they 
learned to manage infrastructure, resources, time, and people, and developed 
their skills, confidence, and sense of self-efficacy. As discussed previously, 
this appeared to be one of the key mechanisms explaining individual change 
within the program.  
Areas for Improvement 
Should another phase of PATI be initiated, certain weaknesses of the program 
should be addressed: 
 Training courses needed to last longer and to be matched with real jobs in 
                                                 
50 Beneke de Sanfeliú, Informe Final. 
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local labor markets.51 In addition, community service projects could have been 
better planned for learning and practicing marketable skills and abilities. 
 Basic education courses were needed by many of the participants, some of 
whom had never held a writing utensil before entering the program, including 
courses to increase literacy and to help participants develop alternative values 
(e.g., reinforcing tolerance and diversity understanding); also, sexual health 
and reproductive education courses would be useful. 
 Serving the heterogeneous (in terms of age, skill level, and physical ability) 
group of at-risk individuals proved overwhelming.52 It would have been useful 
to develop age, sex, and ability-specific courses and community service 
projects to more effectively meet the needs of all the individuals. 
Alternatively, the program could have restricted its inclusion criteria.  
 Rather than abruptly ending six months of support, a future program might 
design a transitional exit for participants that could include follow up, linkages 
with other community resources and support, and limited assistance in 
troubleshooting commonly encountered problems. (Following up with those 
who have completed the program would also make it more possible to assess 
the program's effectiveness.) 
Conclusion 
PATI was a government-sponsored program initiated to relieve the burden of 
poverty on the most vulnerable citizens of El Salvador during a severe national economic 
crisis. In exchange for participating in technical skills training (to improve employability) 
and community service projects full-time for six months, about 65,000 adults of all ages 
received $100 a month. PATI was partially successful in meeting its objectives, 
producing not only some of the more important anticipated outcomes, but also some 
unplanned positive outcomes.  
The primary goal, to provide financial aid to vulnerable Salvadorans, was met; as 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 Margarita Beneke de Sanfeliú, Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social. Evaluación de Impacto 
del Programa PATI. PowerPoint slides (July 23, 2013.) 
 
    54 
of October 2014, of the anticipated 75,581 eligible individuals, more than 65,000 
individuals received between $100 and $600 in monthly payments, depending on how 
long they stayed in the program. In an attempt to meet the second program objective, 
increasing participant employability, those who received the payments also attended 
skills training courses. Although most participants completed training courses, those 
courses did not consistently provide the skills that participants needed to find and secure 
jobs. Further, community service projects also failed to significantly enhance participants' 
marketable skills and abilities. 
With respect to secondary objectives, although program staff whom I interviewed 
had observed and described such successes, formal program evaluations did not provide 
concrete evidence of local governments becoming more empowered to help local 
communities or of intergovernmental coordination and communications having 
improved. The program's most significant benefit of the program, its ability to improve 
community relations and instigate personal growth, was unrelated to the original 
objectives of the program. 
As mentioned above, the program is thought to have assisted an average of about 
13,000 individuals per year (65,825 individuals over five years), not all of whom 
completed the training. Some of the needed improvements related to better preparing 
participants for employment after the stipend ends would simply require using better 
judgment (or "lessons learned," e.g., matching training to real job opportunities) in 
executing existing program components, and therefore should not add to program costs. 
Other improvements, such as lengthening the time spent in skills workshops and 
following up to potentially assist participants who encounter employment roadblocks 
after completing the program would suggest the need for more investment. The cost 
estimates used here are wide ranging and based on inexact data, as noted above; before 
any judgments on cost-effectiveness are made, the actual program budget should be 
examined closely. 
Ultimately, PATI as it existed from 2009 through 2014 could be best described as 
a community development program and secondarily a work force development program, 
with a financial support element. Project staff noted that the most impressive outcomes of 
the program related to an increase in the social cohesiveness of communities involved 
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and a resulting social climate of reduced conflict and increasing cooperation.  
In sum, PATI was an expensive, but moderately effective program. If it were 
feasible to obtain the funding to support its continuation and enhancement, it would seem 
to be a worthwhile endeavor. With the several modifications suggested within this report, 
PATI could become highly successful, useful for aiding members of the El Salvador 
population living in extreme levels of poverty and unemployment. Perhaps the most 
critical of those modifications would be (1) to match skills training courses to local labor 
needs and to provide adequate skill development to prepare participants for job searches 
(e.g., see section 3, USAID Improved Access to Employment Program), (2) to develop 
program activities appropriate for the diverse range of participants, and (3) to incorporate 
follow up and transitional support for participants beyond their official stay in the 
program. 
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Appendix A:  PATI Logic Model 
SITUATION - Problem: Employment crisis in El Salvador, high levels of extreme poverty. 
Objectives: 
1. Provide temporary income support to the most vulnerable members of El Salvador population 
2. Increase employability  
3. Improve community environment 
4. Increase coordination between local and national governments and community 
 
INPUTS ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS OUTCOMES/IMPACT 
   INITIAL INTERMEDIATE LONG-TERM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	
	
Grants and Loans: 
-World Bank 
-USAID 
-ES local governments 
-ES national government 
Participating 
Organizations: 
-FISDL 
-INSAFORP 
-UDEL 
-ES local governments 
-Ministry of Labor and 
Social Welfare 
-Secretaria Tecnica de la 
Presidencia 
(over 500 individuals 
contributing to 
development and 
implementation) 
Payments: 
$100/month for 6 mo 
Community Service 
Projects: 
-farming 
-cleaning up 
community 
 
Skills Training 
Courses: 
-career guidance 
-resume writing and 
interviewing skills 
-technical skills 
(baking, cooking, 
leather-working, 
computer repair) 
 
 
 
65,825 participants 
paid*  
65,825 participants 
received training*  
Improved Community 
Conditions 
Families temporarily 
increase income 
Enhanced self-esteem 
and sense of self-
efficacy 
Change in attitude 
about community 
cooperation 
New job skills 
obtained 
Cleaner environment 
Reduction in 
community conflict 
Improved collective efficacy 
Pursue new 
employment 
opportunities 
/start personal 
business 
Reorient focus from 
self to community 
Successful insertion 
into labor market 
Sustained community 
cohesion 
Reduction in violence 
and delinquency 
Enhanced coordination between government agencies 
Enhanced capacity of local governments to address local needs 
*As of October 2014 - bold boxes indicate anticipated outcomes.
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Section 5.  Jóvenes Constructores 
 
Courtney Riggs 
 
In 2010, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in partnership with several Salvadoran agencies 
implemented Jóvenes Constructores, one of a handful of programs initiated by the alliance to 
help youth complete their educations, develop adult life skills, and obtain employment.1 
Salvadoran youth who leave school before graduating or who face discrimination for living in 
troubled urban communities are generally excluded from consideration for traditional job 
openings, which are scarce in the current economy. Growing up in the country's violent social 
environment and lacking legitimate employment opportunities, too many of El Salvador’s young 
citizens now want to leave the country.2 Jóvenes Constructores, modeled on YouthBuilders, a 
U.S. program that teaches American youth marketable leadership and job skills,3 was initially 
funded through March 2014 by USAID. Since then, Glasswing, a local partner agency, has 
continued to operate the program at one site with funding from a USAID-funded initiative, 
SolucionES. For the current study, it was reviewed CRS and Jóvenes Constructores documents 
and annual reports. It was also visited the program operated by Glasswing on site, and were 
interviewed program graduates, CRS staff, and Glasswing field workers. 
Program Description 
Jóvenes Constructores set out to increase at-risk Salvadoran youths' social and economic 
opportunities by creating pathways to leadership, service, and employment opportunities. 
Program staff aim to prepare each participant for returning to school, for obtaining a job, and/or 
                                                 
1 For additional information on CRS, see Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 2013 Annual Report: Give Us This Day (2014): 
annualreport.crs.org; also, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Mission of Catholic Relief Services: Mission Statement (2015): http://www.crs.org/ 
about/mission-statement/. 
2 See Andrade-Eekhoff for further discussion. 
3 CRS, Give Us This Day; YouthBuild International, Building Communities. Building Lives, “El Salvador/Guatemala/Nicaragua/ Honduras” 
(2011): http://youthbuildinternational.org/el-salvador-guatemala-nicaragua-honduras; YouthBuild International, Building Communities. Building 
Lives, “Our Work,” online pamphlet (2011): http://youthbuildinternational.org/our-work; and YouthBuild International, YouthBuild Bulletin 
(International Issue, Autumn 2011): 2-3, 6, https://youthbuild.org/sites/youthbuild.org/files/ email_images/ 
2011/11/953/YouthBuild_Bulletin_2011.pdf.  
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for starting his or her own business. For program purposes, "at-risk youth" refers to young males 
and females from troubled communities, aged 16 to 25 years,4 who do not attend school and do 
not have a legitimate job.  
The entire program takes five months (5 days a week, for a total of 400-800 hours) to 
complete. Each student is exposed to components that will help advance his or her education, life 
skills, community service experience, and vocational and entrepreneurial opportunities. A 
common theme across those components is leadership development: Students are taught and 
encouraged to exercise leadership skills as they lead discussions, participate in conflict 
resolution, carry out administrative responsibilities, and participate in a variety of other 
activities.5   
Program participants under age 18 are strongly encouraged to complete high school, as 
most employers will not even consider applicants who have not yet graduated. Employment 
training and opportunities are the primary attraction for many applicants who have heard about 
Jóvenes Constructores from others in their communities. Traditional entry-level jobs tend to be 
low-skill minimum-wage positions, but many have opportunities for advancement. To maximize 
students' competitiveness in the real job market, Jóvenes Constructores monitors local 
employers’ needs and creates skill-based training modules to match them. Frequently, however, 
not enough jobs are available or students may lack certain job qualifications (e.g., a high school 
diploma). In those instances, entrepreneurial occupations (self-employment) offer more realistic 
alternatives. The program's entrepreneurial component can teach students how to fill nearly any 
need the community will support—anything from computer maintenance and repair to 
cosmetology or baking—in addition to general entrepreneurial skills needed for success, such as 
how to speak with strangers, work on a team, deal with conflict, and make good decisions.6  
Figure 5.1, below, illustrates the logic behind Jóvenes Constructores. The model shows 
how the system works: the reason for intervening, program “inputs,” activities and participants 
(“outputs”), and expected short, medium, and long-term “outcomes.” Below, each element is 
discussed in detail. 
                                                 
4 Typically, program participants are about 20-22 years old. Age exceptions may be made for individuals at the margins of eligibility who 
are considered to be at high risk of dying without intervention. 
5 YBI Design and Performance Standards, p. 22. 
6 CRS, Final Report, p. 28. 
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Figure 5.1:  Logic Model - Jóvenes Constructores. 
 
 
Inputs:  Investments in Jóvenes Constructores 
Jóvenes Constructores projects were established at eight separate sites, each one 
implemented by one or more partner agencies: Fe y Alegria, Fundación Quetzalcoalt, or 
Fundación para el Desarrollo Juvenil (FDJ). CRS piloted the Jóvenes Constructores model from 
2009 to 2011 with Fundación Quetzalcoalt and FDJ (with funding from the Interamerican 
Development Bank, Nokia, First Green Foundation, and CRS). Starting in March 2011, CRS 
expanded Jóvenes Constructores with Fe y Alegria, with funding support from USAID. FDJ 
ended its involvement with Jóvenes Constructores in December 2010 and Fundación 
Quetzalcoalt did the same in about June 2013.7 At the time of this study, one project remained in 
existence, operated by Glasswing, a local nonprofit agency, and funded by SolucionES/USAID. 
Outputs: Program Activities 
Student Recruiting   
                                                 
7 CRS, Final Report, 5 
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Glasswing began by looking at promising local communities to serve as program sites. 
Communities undergo a two-to-six-month qualification period, during which its schools and 
patterns of violence, along with other factors, are examined. CRS coordinates with one or more 
local partners embedded in prospective communities who can support program success. Once a 
community and a local partner have been selected, evaluators begin the search for eligible, 
motivated applicants. 
Jóvenes Constructores primarily serves at-risk Salvadoran youth from troubled urban 
communities. Males and females between the ages of 16 and 25 years old who have left school 
and are unemployed are eligible. (The majority of recruits are between ages 20 and 22 years of 
age.) However, eligibility alone does not assure acceptance. The program has structured its 
recruitment process to be certain that it invests in youth who are highly motivated to succeed in 
obtaining employment and to become leaders, especially those who have experienced severe 
difficulties or who have been rejected by other systems.8  
Potential recruits often hear about Jóvenes Constructores from others in their 
communities who have already experienced the benefits of the program. The applicant screening 
process itself sparks interest, as word spreads about the program. According to program staff, 
applicant recruiting is an inexact science. Applicants who second guess the "correct" answers to 
recruiters' questions may be evasive about their actual reasons for wanting to participate, but 
those reasons almost always include a genuine desire to become employed. Although many enter 
the program unclear about the direction they want to pursue, once enrolled in the program, most 
seem to find their bearings. 
Applicants who survive the initial screening move on to the second qualifying phase, a 
two-week motivational challenge. The components of that challenge vary, but it is intended to 
give the applicants a realistic experience of what program participation would be like and to give 
program staff an opportunity to further evaluate applicants' motivation and readiness. During this 
period, the applicants are expected to compose a resume and deliver it to a specific company; 
they also must successfully complete a community service project.  
One of the bigger challenges for participants who have been leading relatively 
unstructured lives is simply arriving on time, every day—a non-negotiable requirement. The pre-
                                                 
8 YBI Design and Performance Standards, p. 16. 
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enrollment selection process is meant to assure that enrolling in the program is the informed 
personal choice of each applicant and that he or she is fully committed to succeeding. This 
lengthy screening process has proven to be prudent, considering the program's high-risk 
applicant pool and the considerable investment made in each enrollee (400-800 hours of training 
over five months, six months of follow-up, and program support for each participant's 
employment insertion). 
Each recruit’s personal situation is unique, and staff can use their discretion to include as 
many as possible of those who are in serious need. Some similar programs report higher job 
placement rates, because they serve less troubled youth. Jóvenes Constructores participants have 
often travelled a rougher road to achieve their success. If the desired outcomes for such programs 
are community change and reduced violence, then working with higher-risk youth offers greater 
potential for achieving those goals. Without intervention, these are the youth most likely to 
engage in or be subjected to violence in the future.  
Activities  
From day one, Jóvenes Constructores provides participants with a highly structured 
environment. Students engage in a variety of activities: (1) educational reinforcement, 
particularly for those who have not completed high school; (2) general job skills training, 
including teamwork, punctuality, and understanding rights and responsibilities; (3) vocational 
skills training, sometimes leading to certification; (4) entrepreneurship, emphasizing goal setting 
and financial planning (including savings and the use of internal lending groups); (5) life skills 
training (for guiding and supporting future plans); and (6) community service projects in which 
students apply newly acquired skills to volunteering in their communities. Students who have not 
completed high school are expected to continue their educations, and all are expected to obtain 
employment or to become successfully self-employed upon completing the program. Program 
staff members are committed to enabling each willing and able participant to meet those 
expectations. 
During the interviews, staff members noted that Jóvenes Constructores' structured daily 
routines promoted the participants' success. Each morning, students came together in a circle, 
acknowledging one another’s progress and accomplishments from the day before, airing 
problems, and reviewing the current day’s schedule. Each day closed with a similar gathering. 
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Once a week, students came to class dressed in business attire appropriate for a job interview.9 
For most, showing up on time every day, Monday through Friday, required a kind of self-
discipline that they had not exercised. 
To foster group cohesion and to establish a common culture, Jóvenes Constructores has 
introduced an element unique among the employment programs reviewed for this report. 
Students are allowed to communicate at designated times using a set of special hand signals, 
gestures, and symbols. In respect for the program's inclusivity ethic, each group can add new 
signing vocabulary (gestures representing words and expressions) as long as all members are in 
agreement. Jóvenes Constructores' "group dialect" seems to make it easier for participants to 
transition into expressing positive emotions and attitudes, rather than the habitually hostile verbal 
and nonverbal exchanges they are accustomed to. This reinforces values and behaviors that can 
result in success, internalizing the purpose of rules in place of the power of authority and 
submission.10 
Each student tracks his or her own progress. At the site I visited, students were 
photographed from time to time throughout the program, documenting how they were 
developing. (This does not occur at all program sites.) Students also drew pictures representing 
how they viewed themselves as they began, and again when they finished the program. One new 
recruit, before joining the program, reportedly had drawn a gun symbolizing the violence in his 
life; nearing graduation, he drew a tree in bloom representing his new potential. These kinds of 
activities and the program’s consistent day-to-day routines together function as a form of 
cognitive behavioral therapy; this is intended to provide a secure framework within which 
students can more fully focus on developing their job skills. 
Enhancing Employability. Each program participant learns a specific trade or occupation 
with ±200 hours of vocational training for a job likely to be needed in the community. In 
addition to acquiring trade skills, students receive about 80 hours of general job skills training, 
learning how to network to find jobs, how to prepare and dress appropriately for an interview, 
and even how to proceed when asked to take a polygraph test (required by most employers, 
regardless of the job). They practice writing resumes and learn to communicate effectively by 
email. The staff’s general aim is to give the students every possible advantage for competing 
                                                 
9 The program financially supported participants who could not afford dress clothes so that all were capable of meeting that requirement. 
10 CRS, Final Report, p. 6 
65 
 
 
well in the job market.    
In July 2012, the Salvadoran Institute for Professional Training (INSAFORP), a 
government-funded institution supported by a one percent payroll tax, assisted CRS in financing 
vocational training and course certification with Fe y Alegria.11 CRS conducted periodic labor 
market studies to determine labor demands and then created training modules to match. For 
example, one CRS study indicated a need for motorcycle delivery drivers.  Based on that finding, 
CRS developed a curriculum and worked with Fe y Alegria in alliance with the Salvadoran 
Automobile Club (ACES) to conduct driver training specifically for those jobs. At the time of 
this study, more than 400 businesses had employed Jóvenes Constructores youth, with many 
returning more than once to hire additional program trainees.12  
In spite of that success, Jóvenes Constructores recognizes that the at-risk population 
remains at some disadvantage in the open job market, and that the number of job seekers will 
more often than not exceed the number of jobs to be filled. Therefore, it offers an 
entrepreneurship module, as well, in which trainees acquire skills needed for starting and 
managing a business of their own. Over the course of five-month program, students planning for 
entrepreneurship set aside start-up money with a self-managed savings system.   
Life skills training.  Jóvenes Constructores staff members recognize that job skills alone 
will not adequately prepare most at-risk youth for competing in the job market, much less for 
fully participating in family and community life. Life skills training is needed to provide a strong 
character foundation for everything else the program offers. This training is oriented toward 
enabling students to accomplish insertion into society—school, family and/or employment 
settings—and to gain confidence in a possible future in El Salvador, rather than looking toward 
immigration for personal and financial security. Life skills training and character development 
are taken so seriously that three mornings a week are devoted to it: building a positive identity, 
developing self-esteem and empathy, and coming to value forgiveness above revenge, among 
other things. Individual and group counseling are offered, as well. Staff members interview each 
                                                 
11 INSAFORP, Catholic Relief Service e INSAFORP Entregan Reconocimientos, online public bulletin, (2015b): http:// 
www.insaforp.org.sv/index.php/comunicacion-institucional/noticias-menu/314-catholic-relief-service-e-insaforp-entregan-reconocimientos; and 
INSAFORP, Catholic Relief Services e INSAFORP Firman Convenio de Cooperación, online public bulletin (2015a): http:// 
www.insaforp.org.sv/index.php/comunicacion-institucional/noticias-menu/142-catholic-relief-services-e-insaforp-firman-convenio-de-
cooperacion. 
12 Catholic Relief Services, Final Report, 8. 
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student to determine his or her needs; not uncommonly, students come to the program with 
unresolved histories of physical, mental, and/or sexual abuse.  
Community service. Importantly, the program includes a community service component. 
This has a dual purpose: the practice of skills learned in job training and the development of 
social and community-building skills. Each student spends at least 60 hours on community 
service projects such as building, remodeling, or cleaning parks, community centers, and 
classrooms. High school graduates may tutor others who need academic assistance. Such projects 
enable students to apply and hone their newly acquired skills and reinforce the system of values 
introduced through life and job skills acquisition.13 
Coordination of Job Training and Placement  
Students are initially most motivated to achieve in Jóvenes Constructores by the promise 
of gaining access to employment. That is a complicated promise for the program to keep; thus, 
each site has its own job coordinator who is responsible for staying current on the needs of local 
employers and coordinating or creating skill-building programs that prepare participants to be 
competitive for those jobs. Working on behalf of individual participants, the job coordinator 
mediates placements among program staff, students, and potential employers. A good job 
coordinator knows what kinds of openings are available or upcoming, as well as the strengths 
and weaknesses of each job seeker, and strives to facilitate good matches. In addition to building 
working relationships with potential employers, the job coordinator maintains a professional 
relationship with the Ministry of Labor. Ties such as that have helped to open doors, leading to 
higher job placement rates.  
Despite attempts in El Salvador at interagency coordination on the part of all of the 
various youth programs, the government, and other NGOs, it has not been unusual for Jóvenes 
Constructores to find that it has enrolled participants who have been associated previously with 
another program. Program coordinators are aware of this, but the extent to which it happens is 
unknown as there is no way to track students' movements. Most participants who have been 
trained in programs other than Jóvenes Constructores have been taught life skills, but often they 
have acquired little in the way of marketable job skills. At the time of this study, INSAFORP 
                                                 
13 YBI Design and Performance Standards, p. 21. 
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was attempting to certify program graduates' competencies; however, other programs have not 
been doing this. That deficit contributes to the difficulty of determining how many individuals 
participate in multiple programs.  
Program Effectiveness 
The greatest problem facing Salvadoran youth and young adults today may be the 
nation’s gangs and the violence associated with them. Reducing gang involvement and violence 
were not specific goals of Jóvenes Constructores, but those factors affected students' daily lives 
including, in areas controlled by gangs, their ability to obtain employment. Gangs and increasing 
local violence created serious challenges for program implementation.14 Program staff learned 
that before becoming engaged with Jóvenes Constructores, many of the youths from high-risk 
communities had not expected to survive to adulthood. The majority of program graduates 
interviewed related that this had been the first time they had had a safe place in which to be open 
and authentic, where they could neither judge nor be judged—in short, where they could live in 
an environment conducive to learning and growing. The students' troubled backgrounds had 
virtually assured that they would not finish high school, would not acquire the most basic social 
and life skills needed to build a future, and most certainly would not find or maintain worthwhile 
employment. The rare few who might have acquired a job interview would almost certainly have 
been met ultimately with rejection, discriminated against for belonging to a troubled community 
where gangs were prevalent. Left to fend for themselves, their individual prospects would have 
remained poor, their collective hopelessness adding to the intractable poverty of their 
communities' prospects.  
Outcomes 
CRS and Jóvenes Constructores emphasize behavioral change and life skills development 
as fundamental to the mission of generating employment opportunities for at-risk youth. Students 
are prepared, one by one, to complete their schooling and to become employed either in a 
traditional job (preferably with benefits) or as an entrepreneur. Students are expected to respect 
the program's day-to-day structure and to become positive community leaders.  
                                                 
14 Andrade-Eekhoff, p. 11 
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Students begin that journey by embracing a shorter-term outcome: simply having a 
purpose and a place to be each day of the week with their peers, acquiring the intrinsically 
rewarding life and job skills imparted by Jóvenes Constructores staff. It stands to reason that the 
program schedule alone would give them less time, opportunity, and even inclination toward 
delinquent activities. Five months is not a long time to prepare for legitimate work, acquire 
greater self-confidence (self-esteem) and self-control, and to strengthen one's community ties, 
but experiencing real progress in any one of those areas will create momentum in the others.  
As critical as the short and medium-term outcomes were (and are) for program 
participants individually and as a group, the long-term outcomes projected for Jóvenes 
Constructores reach even further. Jóvenes Constructores, or something very much like it, is still 
expected by its organizers to be a significant contributor to increasing economic opportunities 
and providing a renewed sense of belonging for its least advantaged young citizens.  
In the United States, crime and disorder is commonly predicted using measures of socio-
economic status (employment being a major factor) and community ties. Assuming those 
predictors to be universal, Jóvenes Constructores aimed to address problems in both areas. The 
program's graduates have reported feeling more a part of their communities and safer in their 
neighborhoods. One Glasswing staff member commented that those changes alone support the 
program objective that calls for participants to envision their futures in El Salvador, as opposed 
to as immigrants.  
In spite of numerous challenges inherent in reaching at-risk youth, 83% of Jóvenes 
Constructores students are reported to complete the program. Staff members follow graduates for 
six post-graduate months, tracking whether they are earning at least the minimum wage and, if 
needed, encouraging them to obtain traditional jobs with benefits. Those measures are tracked 
for each participant from enrollment through graduation and job insertion, using individual case 
files and verification documentation. According to an external evaluation conducted at the end of 
2013, using a random selection of 500, 2010-2015 graduates, 59% of graduates had jobs, 47% 
with benefits.15 Despite their disadvantaged backgrounds, compared with the overall population 
of Salvadoran workers, Jóvenes Constructores graduates were reported to have attained more 
                                                 
15 Beltran y Savenije; report in Spanish. 
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than twice the average rate of jobs with benefits.16 Many who did not currently have jobs 
reported having returned to school to complete high school or college. Frequently, driven by 
financial considerations, graduates reported moving between formal employment, self-
employment, and education as opportunities arose. Simply having the credentials, confidence, 
and ability to choose among those alternatives as their situations changed gave those participants 
an edge. In some respects, of course, program evaluation and effectiveness could have been 
improved. For example, not all graduates were tracked for the full six-month post-graduation 
period, and few were monitored for longer periods.17  
Implementation Rates  
Participants in Jóvenes Constructores projects that received USAID funding experienced 
success rates that exceeded the benchmarks established for the project, according to the CRS 
Final Report.18 Six percent more participants enrolled in the workforce development program 
than were expected (3,157 vs. 2,970). Of those, 84% completed the program, only one percent 
shy of the goal (2,640 vs. 2,673). Employment numbers showed that 50% of graduates had 
obtained a job upon graduating or had gone on to find a better one, which was 6% more than 
expected (1,572 vs. 1,485).19 Graduates achieving self-employment fell just two percent shy of 
the goal (584 vs. 594). The education component experienced similar success, as 501 participants 
returned to school after completing the program, 16% more than the goal of 431. Considering 
employment and education together, the total number of participants served exceeded the project 
goal by eight percent (2,073 vs. 1,916).20 
Another site, operating for 2½ years and funded by CRS and the Open Society 
Foundation (OSF), documented outstanding results, as well. It exceeded its benchmark goal for 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Graduates frequently changed residences and phone numbers, making them difficult to reach. Many maintained contact with the program 
and some had a presence in social media such as Facebook. Through that channel, CRS was able to locate and arrange to meet with five graduates 
from varying communities and cohorts for this study. 
18 CRS commissioned a study to compare performance between Jóvenes Constructores and other similar programs.  Unfortunately, other 
programs did not maintain data regarding insertion. The only possible comparisons were cost per participant and cost per training hour. These 
comparisons can also be used against prison housing and meal costs. 
19 Those employment numbers represented only those individuals who had completed a U.S. Government-funded workforce development 
program, such as Jóvenes Constructores (or Mi Nuevo Plan de Vida).  
20 CRS, Final Report, p. 9. 
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numbers served by 11% (155 vs. 140) and for graduates by five percent (132 vs. 126). 
Employment data showed that 29% had obtained jobs, seven percent more than expected (45 vs. 
42), and 28% had become self-employed, 54% more than expected (43 vs. 28). Sixty-one 
participants (40%) had returned to school, more than doubling the goal of 28.21 The similarity in 
results across sites is not particularly surprising given that the programs all used the same model 
and outcome goals; also, all of the programs were strongly community-based, rendering funding 
sources irrelevant to program success. 
Cost Effectiveness 
According to the June 30, 2014 CRS Final Report, USAID invested a total of $4.9 
million in Jóvenes Constructores and one other youth employment program in El Salvador.22 
CRS matched USAID funds with another $716,000. CRS functioned as the umbrella 
organization for the program, and CARITAS operated the two programs as an implementing 
partner, serving 4,187 youths; the average cost per participant was reported to be $1,347.23 The 
amount spent per youth receiving technical training was reported as $1,210.24 Meaningful cost 
comparisons are difficult to make, however, as each program claimed different training 
components, hours, numbers trained, and other outcome measures. Jóvenes Constructores 
specifically shows a range of cost per participant from $782 to $1,408 across program sites, with 
technical assistance amounting to $426 per participant.25 
Success Stories  
Jóvenes Constructores staff members insisted that students and graduates communicated 
most effectively about the program and its successes. Community members including families, 
neighbors, and teachers described the positive changes they had noticed in program participants. 
Other at-risk youth also noticed those changes, which motivated them to apply. Graduates from 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 That funding was shared with Mi Nuevo Plan de Vida operated by CARITAS. 
23 CRS, Final Report, p. 3.  
24 One might compare the one-time cost of preparing a youth to support himself or herself and a family with the expense of housing and 
feeding one inmate in an over-crowded prison, estimated to cost an average of $1,142 per year (CRS, Final Report, p. 43). 
25 Andrade-Eekhoff, p. 8. 
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various program sites set up Facebook pages showcasing their programs' successes.26 CRS 
developed videos featuring graduates, such as one featuring a young woman who become a 
successful baker in her community.27 These examples, and those shared below, are just a few of 
the success stories that were heard from CRS and program staff members, and the participants 
themselves. 
 A young man who had become involved in a gang enrolled in the program. His 
family owned a home-based clothing store. In a Jóvenes Constructores workshop, he 
learned to stamp images onto fabric, enabling him to expand the family business. 
That success made it financially possible for him to go back to complete high school. 
He has since become a community leader, and plans to go on to college to study 
social services.  
 A 21-year-old male was referred to Jóvenes Constructores while in juvenile detention 
and involved with gangs. Once accepted into the program, he was placed on parole. 
His first job was in a local store; a few months later, he moved on to work in a 
bakery. Now he is waiting to enter a Catholic seminary to prepare for becoming a 
priest.  
 In order to protect herself from gang members' threats, a young woman had been 
forced to leave high school before graduating. Wanting to occupy her time 
productively, she applied to Jóvenes Constructores. Initially very quiet, she soon 
found a safe place to express herself in the program. She succeeded in starting her 
own business selling natural medicines; her earnings enabled her to return to finish 
high school. She said that she had little to spend on herself, but with the job and life 
skills she had learned, she took pride in having acquired ways of helping others.  
Community service projects have proven a particularly rich context for student success. 
One group started a cyber café in a community. The program donated computers, and the 
students repaired them as needed. The cyber café gave neighborhood kids a place to do 
homework with free use of its computers. That student group also cleared the local beach of 
debris from abandoned turtle nests.  
                                                 
26 CRS, Final Report, 13. 
27 See https://youtu.be/BmpB-Fl-4hA  
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Another student was given an opportunity to teach baking in a rural area for two weeks; 
he formed strong attachments with the local people there and found it hard to leave. Still another 
student was sent to a school to repair old computers; she learned to work as a member of a team 
and became comfortable asking peers for help. She developed self-discipline, as she had to be 
punctual to catch her daily bus, which left on time, with or without her. A different student 
described working with her group to build an entire playground from the ground up; she became 
attached to her co-workers and enjoyed the sense of satisfaction she experienced when the 
playground was completed. 
Personal growth and hope for the future were recurring themes throughout these and 
other success stories. Nearly every participant described entering Jóvenes Constructores feeling 
insecure and lacking self-confidence, but then finding a "second family" there. The security 
provided by the stable routine, along with being consistently surrounded by positive people, 
allowed students to grow and mature. They reported gaining confidence in their own ability to 
navigate communities outside the program, no longer feeling judged or discriminated against.  
Program staff members related having learned how much positive change depended upon 
the various program sites sharing a common culture and philosophy. Unusual as it may seem, the 
use of the group's hand gestures for communicating was often mentioned as uniquely important; 
all staff members and many graduates brought this to attention. Perhaps that is less surprising 
when we remember that “insider” slang and jargon arises from and bonds groups of young 
people, everywhere.  
In addition to gathering anecdotal evidence during graduate and staff interviews of the 
program's success, CRS shared data that it collected on each student in order to measure progress 
at both individual and program levels. With that data, leaders could make strategic decisions, 
assess results, and review progress and program completion rates.28 Periodic meetings with 
program staff across the various sites helped them to learn from their respective experiences, as 
well.  
In addition, a 2011 International Youth Foundation evaluation and two other external 
evaluations contributed to what is known about the program. The 2011 International Youth 
Foundation evaluation focused on the first pilot cohorts in El Salvador and Nicaragua in 2009. 
                                                 
28 Andrade-Eeekhoff, p. 6. 
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For the USAID expansion process, a midterm external evaluation was conducted by the Jesuit 
University, UCA. Dr. Antonieta Beltran and Dr. Wim Savenije conducted the second external 
evaluation, focusing on the ability of the program to foster youth resilience, as well as 
monitoring educational support and outcomes.  
Together, the sum of these data sources indicates that Jóvenes Constructores has been 
successful in its program completion rates, graduate employment and self-employment rates, and 
student satisfaction. The external evaluations provided Jóvenes Constructores with objective 
analyses of the program's impact and challenges; which have been used to modify and further 
improve the model.29 
Obstacles to Effectiveness  
During this study, It was able to observe and to hear about several problems that hindered 
the program’s effectiveness. Those appeared to affect the program in three areas: (1) eligible 
individuals could not or did not always participate, (2) graduates could not or did not always 
obtain and maintain employment, and (3) program staff members and others could not or did not 
consistently collect and analyze the amount of quality data needed to effectively monitor, 
manage, and report program successes. 
Obstacles to program participation  
During their earliest stages of contact with Jóvenes Constructores, recruits’ own reticence 
and mistrust sometimes became an obstacle to their full program participation. During the 
recruitment phase and initial program activities, according to staff, applicants and students often 
had difficulty being truthful; the more at risk they were, the less likely they were to be entirely 
forthcoming about themselves and their reasons for being interested in the program. Over the 
course of time, as trainees, most would gradually open up and become less fearful, more willing 
to reveal themselves. When they fully participated in this way, they began making real progress. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to participation (for both staff and trainees) was gang 
related. This was especially problematic at program sites in areas where more than one gang 
operated. Conflicts and violence would break out when program participants from 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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neighborhoods controlled by one gang tried to cross into neighborhoods controlled by rival 
gangs in order to attend program activities; the consequences could be severe, up to and 
including homicide. Such a situation forced Jóvenes Constructores to close part of its Mejicanos 
program when the gang in the program zone would not permit youth from rival territories to 
participate.30 Staff found it safer to locate programs in areas occupied by only one gang. 
Unfortunately, not only gangs created such problems for Jóvenes Constructores; according to a 
CRS staff member, police and the military were also known to harass or threaten students and 
staff for their involvement with the program.  
Obstacles to obtaining employment  
Students, particularly those deemed most at risk, continued to have hurdles to overcome 
in order to obtain and maintain employment, even after being trained. Employers remained 
reluctant to hire workers from certain neighborhoods, a problem that is encountered by nearly all 
employment programs. Business owners and managers fear being infiltrated and extorted by 
gangs from those areas, and have concerns about those applicants' limited access to public 
transportation and their ability to show up reliably during the required hours. As a result, even 
trainees of age and with work permits (required for those under age 18) face discrimination 
based on their home addresses. Some reported showing up for scheduled interviews, then being 
turned away by security guards.  
Even for a minimum wage job, applicants who make it through their interviews are likely 
to be required to take a polygraph test administered by a security company (many of which are 
owned and managed by former military personnel). The security companies have little 
knowledge of human resources issues; candidates who do not pass the polygraph are simply 
rejected. Anyone with a criminal record or who has a family member involved with a gang can 
easily fail a polygraph test if they try to hide certain facts, but if truthful, that applicant is 
unlikely to be hired for fear that his or her affiliations might lead to interference with the owner’s 
operation of the business. 
With persistence, support, and troubleshooting from staff, many Jóvenes Constructores 
trainees do manage to find jobs. Those students' hurdles then become everyday challenges such 
                                                 
30 CRS, Final Report, p. 7 
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as finding reliable, affordable transportation and childcare. Those who rely on public transit may 
find that the hours they are scheduled to work do not always coincide with hours that busses are 
running. Private transportation for service sector jobs is provided by some businesses, but those 
systems often refuse to go into the neighborhoods where at-risk trainees live; this is especially 
true at night. Commonly, reliable childcare during job shifts is difficult to find.   
Self-employment, other than the difficulty of finding startup capital, offers more 
flexibility, but entrepreneurship presents equally serious challenges.31 Young entrepreneurs 
reported needing to keep a low profile to avoid potential extortion from gangs or even neighbors, 
and trouble from would-be competitors. A young student baker reported preparing her larger 
catering orders away from her usual location, to avoid drawing attention to herself. It takes 
determination and persistence to continue under such adverse circumstances. 
Obstacles to data collection and analysis  
Making a compelling evidence-based connection between providing at-risk youth with 
life and job skills training and achieving long-term crime reductions requires the collection and 
analysis of reliable data. Crime reduction was not a stated goal of Jóvenes Constructores, and 
such data were not systematically collected, but the program may have provided a few secondary 
crime prevention benefits, nonetheless.32 Collection and analysis of reliable data is inhibited in 
El Salvador in several ways. First, the Salvadoran culture is not receptive to tracking information 
(even crime rates) about individuals by location, regardless of the purpose. Also, gangs posed a 
strong threat to the safety of those affiliated with Jóvenes Constructores, impeding the staff’s and 
third parties’ ability to ask for and document such data. It is difficult to obtain information 
relating to violence when community members fear being killed for talking to the wrong people 
about such matters. Conducting even simple interviews involved risk and required safety 
precautions. CRS could not use police escorts for site visits; to do so would have suggested to 
gang members that Jóvenes Constructores and the police were affiliated, a potential death 
sentence for program staff. Such barriers are not specific to Jóvenes Constructores and are not a 
                                                 
31 For more information about entrepreneurship within the Jóvenes Constructores program, see Wendy-Ann Rowe, Richard Jones, and 
Katherine Andrade, Creating Change, Creating Opportunities: Promising Practices in Youth Enterprise Development for At-risk and Gang-
involved Youth (USA: Catholic Relief Services, 2011):  
32 Andrade-Eekhoff, p. 18 
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program weakness, but rather are a data collection weakness in El Salvador. 
As previously mentioned, Jóvenes Constructores did collect some data about program 
participants, although none were collected beyond the six-month post-graduation period. The 
lack of systematic data collection for measuring long-term program impacts led to the external 
survey of 500 randomly chosen graduates, mentioned above.  
One external evaluation concluded that Jóvenes Constructores was successful in instilling 
protective factors in at-risk students that may have helped to prevent them from becoming 
victims or perpetrators of violence; this was attributed to four key program elements: (1) 
changing students' routines, distancing them from risky behaviors and peers; (2) affiliating 
students with others working toward similar positive goals; (3) emphasizing the use of a moral 
and ethical compass to guide actions; and (4) teaching students how to navigate difficult 
relationships in family and community.33 (The evaluation was not designed to extend its findings 
to crime and violence prevention or to community or municipal levels.)    
To its credit, CRS has persisted in searching for solutions to programmatic problems and 
in preparing students to overcome employment-related obstacles. Acknowledging that certain 
gang-related problems are almost insurmountable, it ceased locating projects where rival gangs 
share a common border. Additionally, CRS seems cognizant that working relationships need to 
be maintained with law enforcement, and yet is still sensitive to the community's negative 
perception of any who might be police allies.  
As for its more immediate objectives, Jóvenes Constructores appeared to be making a 
concerted effort to find employment for every graduate. Tailoring job training to market 
demands, it increased the chances that program participants would qualify for local jobs. The 
challenge is to continuously reinvest and retool for changes in a market that is ever evolving. 
This is a challenge for employment programs worldwide, not just for Jóvenes Constructores. 
Graduates hired into their first jobs, however, reached a significant life milestone that they may 
have missed without help. Given the option of acquiring entrepreneurship as well as 
conventional job skills, they were equipped to choose alternative ways to earn a living. 
Entrepreneurships that they trained for were within reach and appropriate, allowing income 
earned to be comparable to that of most jobs available.  
                                                 
33 CRS, Final Report, p. 7; findings from Beltran y Savenije in Spanish. 
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Graduates also made it clear during our discussions that the program's community service 
activities became more than a way to fulfill a 60-hour program requirement. Some found 
volunteer opportunities that allowed them to put newly acquired job and personal skills into 
practice, helping others. Many created lasting bonds with people whom they never would have 
encountered any other way. Further, they experienced the benefits of teamwork and shared 
responsibility. Perhaps most important for their growing self-esteem were those experiences of 
being useful and welcomed as persons who could and did improve the lives of others. 
Upon completing the five-month Jóvenes Constructores program, students' 
accomplishments were formally acknowledged at a graduation ceremony. Graduates stated that 
they highly valued the ceremony, the first of its kind for most of them. For the next six months, 
program staff followed up with them to assure that they were either employed or in school. The 
first two or three months of their post-graduate transition were critical.34 During that period, staff 
visited with employers, reviewed the books of the self-employed, and checked in with the 
schools of those who were completing their educations.  
From our observations, reshaping the futures of program participants—supporting them 
in completing high school and preparing them for employment, as well as teaching other 
necessary life skills—better equipped them to deal productively with the complexities that came 
with living in at-risk communities. Throughout the program, youth seemed to be learning ways 
to cope maturely with adverse circumstances, strengthening their communication skills, and 
building self-confidence, all of which raised their chances of avoiding situations that could end 
in violence.35 
Listening to program graduates, it is believed that completing the Jóvenes Constructores 
program had given them self-confidence. They had come to feel (and be) more secure, to be 
more comfortable interacting with others and with talking openly about themselves and their 
lives, not only within their somewhat sheltered group environment, but at and beyond home. 
People outside the program noticed that the group’s shared language of hand gestures was used 
to communicate in a non-hostile manner. Personally, I observed and interacted with a group of 
polite individuals who were highly respectful to staff, one another, and to me. They appeared 
                                                 
34 Beltran y Savenije; in Spanish. 
35 Due to methodological issues in measuring rates of violence, discussed in greater detail below, it is not currently possible to provide 
definitive numbers regarding violence reduction rates within the program communities.  
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happy with where they were, and they spoke enthusiastically about the program and the benefits 
it brought them. Job skills and employment were deemed important, but they also spoke of 
having “changed,” of becoming better people in general. Jóvenes Constructores was targeting 
and serving those who were at high risk, and staff members appeared to be navigating the many 
challenges involved well enough to make a clear difference.  
Replication 
The Jóvenes Constructores program is based on YouthBuild International. As part of the 
adaptation process in El Salvador, CRS (with YBI) created, tested, and validated program design 
and outcome standards for Jóvenes Constructores programs in El Salvador.36 As a result, 
replication of projects using the YBI model, including Jóvenes Constructores, is best informed 
by its design and performance standards. The standards establish key components of the Jóvenes 
Constructores model, including how they should be implemented and the outcomes they should 
achieve. They provide direction and guidance for "best practices" for those programs wishing to 
replicate Jóvenes Constructores. At the same time, there are replication difficulties that warrant 
discussion. 
Replication raises the question of whether, if successful, the model of Jóvenes 
Constructores could be successfully implemented in other communities deemed “at risk.” A 
partial answer can be found in CRS’s experience to date with initiating programs using the 
Jóvenes Constructores model at multiple sites. CRS managed the programs and tracked their 
participants, while partner organizations operated day-to-day program activities. Of eight 
programs initiated, one, operated by partner organization Glasswing, remained in operation at the 
time of this study. Closures of the other programs were attributed to various factors, two of 
which would need to be resolved for further replication to be feasible: (1) scaling the program to 
dimensions that can be funded locally and/or by partner organizations without degrading quality 
and effectiveness, and (2) ensuring the safety and security of participants and others associated 
with the program. CRS is currently working on scaling the model to make it affordable for local 
governments.  
The second unresolved issue is that programs such as this, which serve youth already at 
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risk for crime and violence, are not themselves without risk to those involved. For all of their 
successes in helping willing recruits to make life-changing progress toward a more fruitful life, 
success can come at considerable cost. CRS attempted to replicate the Jóvenes Constructores 
model in one particular location where it admitted youth who were already in conflict with the 
law—young people who were farther along the path toward violent crime than those more 
typically accepted into the program. This site operated for approximately a year and a half before 
a situation arose that forced its suspension when a shooting injured a participant and staff 
member.37 The program had recruited a total of 55 participants, a lower number than the usual 
goal of 80 participants. The low enrollment was generally perceived to reflect a lack of 
motivation on the part of potential recruits. In this case, the catchment area was dominated by 
gangs, each of which acted to prevent participants who lived in areas controlled by its rival gangs 
from participating. This program documented only half the completion rate of other sites, 
although those who did complete the program had insertion rates (into employment or education) 
similar to those of all youth in these programs.  
 The most common advice offered by staff to others who might want to replicate this 
program was to teach and nurture “soft skills” along with job training. They included in this 
creating a culture of resilience where participants feel safe. Jóvenes Constructores accomplishes 
this by establishing a structured environment within which participants can function—a routine 
that is followed every day and a common mode of communication that is shared and expanded 
by the participants as a group. Additionally, psychological counseling has proved useful. Lastly, 
an outlet for recreational activities is important, a place to engage in sports and arts that expand 
life and can help build confidence and a sense of community. CRS staff members believe that 
tracking participants beyond graduation has contributed to the program’s success, as well. 
Several CRS staff mentioned that this might be the key to sustaining the program, as it allows 
them to learn and respond to what is working, and what is not. Last, they recommend flexible 
admission criteria, as the most at-risk applicants need the most help, yet they may be excluded if 
acceptance criteria are overly rigid. 
The Jóvenes Constructores model could be replicated at multiple sites, provided that the 
sites were carefully chosen and that there were implementing partners and funding available. 
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Successful replication demands a regard for safety. Although it is admirable to take on youth 
who are at higher risk than those typically involved in these types of programs, certain 
precautions would be necessary. Perhaps future sites should, for example, not be located in areas 
where more than one gang shares a border, in order to avoid potential territorial gang issues and 
corresponding violence. As a result of its accomplishments and potential for long-term 
“grassroots” change, CRS and others continue to try to overcome the funding and security-
related obstacles to successful replication.  
The cost per youth employed might also be a deterrent for development organizations 
(e.g., NGOs) without external funding. In 2014, only Glasswing, funded by SolucionES, was 
able to undertake replication, and then only because SolucionES had USAID funding. At the 
time of this study, CRS was developing an alliance with INSAFORP and the Interamerican 
Development Bank to bring the program model to scale. Based on recently (2015) signed 
agreements, CRS will provide funding to train INSAFORP and a network of INSAFORP 
implementers in the Jóvenes Constructores model.  INSAFORP will fund all the direct 
implementation costs. 
Sustainability 
Funding 
For four years, CRS partner organizations with external funding implemented the Jóvenes 
Constructores model. At the time of this study, the partner at the one remaining site, Glasswing, 
projected that its SolucionES funding could be maintained for four to five more years, provided 
that the program continued to meet employment rates of at least 70%. CRS now receives funding 
from IADB/Multilateral Investment fund, as well as co-financing with INSAFORP. This enables 
CRS to train INSAFORP implementers in the Jóvenes Constructores model; INSAFORP will 
fund implementation of the program.  
Programmatic Sustainability 
After four years of implementing the Jóvenes Constructores model, CRS settled on a few 
areas of focus for continuing and stabilizing the program in the future. With respect to 
employment, CRS leadership wants to ensure that the entrepreneurship module remains a part of 
the program. They believe that giving participants the skills to start their own businesses is a 
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strong alternative for at-risk youth, as they face greater challenges than others in obtaining 
traditional employment. CRS would also like to implement career counseling so that participants 
can learn what types of jobs are available and which paths could lead to the job or career of their 
choice. Often, program participants are all on a single job path, competing with hundreds of 
others for limited positions, with no way of knowing what other options might be out there for 
them.  
Education is another important aspect of potential future programming. Staff would like 
to help youth who have not yet finished middle school become part of the program, convinced 
that education is as important as a job. In fact, it may be the only path to getting a job, since 
many companies will only hire applicants who have a high school education. Many of the 
graduates I talked with had a strong desire to return to school, either to finish high school or to 
continue on to college.  
Finally, CRS wants to strengthen its relationship with communities. Community service 
projects create ties with those communities and give greater visibility to the program and its 
successful participants. Building those community ties may be the most effective way to 
transform not only the communities’ perception of the formerly "at-risk" youths, but also the 
youths’ self-perceptions within that community where they previously were judged to be 
troublesome. Perhaps demonstrating to the community and government the kinds of change that 
such at-risk youth are capable of making when given the right opportunities would bolster the 
programs’ ability to obtain much needed funding and other support.  
Conclusion 
The Jóvenes Constructores program model was implemented by CRS and partner 
agencies to provide at-risk youth with job and life skills that would give them better access to 
lifelong opportunities. With the volume of at-risk youth in El Salvador, programs such as this are 
vital. Due to the large investments in this program, it will continue to be important to ensure that 
the program is effective. Based on information received from program graduates, partners, and 
CRS employees, it appears that they have been accomplishing the goal of providing at-risk youth 
with life and job skills needed for success. A high number of participants returned to school or 
attained employment upon completing the program, and they maintained that status over the six-
month follow-up period. Having the ability to track participants and report success rates, even in 
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limited terms, appears to be one of the strengths of the program, as far as internal evaluation 
goes.  
The program would be strengthened if it had the ability track community-level changes in 
relation to its activities. In the future, perhaps those implementing these programs could require 
participants and graduates to complete a questionnaire asking how they perceive their 
communities to have changed, if at all. A survey could be given to participants when they begin 
the program that asks questions regarding their community. The same survey could then be given 
a couple times during the program, as well as every three months for a year following 
graduation. With several participants at each location typically coming from the same 
community, enough data could be collected in this way to make the results statistically 
significant. This would allow researchers to determine what, if any, changes the community 
perceived the program having made and which communities were experiencing those changes. 
Additionally, assuming employment programs were located in several communities, those could 
be compared to assist in determining which programs were affecting the greatest change, and 
how.  
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Section 6.  Project HOPE: 
Having Opportunities for Peace and Employment 
 
Doug Mellom 
 
 
In 2008, the AGAPE Foundation of El Salvador established Project HOPE, an 
employment program aimed at helping rural Salvadoran youth realize their cultural, social, and 
economic rights, despite living in socially disadvantaged areas with high rates of violence.38 
According to a 2005 report from the World Bank: 
Poverty [in El Salvador] continues to be disproportionately rural. About half of 
Salvadorans living in rural areas are poor, a quarter of which live in mere 
subsistence, while 28.5 percent of the urban population is poor and only 9 percent 
are extremely poor.39  
Educational opportunities for youth living in rural areas of El Salvador, particularly in 
Ahuachapán, Sonsonate, Chalatenango, and Cabañas, are scarce compared with similar 
opportunities in more urban areas such as San Salvador.40 Rural youth must travel considerable 
distances simply to take advantage of opportunities that are routinely accessible to most urban 
youth, hardly an affordable proposition for a young person living in relative poverty. Yet that 
lack of education severely inhibits their future opportunities for gainful employment; therefore, 
youth commonly drop out of school to work as temporary farm laborers or in the informal labor 
market (e.g., street vending) to supplement their families’ low incomes.41 For rural youth, those 
educational and economic disadvantages have been related to the increased probability of 
                                                 
38 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE: Habilitando Oportunidades para la Paz y el Empleo Juvenil, Asociación AGAPE de El Salvador (2014): 
http://www.agape.com.sv/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=105; and Jacobs Foundation, "Having Opportunities 
for Peace and Employment," Jacobs Foundation (2012): http://jacobsfoundation.org/ project/project-hope-having-opportunities-for-peace-and-
employment/. 
39 World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment: Strengthening Social Policy," Poverty Reduction and Economic Management and 
Human Development Sector Management Units: Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Report No. 29594-SV (2005): 1-134, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/ 01/11/000160016_20060111134320/Rendered/PDF/295940SV.pdf.  
40 Compassion International, El Salvador: Rural Region (2014): http://www.compassion.com/el-salvador/agriculture.htm; and 
AGAPE, Habilitando Oportunidades. 
41 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE; World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment." 
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becoming involved in violence or gang activity.42 Thus, Project HOPE sought to bring its 
employment project to them.  
Project HOPE was administered and championed in El Salvador primarily by the AGAPE 
Foundation of El Salvador,43 a Catholic organization founded in 1978 by Franciscan priest 
Flavian Mucci. It is comprised of several multidisciplinary social work programs that serve 
individuals living in extreme poverty, addressing basic needs and helping to solve social, 
spiritual, educational, and productive problems. Project HOPE was developed to create 
employment opportunities; AGAPE, the Pestalozzi Children’s Foundation, the Jacobs 
Foundation, and the Fundación Salvador del Mundo (FUSALMO) funded the project.44  
Over a 30-month period from 2004 to 2006, INSAFORP, the Pestalozzi Foundation, 
Swisscontac, and the AGAPE Foundation of El Salvador cooperatively executed the Project 
HOPE pilot project, serving at least 1,299 participants.45 Following the pilot run, Project HOPE 
was fully launched in 2008 and continued into 2012.46 Program records made available for this 
study indicated that between 9,200 and 10,000 youth had participated during that period.47 In 
contrast, stakeholders who were interviewed during the study reported the numbers of those who 
participated and completed the program as "unknown," with estimates as low as 3,000. The 
interviewees reported that Project HOPE had ended in 2012 when funding ended; the exact date 
could not be confirmed.  
To gather information for the current study, I reviewed official agency documents and 
related materials (e.g., newspaper and media articles, reports), conducted a focus group with 
                                                 
42 World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment." 
43 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
44 AGAPE, Que es AGAPE? Asociación AGAPE de El Salvador (2014): http://agape.com.sv/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=7&Itemid=2; R. M. Aguilar, "Presentan Culminación del Proyecto HOPE," La Prensa Grafica 6 (March 21, 2013): 1-2,  
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/presentan-culminacion--del-proyecto-hope; Jacobs Foundation, "Having Opportunities;" and Fusalmo, Misión, 
Visión y Valores, Fundación Salvador del Mundo (2014): http://www4.fusalmo.org/index.php/quienes/nosotros/mis-vis-val. Fusalmo, in El 
Salvador, began in 2001 with the mission of sponsoring projects promoting holistic development (e.g., educational and work opportunities) for 
underprivileged and at-risk youth. The Jacobs Foundation sponsors evidence-based programs that support youth in becoming socially responsible, 
productive members of society. Pestalozzi Children’s Foundation is a Swiss nonprofit organization that sponsors projects in developing countries 
that support the rights of children and youth to a quality education and promising future.  
45 elsalvador.com, Insaforp Firmó un Convenio de Cooperación (June 20, 2007): http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/ 
nota_completa.asp?idArt=1567065&idCat=3791. 
46 Jacobs Foundation, "Having Opportunities." The majority of the information in this segment, unless otherwise cited, was provided 
by Project HOPE and/or confirmed by stakeholders during individual and focus group interviews conducted in November 2014. 
47 Aguilar, "Presentan Culminación del Proyecto HOPE;" and Jacobs Foundation, "Having Opportunities." 
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former program participants, and interviewed former employees. Before leaving the U.S. for El 
Salvador, I attempted to locate all relevant reports, articles, and other documents with a Google 
search on "Project HOPE" and the names of the major affiliated stakeholder organizations. That 
search did not produce a significant amount of information. Upon arriving in El Salvador, I 
conducted a focus group with eight former participants from one program administered by 
Project Hope; that meeting was held at AGAPE headquarters in the Department of Sonsonate. I 
also conducted one interview with two former project employees and one interview with another 
former employee. The focus group and interviews all were recorded. A translator assisted with 
oral translation of the interviewees' remarks (I am proficient but not fluent in Spanish), and I 
recorded handwritten notes. Following the interviews, I requested official project documentation 
from the agencies; a limited amount was received.48 Shortly after the interviews and the focus 
group were completed, handwritten notes were transcribed and audio recordings were reviewed 
to determine whether any relevant information was missing from my notes. I identified common 
themes across the remarks made during the focus group and individual interviews; these are 
discussed in later sections of this report.  
Program Description 
The purpose of Project Hope was to provide employment training for marginalized, at-
risk youth in several rural regions of El Salvador, particularly in Ahuachapán, Sonsonate, 
Chalatenango, and Cabañas,49 in order to mitigate the lack of educational and employment 
opportunities available for youth in rural areas compared with those available in urban areas of 
the country. The lack of access to education and employment opportunities in rural areas was 
considered to be a significant contributing factor in those youth being at increased risk of 
engaging in violence.50 Project HOPE reportedly meant to assist at-risk youth, "at-risk" meaning 
those who lacked opportunities for further education or jobs, and who were therefore considered 
the most likely to become engaged with gangs and violence. The project targeted youth who (1) 
were 16 to 19 years of age, (2) had at least a 6th grade education, (3) were not presently 
attending school, and (4) were either unemployed or underemployed; however, those criteria 
                                                 
48 I requested a copy of the earlier impact study related to outcome measures, but did not receive it.  
49 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
50 World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment." 
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could vary across the local projects.51 Individuals with histories of criminal or violent behavior 
were not necessarily excluded, according to interviewees. 
The project reportedly set out to recruit more women than men. Females were more 
likely than males to be victims of violence, and they typically were not being employed in 
traditionally male-dominated occupations, such as mechanics. Both official project records and 
interviewees indicated that males and females were about equally represented among the 
participants.52  
Initially, individuals considered at-risk (particularly for violence) and who were 
economically and socially marginalized were identified and recruited into the program with the 
help of nonprofit and other organizations that served the targeted areas. Youths who were 
referred were evaluated using a diagnostic instrument that helped determine whether they were 
better suited for job placement or for self-employment. Both training modes included career 
counseling, vocational-technical training for a specific occupation, and "culture of peace" 
training. Youths bound for job placement gained experience working for a business during the 
training period, while those aiming for self-employment received added business training in 
entrepreneurial management. For both modes, the initial objective was for participants to develop 
the frame of mind and skills needed to obtain and maintain gainful employment. Reportedly, a 
secondary objective was for participants to transmit what they were learning (attitudes and 
knowledge) to other family and community members, ultimately resulting in a reduction in 
violence and a cultural transformation from violence toward peace throughout the entire 
community.53 
According to various stakeholders, recruitment into the program was facilitated in several 
ways. The program was publicized on the AGAPE radio station and TV channel, and in flyers 
and brochures posted in the city halls of targeted regions. Project HOPE also relied on strategic 
alliances with local governmental and nonprofit service organizations in the targeted 
communities to identify qualified youth who might be good prospects.  
The diagnostic instrument used to determine whether each participant would enter the job 
placement or self-employment path reportedly was re-administered throughout the participants' 
                                                 
51 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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time in the program as a means of assessing whether the aptitude needed to progress was being 
maintained. In addition, a separate diagnostic instrument was used to identify whether individual 
participants possessed the qualifications that companies were looking for in potential employees 
(e.g., a high school diploma). Although the diagnostic instruments theoretically played a role in 
determining participants' preparation for work, stakeholders indicated that in practice the training 
path offered tended to depend more on the local community's needs, and that the decision often 
was made by the local partners. Certain communities had businesses or companies that wanted to 
hire youth; at those project sites, more participants would be assigned to the job placement path. 
Other communities could offer few or no job opportunities for youth, and so the self-
employment/entrepreneurial modality would be offered. Official data were not available, but 
interviewees indicated that the majority of participants were, in fact, enrolled in self-employment 
or entrepreneurial training due to the overall shortage of formal employment opportunities in 
rural areas.54 
Trainees in the job placement mode spent about 400 hours in training; entrepreneurial 
trainees spent about 300 hours in training. Vocational-technical skills training emphasized 
efficient and effective performance in specific jobs, an understanding of the theoretical basis of a 
particular occupation, the processes and procedures undertaken to perform that occupation's tasks 
(and alternatives for continuously enhancing performance), and general techniques for obtaining 
sustainable, quality employment throughout one’s career.  
In addition to occupation-specific training, both modalities included career counseling 
and culture of peace training.55 The latter consisted of 40 hours of workshop training, 
emphasizing nonviolence, respect for human rights, cross-cultural understanding, inclusion, 
tolerance and solidarity with others, peaceful conflict resolution, the universal right to 
information and knowledge (e.g., freely making information available that is needed by others to 
make assertive decisions, establishing direct communication among partners), and respecting all 
forms of diversity; it also promoted critical self-reflection and analysis as a transformational 
tool.56 Regardless of the path taken, participants completed their training in about six months. 
Project HOPE had established strategic alliances with numerous other local and regional 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 HOPE, Fundación Pestalozzi, Fusalmo, and AGAPE. Malla Curricular: Proyecto Educativo HOPE (n.d.), 1-16. 
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organizations; these included World Vision, MELIDAS, INSAFORP, Save the Children, 
ADESCOS, Swisscontact, International Plan, and the Ministry of Work/Labor. According to 
interviewees, the purpose of forming extensive alliances was twofold:  first, the alliances 
facilitated effective use of the organizations' varied but limited resources to achieve the common 
goal of providing at-risk youth employment opportunities, and, second, alliances broadened the 
possibilities for recruitment. Although Project Hope used several techniques, recruiting through 
its local allies, who were aware of local conditions and needs, was its principle method.  
Project HOPE also coordinated efforts with NGOs, municipal mayors, and the business 
sector to identify supply and demand for labor, to contribute to the training of young people, and 
to generate opportunities for employment and self-employment. Furthermore, the project 
coordinated with church, community, school, and cultural leaders to acquire the physical 
infrastructure for job training and to promote the development of the job programs. INSAFORP, 
a Salvadoran government agency that collects a 1% payroll tax to support vocation training, 
provided funding for job training for both intervention strategies, while Swisscontact funded 
teacher training and helped with the design of various components, specifically the vocational-
technical and culture of peace trainings.57  
A common concern of those who had worked for or participated in Project HOPE was the 
lack of financial and other resources needed to carry out even the most basic program activities. 
Forming mutually beneficial partnerships was a way to at least partially overcome that problem. 
One interviewee described an instance, for example, in which the MELIDAS organization was 
able to provide materials and equipment for training, yet lacked financial resources needed   to 
execute it; Project HOPE could offer the financial resources, but lacked materials and equipment. 
Joining forces, they delivered the training.  
Project HOPE’s affiliation with various organizations already well known to community 
members enhanced its legitimacy. One interviewee cited Project HOPE’s close relationship with 
the AGAPE Association, which had a very good reputation, as helpful in establishing its 
partnership with the Ministry of Labor. Overall, Project HOPE’s extensive collaboration with 
other organizations was one of its better strategies for increasing its effectiveness.     
                                                 
57 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
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Program Challenges  
For a variety of reasons, Project HOPE seemed to struggle with both external and internal 
challenges to its plans for enhancing employment opportunities for youth. Some of those 
challenges, as well as some of the program's strengths, are discussed below. 
External Challenges 
Research has indicated that individuals who lack sufficient education have severely 
limited employment prospects and that unemployed (therefore economically disadvantaged) 
individuals are at higher risk of becoming involved in violence or gang activity.58 In El Salvador, 
Project HOPE aimed to help such high-risk individuals attain stable employment, either with an 
existing company or as skilled entrepreneurs. It seemed that participants on the job placement 
path were experiencing more success than those on the entrepreneurial path, yet fewer 
participants seemed to have access to job placement training—specifically, those with at least a 
high school diploma. This occurred because nearly all employers were insisting that their 
applicants, including those from Project HOPE, have that credential. When asked, interviewees 
acknowledged the obvious:  that the most at-risk individuals (those at the greatest educational 
disadvantage) were generally excluded from the path that produced the most employment 
opportunities. Including non-graduates would not only be pointless for them, but it could alienate 
potential employers from the program. In other words, the practice of recruiting and placing high 
school graduates was somewhat of a mismatch with the program goal, to enhance employment 
prospects for the most at-risk youth. Staff appeared to feel conflicted about that reality, but they 
had little choice. (See also section 3.) 
The shortage of jobs in the surrounding environment limited the project's potential for 
success. One interviewee reiterated that there simply were not enough quality job opportunities 
for youth living in the rural areas, noting that it was beyond the financial capability of the project 
to effectively address that problem. Although Project HOPE staff could have considered limiting 
the number of recruits to the number of available jobs, as some other programs had done (see, for 
example, section 3), there is no indication that Project HOPE staff had considered that strategy 
                                                 
58 World Bank, "El Salvador Poverty Assessment." 
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or, if they had, whether it would have been a practical approach given local circumstances. In 
sum, the intervention strategies used by Project HOPE might have complemented concurrent 
economic development in those regions, had such development been in place, but the project was 
not intended or equipped to compensate for the lack of such development.  
Operational Challenges 
According to the interviewees, apparently few program graduates had kept in contact 
with Project HOPE staff, although this seemed to vary among individuals. Project HOPE had not 
incorporated a formal follow-up process. Some interviewees expressed frustration with that, 
citing the various potential benefits of follow-up that were being forfeited, but formalizing such 
after-program responsibilities may not have been a high priority, given the program's limited 
resources. 
 The proper use of diagnostic instruments also posed an operational challenge. The tools 
seemed to offer a practical way for to allocate the limited funding that the project received from 
its sponsoring organizations.59 That same tool, however, made it almost too easy to place 
students in accord with their profiles. Many marginalized youth who participated in the project, 
but did not meet stringent employer standards, reportedly were passed over. In addition, the 
attitudinal diagnostics were self-report measures; it did not appear that other sources were being 
used to check the validity of participants’ responses.60 Essentially, the diagnostic instruments 
suffered from limitations similar to those of other self-report methods (e.g., respondents’ 
tendency to answer in socially acceptable ways, particularly if the truth might jeopardize their 
acceptance into the project.)61 
                                                 
59 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE; Aguilar, "Presentan Culminación del Proyecto HOPE"; and Jacobs Foundation, "Having Opportunities." 
60 Fundación Pestalozzi, AGAPE, and Fusalmo, Mi Registro de Avances, HOPE: Habilitando Oportunidades para la Paz y el Empleo 
Juvenil (n.d.), 1-8. 
61 D. Champion, Research Methods for Criminal Justice and Criminology (Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005). The diagnostic instrument's 
validity could have been improved by collecting data on the same measures from other sources, such as interviews with local community 
residents and leaders about an individual, or obtaining official data on each individual from, for instance, prior criminal, employment, and/or 
educational records. However, such data collection may not have been feasible for an organization that was already functioning with quite limited 
financial resources. 
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Organizational and Collaborative Challenges 
Project HOPE's strategy for success relied on the involvement of and collaboration with 
various partner organizations. Nonetheless, the project seemed to lack any specific long-term 
planning that considered those partnerships. The collaborative relationships were one of the 
program's strengths; they allowed the agencies to recruit more widely and to match resources to 
achieve mutual goals and objectives related to making employment opportunities accessible for 
at-risk youth. Yet those alliances added complexity to the program's operations. Each project 
launched was implemented somewhat differently, depending on which partner organizations 
were involved. Thus, a significant limitation of the intervention design was its lack of detailed 
planning that considered each of its site's unique set of projects and partners, along with 
inadequate attention to monitoring and coordination among the various partners. It seemed that 
the alliances were necessary in order for Project HOPE to deliver the program, but their benefits 
were offset to a certain extent by occasional costly complications, many of which could have 
been avoided with advance planning. 
Project HOPE sought to partner with El Salvador's Ministry of Labor in order to facilitate 
relationships with companies that could become potential employers. That partnership benefitted 
the program in that the companies reached through that connection were credible. On the other 
hand, according to one interviewee, some companies were reluctant to become involved with 
Project HOPE because of its partnership with the Ministry, for fear of inviting that agency's 
closer scrutiny.  
Internal Challenges 
Project HOPE suffered internally from its lack of qualitative or quantitative standards and 
measures by which to assess effectiveness. No official evidence was found that the program's 
outcomes were being documented, monitored, measured, or assessed, or that someone was 
responsible for seeing that they were. Perhaps the aforementioned impact study will present such 
data. In addition, the program did not make use of an internal audit process to determine whether 
the components and activities of the intervention were being administered as planned; informal 
indications suggested that they often were not. Process evaluations might have determined early 
on whether this factor was inhibiting program effectiveness; such evaluations, had they been in 
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place, might have provided timely insight into problems that employees and students were 
experiencing, making it possible to adjust or adapt the program accordingly.62  
Program Effectiveness 
Project HOPE did not systematically collect data needed for a quantitative assessment of 
its effectiveness in achieving the goals and objectives it had articulated. There were not 
consistent, reliable records of the numbers of youth who had participated in either modality or 
who had completed the program, or who succeeded afterward in attaining employment of any 
kind. There were no measures or data for evaluating the effects, if any, of the culture of peace 
component, or for determining whether reductions in violence may have occurred in the 
communities during the program's operation.   
At the time of this study, Project HOPE’s website posted the claim that in 2007, a total of 
227 individuals, participating in 12 programs, had specialized in one of seven self-employment 
specialties;63 the website did not indicate how many had completed the program or how many 
were subsequently employed, nor did it offer program data for other years. A 2012 article posted 
at telemudo.com reported that 325 youth had participated in Project HOPE that year;64 again, the 
article did not indicate whether any of them had been employed after completing the program. 
An interviewee related that 30% of the youth who completed the entrepreneurship modality had 
become self-employed or established their own businesses, reaching the initial goal. Another 
interviewee contradicted that, recalling that Project HOPE had claimed an employment rate 
between 30% and 32% for the two modalities combined over the five-year life of the project, the 
majority of those finding jobs; s/he added that the entrepreneurial modality had failed because 
the rural areas were unable economically even to support their self-employed neighbors. The 
data were no more reliable for the job placement modality. One interviewee asserted that 80% of 
youth who completed that training found jobs; again, that report could not be reconciled with a 
contradictory report that the five-year employment rate no more than 32% for the two modalities 
combined. In addition, of the eight participants I interviewed, just two were employed at the time 
we spoke. Someone mentioned that an impact study was nearing completion and a copy would 
                                                 
62 Champion, Research Methods. 
63 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
64 J. Ventura, "Fusalmo Puso en Alto la Cultura," El mundo.com (October 12, 2012). 
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be sent to me; despite my repeated requests, that report never arrived. 
Drawing upon the few official documents and program materials that were available and 
stakeholder interviews, little quantitative evidence could be found to support a finding that 
Project HOPE had been effective in achieving its goals and objectives. Despite this, and the 
interviewees' reports of the programs shortcomings and challenges, the stakeholders also 
reported experiencing positive qualitative changes.   
All of the interviewees, both participants and employees, were unanimous in holding 
Project HOPE trainers in high regard, particularly (but not only) those whom AGAPE had 
trained to teach the culture of peace curriculum. About the job skills instructors, one former 
participant said, "I felt so happy because they taught us a lot about sales . . . [and] helped me 
improve my resume to help in future job seeking."65 Another described the approach the 
instructors used: "My teacher encouraged role playing to reduce fear involved with a new job . . . 
organizing files and self-techniques [customer needs, why customers buy products] were some of 
the most beneficial aspects of the program." For many, this was their first employment training 
and first experience in a formal place of work. The youth interviewed generally seemed quite 
thankful for the help and insights provided by their instructors, and they considered Project 
HOPE to have been relatively successful in transmitting skills and knowledge that would support 
them in finding and taking advantage of future employment opportunities.   
The culture of peace training had an impact on nearly everyone who encountered it, 
through the program or through program participants. Interviewees described how the training 
had taught them to interact in peace and solidarity, to work effectively with each other, to be 
respectful, humble, and "go the extra mile," seeing one another as brothers and sisters. Former 
participants said that the training had influenced their understanding of how one should think and 
behave in a work environment. Nearly all viewed the ideology and practice as having potential 
for reducing the violence in their communities, with the emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution.  
Project HOPE employees observed that the culture of peace training had had a profound 
impact beyond the youth participants, as parents taught their other children its principles and 
modified their behaviors at home to reflect culture of peace ideals. The employees also witnessed 
young participants increasingly resolving their differences without resorting to violence, and 
                                                 
65 Quotes were transcribed as accurately as possible during the focus group with assistance from a translator. 
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noted that the youth continued to talk about what they had learned in the program (particularly 
regarding culture of peace) after completing the project. One person related that the researcher 
conducting the impact study had commented that every youth s/he spoke with had mentioned the 
culture of peace training and passing it on to other family members.  
Interviewees also cited the cultural festivals that they and other participants had 
organized in their communities as a beneficial Project HOPE activity. Family members and 
others who were interested could attend. The festivals, which promoted the culture of peace and 
nonviolence, were coordinated by youth who had been considered at-risk for violence in those 
communities. Possibly the very fact that they now were facilitating a cultural transition from 
violence to peace was influential.  
Although much of what they said was positive and optimistic, none of the interviewees 
could produce evidence that Project HOPE had reduced violence in the rural communities that it 
served. Most seemed certain that having more youth employed would reduce violence, if only 
because of the significant amount of time that work occupied. Many also believed that 
internalizing and transmitting the culture of peace values and practices had great potential for 
reducing violence, as it offered alternative, far less painful and destructive ways of perceiving 
and responding to a difficult life. In summary, however, for purposes of this study, the lack of 
data meant that it could not be shown what impact, if any, the program had on reducing violence 
in those rural communities.  
The interviews with those who participated in and worked for Project HOPE identified 
numerous difficulties faced by the project. The most common was the lack of resources 
sufficient to deliver the project's activities. In particular, providing sufficient infrastructure, 
including a place to train youth, was identified as a major difficulty. Several participants 
interviewed described fixing a stranger’s roof in exchange for holding training sessions in his 
home when no other place was available. The youth (five in all) had listened to lectures on 
employment orientation and then received employment training for one month, from 7 a.m. until 
5 p.m., for a total of 275 hours spent in that person's house. They did not have enough voltage to 
run their machines in this location, and felt ashamed for invading private space (e.g., asking for 
water or to use the bathroom). The entire project at that particular site was closed down after one 
month, due to the lack of funding to continue training. The difficulty in obtaining basic 
necessities such as infrastructure in order to effectively administer the program was a significant 
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factor in limiting program effectiveness.  
Program participants identified the unpaid time that needed to be committed—eight to ten 
hours a day for training and work—as another obstacle. The major difficulty was transportation, 
particularly in rural areas. Participants often had to travel long distances over poor roads for 
training and to reach their assigned jobs. Many reported quitting the program because of 
insurmountable transportation problems. Project HOPE requested that companies and other 
organizations help with providing food and transportation (or some compensation for hours that 
trainees worked), but many of them were evidently unwilling or unable to do so.  
Overall, insufficient financial resources were the cause of most of the complications that 
severely restricted the effectiveness of the project's activities and reduced the likelihood of 
accomplishing its goals. Still, the biggest hurdle the program was simply the lack of employment 
opportunities for the participants who had been trained and prepared by the program. 
Replication 
Project HOPE (as it existed from 2008 to 2012) had not been replicated at the time of this 
study. Several issues would need to be addressed if it or a similar project were to be replicated 
successfully in the future. With that in mind, Project HOPE employees and participants whom 
we interviewed identified several program elements that they would like to see reinstated in 
some form: 
 Far more employment opportunities would need to be developed, particularly 
in rural regions, for such a program to fulfill its purpose. New job creation 
was beyond the scope and the resources of Project Hope. 
 Strategic alliances enabled program activities that otherwise would have been 
impossible. Because they were not planned for, however, those alliances also 
added complexity; future programs could strengthen the planning and 
processes needed for efficient and effective collaborations, up front. 
 The culture of peace training was valued by virtually all of the interviewees. 
There were accounts of nonviolent "culture of peace" principles being 
transmitted from program participants to families and communities. The 
translation of those principles into attitudes and behaviors appropriate in the 
workplace made it relevant to Project HOPE's employment goals. As with 
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other elements, sufficient resources would need to be invested to fully exploit 
its potential. 
 
The lack of sufficient resources was consistently identified as the greatest obstacle 
encountered by Project HOPE; while I could not assess the program's cost-effectiveness, the 
program's budget and expenses should be carefully analyzed before considering its replication. 
Also important, not having a plan and processes in place for internal and external program 
evaluation was a deficiency that should be corrected in any future program of its kind.  
Sustainability 
Project HOPE ended in 2012, largely due to lack of funding. As mentioned above, I was 
unable to assess whether the funding was insufficient or cost-effectiveness could have been 
improved, or both. That question would need to be addressed in order to determine the program's 
capability to become a sustainable operation. 
Also limiting sustainability was the lack of enough jobs for all of its graduates, together 
with the inability of local communities to financially support the program's self-employed 
entrepreneurs. Most interviewees thought that the lack of quality economic development in rural 
El Salvador was the most significant limiting factor for program sustainability; unfortunately, 
that was also the factor that the program had the least ability to control.     
Despite the program's demise, Project HOPE's legacy was evident, which could be 
considered a kind of sustainability. Through its alliance with Project HOPE, INSAFORP 
extended its services into rural El Salvador; that work is ongoing. Furthermore, after expanding 
its curriculum to meet Project HOPE's training requirements, INSAFORP expanded its offerings 
beyond technical training to include self-employment/entrepreneurial training and human 
development modules (including the culture of peace). Operating in the rural regions once served 
by Project HOPE, INSAFORP has continued to support the job placement modality previously 
offered there by the program.  
The culture of peace curriculum is mentioned most often as Project HOPE's greatest 
lasting contribution. Several other organizations later adopted that curriculum, incorporating it 
into their training and activities. Reportedly, INSAFORP and the AGAPE Association in 
particular have done so.  
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Cost Effectiveness 
No information pertaining to the budget of Project HOPE was available, nor were there 
reliable data related to the number of participants who successfully completed either training 
modality. Limited evidence suggested that the job placement modality may have been more 
effective than the self-employment modality at securing stable employment for at-risk youth, but 
no information was available on costs associated with either training modality. Hence, we could 
not assess the cost-effectiveness of preparing trainees for employment in either modality, nor of 
Project HOPE as a whole. 
Conclusion  
Project HOPE was created to provide employment training for at-risk and marginalized 
rural Salvadoran youth. The AGAPE Foundation of El Salvador executed the program with 
funding and operational assistance from numerous other organizations, such as the Jacobs 
Foundation, the Pestalozzi Foundation, INSAFORP, and Fusalmo. The project had two 
intervention strategies: a self-employment/entrepreneurial training modality and a job placement 
modality. Both included career-counseling, vocational-technical training in a specific occupation, 
and culture of peace training.66 The self-employment/entrepreneurial intervention added a 
training component for business and entrepreneurial management, and the job placement 
intervention reportedly youth with work experience in an actual business or company (generally 
uncompensated) during the course of their training. 
The immediate goal of Project HOPE was to instill in the youth a positive attitude and 
mindset that would assist them in becoming better employees, whatever occupation they chose 
after completing the project. The intermediate goal was for the youth to internalize the 
components of that training, allowing them to obtain and maintain quality employment and good 
working relationships with others, along with continually enhancing their job performance. The 
ultimate goal of the project was for the youth to transmit knowledge obtained in the program to 
others in their communities, establishing a culture of peace for the betterment of society, as well 
as attaining and maintaining quality employment throughout their careers.67  
                                                 
66 AGAPE, Proyecto HOPE. 
67 Ibid. 
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Overall, it was quite difficult to assess the effectiveness of Project HOPE in attaining its 
goals due to the shortage of documentation, outcome measures, and data collection throughout 
the life of the program. Based on the limited information available, it appeared that the project 
was unsuccessful in leading to employment for the majority of the youth who participated. Based 
on anecdotal evidence, the job placement modality may have been somewhat more effective than 
the self-employment modality at providing youth with good employment opportunities, although 
it appeared that due to a lack of actual job openings, the majority of youth who participated in 
the program were channeled into the self-employment/entrepreneurial intervention. Lack of 
adequate funding to provide for basic necessities for operating the program (e.g., appropriate 
facilities for conducting training) and the lack of sufficient employment opportunities to 
accommodate the trainees in rural regions were the primary factors inhibiting the program’s 
success. One of the more effective strategies for overcoming financial limits was its extensive 
collaboration with other organizations, combining resources to achieve mutual aims.  
As mentioned several times above, Project HOPE's culture of peace training was possibly 
the most valued part of the entire program; project stakeholders consistently identified it as such. 
The cultural transformation it promoted might be an effective way to help change the cultural 
environment in ways that not only would improve the immediate qualify of life for community 
residents, but that could attract the economic development and the new businesses needed in 
order for youths to gain access to much-needed jobs for supporting themselves and their families.  
Based on the findings from this study, several policy recommendations are offered for 
consideration by future employment programs: 
 Establish adequate qualitative and quantitative measures to assess and manage the 
effectiveness of the program. Identify outcomes to be monitored; determine who will 
monitor them and how they will be measured, documented, and assessed.  
 Use process evaluations (internal audits) to determine whether the program is being 
implemented as designed, or if certain deviations from the central program design 
may be inhibiting effectiveness; also, whether partners' shares of limited funds are 
being appropriately used.  
 Conduct in-depth long-term planning with partner organizations. Project HOPE's 
wide collaboration was both a strength and a weakness; it was also most certainly a 
necessity. Given that, advance collaborative planning would have clarified 
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expectations and provided a framework for determining whether the alliance's mutual 
promises and obligations were being fulfilled. (On the other hand, note potential 
employer's sensitivities to prospective alliances; some were reassured while others 
were apprehensive when Project HOPE partnered with Labor Ministry. 
 Align the number of job-bound trainees to the number of likely available job 
openings; be prepared to screen trainees for characteristics (e.g., a high school 
diploma) required by employees. 
 Follow up with participants after they have completed the program to help 
troubleshoot their employment obstacles until they have achieved some success; also, 
in order to learn what has and has not worked, for future program development. 
 
This study was limited by the absence of sufficient documentation and data. The overall 
impression one is left with is that Project HOPE, despite having done some good in the 
communities it served, was unsuccessful at fulfilling most of its objectives related to providing 
sustainable employment opportunities to at-risk rural Salvadoran youth. The prospects for future 
successes for similar programs could be improved, given attention to the recommendations in 
this study.  
In particular, future youth-oriented employment programs are encouraged to coordinate 
and cooperate with other agencies having similar or complementary goals; detailed long-term 
planning would be required in order to maintain the structure, focus, and integrity of the core 
program and to ensure that mutual promises and obligations are being kept. Someone needs to 
know at all times where funds are coming from and where and how they are being spent, no 
small task with a multiagency alliance. However, with the right management and coordination, 
the promise of joining forces and resources to achieve mutual ends is attractive.  
Finally, without the kind of regional economic development that is beyond the scope of a 
cash-strapped youth employment program, a struggling endeavor such as Project HOPE simply 
exemplifies and magnifies the dilemma that brought it into being in the first place:  Salvadoran 
youth in the poorest, mostly rural, regions of the country are at risk of involvement with gangs 
and violence in large part because they presently have few or no immediate, legitimate 
alternatives for a social and economic future. 
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Section 7.  Projóvenes II:  Social Cohesion and Youth Participation 
as a Violence Prevention Model 
 
Laurel Burgett 
 
 
The majority of programs studied for this report aim in various ways to directly improve 
opportunities for young El Salvadorans to obtain legitimate employment. In contrast, the Project 
of Social and Violence Prevention with Youth Participation, Projóvenes II, is a project that 
indirectly affects the employment prospects of its clients by targeting regions with high risk 
factors for juvenile delinquency and violence, and then mitigating those risk factors, particularly 
for those age 35 years and under. El Salvador’s National Institute of Youth (INJUVE),1 an 
organization responsible for the formulation, execution, management, and monitoring of projects 
aimed at assisting with the growth and development of Salvadoran youth and reducing violence 
among them, directs Projóvenes II. 
According to INJUVE’s Conceptualization of a Social Model of Violence Prevention 
with Youth Participation,2 the El Salvador government’s political agenda included the prevention 
of violence and addressed other topics relevant to youth within its National Policy on Justice. 
During his 2012 opening remarks to Juventour, an annual conference to promote youth, 
President Mauricio Funes stated, “The essence of the work we carry out through government is 
creating opportunities for Salvadoran youth.” The focus on youth is a primary concern for the 
recovery of El Salvador’s continuing state of social and economic distress. The effort to 
construct peaceful and inclusive communities is believed to be the foundation needed to provide 
for their material needs and the development of Salvadoran youth into productive members of 
society.   
The Project of Social and Violence Prevention with Youth Participation, also known as 
                                                 
1 The organization was known as CONJUVE until 2012, when it was renamed INJUVE. 
2 W. Savenije and Maria Antonieta Beltran, Conceptualization of a Social Model of Violence Prevention with Youth Participation (San 
Salvador, El Salvador: Impresos Multiples S.A. de C.V., 2013). 
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Projóvenes II, is among several initiatives under INJUVE’s direction. Projóvenes I, the first 
phase of the Projóvenes project, operated from 2003 to 2009, with funding from the European 
Union and the Republic of El Salvador. The European Union Head of Mission to El Salvador 
cited the results of Projóvenes I as promising and supported its continuation through a second 
phase, Projóvenes II, which is currently scheduled to end in 2015. The challenges encountered 
while implementing Projóvenes I resulted in 2012 in the establishment of the National Youth 
Institute (INJUVE) to lead the Projóvenes II project.  
INJUVE’s Prevention Model complements the framework of the General Youth Law and 
the National Youth Policy that guide state actions for the implementation of youth development 
public policy, plans, strategies, and programs.3 The Prevention Model is organized around risk 
factors and dynamics of vulnerable communities that negatively affect youth at risk. The two 
most common social risk factors are unemployment and domestic violence. According to 
INJUVE, environmental factors that are detrimental to youth include dark areas, poor roads, lack 
of recreational space, dilapidated infrastructure, natural disasters, and the presence of bars. 
Activities developed to support the Projóvenes project’s objectives are designed around each 
individual community's complex of interactive dynamics and symptoms. INJUVE relies on 
community management teams to plan activities that are relevant to their local environment 
needs. Their success depends heavily upon volunteers and participation. Such activities include 
workshops that enhance the physical environment, such as building and painting sports facilities. 
Other workshops might include arts and crafts, or training to improve opportunities for 
employment. INJUVE also supplies the guidance, resources, and transfer of knowledge needed 
to enable city leaders to assume responsibility for sustaining their communities. 
Unfortunately, El Salvador has been well known as one of the most violent countries in 
the region in the aftermath of El Salvador’s 12-year civil war. The prevalence of human rights 
violations and death squads operating with impunity is part of the institutional legacy that 
threatens Salvadorans today. The Peace Accords of 1992 marked the end of the war; however, 
violence and insecurity continue. Efforts to create a democratic institution have been 
unsuccessful, contributing further to the current high levels of violence. The war affected the 
country's governance systems, and El Salvador now suffers from political polarization, weak 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 60. 
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democratic institutions, and ineffective judicial systems. Meanwhile, the formation of street 
gangs has evolved as a consequence of social and economic destruction; those gangs have 
become the leading perpetrators of violence. Weak enforcement response on the part of judicial 
and law enforcement institutions has permitted the gangs to strengthen their authority among the 
population.4  
According to the RESDAL Public Security Index, 45% of Salvadoran gang members are 
situated in San Salvador.5 The presence of gangs is linked to issues of youth and public security. 
The Mara Salvatruche and Mara 18 factions, in particular, battle for control of Salvadoran 
neighborhoods and communities.6 Typical crimes include extortion, muggings, highway assault, 
home invasion and auto theft. According to an April 25, 2014 travel advisory from the U.S. 
Department of State, Salvadoran police statistics at the time indicated a steady rise in homicide, 
as well, since August 2013. The National Civilian Police (PNC) cannot adequately address those 
crime issues with its limited training, resources, and overall response capabilities. The current 
conviction rate in El Salvador is 5%, demonstrating the lack of sufficient resources to 
investigate, prosecute, and deter violent crime.  
The Projóvenes II project targets 14 municipalities, covering 78 communities in the 
Metropolitan San Salvador area. Much of the violence occurs in impoverished, densely 
populated cities. INJUVE’s focus is on children and young people who live in those areas. 
Communities attempting to mitigate the conditions that support crime rely upon a prevention 
model used by cooperative partnerships among state government agencies, educational 
institutions, employers, the PNC, the Institute of Sports, and the Departments of Education and 
Transportation. INJUVE claims that the Projóvenes II project has enjoyed high levels of 
participation and continues to offer promise for violence intervention. The project has generated 
opportunities for labor training and employment mediation, and has contributed to much-needed 
personal, family, community, and municipal development to provide support and opportunities 
for youth at risk. 
The current study focuses on phase two, Projóvenes II, as managed by INJUVE in San 
                                                 
4 Stephanie Brewer, Mark Jensen, Timothy Mayhle, Spring Miller, Maria Romero, and Molly Thomas-Jensen, No Place to Hide: 
Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador, manuscript (Harvard University, 2007). 
5 RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America El Salvador (last modified March 2013): http://www.resdal.org/seguridad/assets/ 
resdal-index-2013-el-salvador.pdf. 
6 Brewer et al., No Place to Hide. 
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Salvador, El Salvador. To gather the information presented in this report, I reviewed program 
documents obtained from INJUVE staff, attended a presentation by INJUVE, and conducted 
group and individual interviews of stakeholders.  
Program Description 
Projóvenes II is supported financially by the European Commission's Cooperation with 
El Salvador, which provided more than 14 million euros to the endeavor. An evaluation of that 
effort found that Projóvenes I had established an “insightful and valid alternative approach for 
youth delinquency through intervention that was later accompanied by a change in public 
policy.”7 The updated focus for Projóvenes II youth included community action, citizen 
literature, local governments, regional government leadership, a more participatory violence 
model, restored spaces, and communal meeting places, as well as the external partners’ authority 
to supervise programs.  
Projóvenes II serves at-risk individuals from birth to age 35, who live in 14 
municipalities (counties) encompassing 78 at-risk communities in San Salvador. Criteria for 
qualifying communities as “at risk” were determined by government and local authorities; they 
routinely have high levels of violent incidents such as murder, aggravated assault, sexual assault, 
and robbery. The Prevention Model mentioned above concentrates on five core areas to guide 
community development that supports the project's objectives: sports and recreation, culture and 
arts, family and volunteerism, health and social environment, and education and labor formation 
(preparation for employment). 
INJUVE's Institutional Role 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), among others, considers El Salvador 
one of the most violent countries in the world. Youth violence is recognized as one of the 
country's principal problems for deterioration of public security.8 That issue has generated 
policies and laws that mandate National Youth Policy. INJUVE was established as the head of 
government programs that highlight specific social and economic rights for youth. Previous 
                                                 
7 ADE, "Evaluation of European Commission’s Cooperation with El Salvador–Country-level Evaluation," Final Report (2010): 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/elsalvador/46141753.pdf. 
8 RESDAL, Public Security Index. 
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repression policies were unsuccessful at resolving social violence issues, leading to the adoption 
of integration and prevention strategies focused on youth. The new policy shift moves toward 
consolidating policies that address the juvenile condition, replicating positive outcomes at a 
national level, as well as within the 14 municipalities and 78 communities involved in the 
Projóvenes II project.9  
INJUVE's theoretical approach, adopted by the Social Model of Violence Prevention, is 
clarified as crime prevention, a way to protect public safety.10 Crime theory has consistently 
identified as causal factors such conditions as lack of education, unemployment, poverty, social 
structure, peer pressure, and opportunity. The focus on youth at risk is a reasonable strategy; this 
promises to be a productive population within which to apply prevention and intervention 
strategies, which have potential for improving the social and economic environment in El 
Salvador. Projóvenes’ Prevention Model is a comprehensive proposal for solving Salvadoran 
cultural problems and improving the lives of youth at risk, and El Salvador’s youth are in a 
unique position to intervene in the local dynamics of their communities to help establish social 
cohesion and strengthen their sense of community, thereby reducing the propensity for 
violence.11 
Local Communities - Conditions and Requirements   
According to an INJUVE concept, “the social model of violence prevention is based on 
the notion that violence has social roots and they manifest largely in poor and excluded urban 
environments.”12 The municipalities targeted by Projóvenes II are poor and lacking in social 
services such as education, health, and social security. High levels of violence are concentrated 
in high-poverty areas; the relationship is believed to be a condition of social fragmentation and 
lack of collaboration among its members. The risk factors of unemployment and domestic 
violence provide an environment of continuing social and economic dysfunction. The lack of 
strong family bonds, due in part to single parent homes and absent working parents, provides 
opportunities for youth to form gangs to share a social identity, interacting with each other 
through criminal behavior. Gang members establish territorial control in their neighborhoods 
                                                 
9ADE, "Evaluation." 
10 Savenije and Beltran, Conceptualization of a Social Model, 12. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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using extortion, violence and threats. 
Projóvenes II seeks to promote social cohesion and to mitigate risk factors for juvenile 
delinquency in local communities. Social cohesion develops when residents are engaging with 
one another for the betterment of their community and are included as members of the wider 
society. Because of local participants’ connection to the community, their roles within the 
Projóvenes process are valuable in generating social cohesion. The municipal mayors have 
pledged their support and promote the activities organized in their communities. Their 
commitment includes methods for local prevention and intervention techniques and a supportive 
infrastructure. 
INJUVE recognizes that municipal governments are the institutions that best understand 
local needs and expectations, and that have the authority to allow security-related measures 
needed to implement programs. The Prevention Model requires the involvement and institutional 
strengthening of the 14 municipal governments as needed to meet the results described by the 
European Union. An INJUVE employee described the institution's responsibility as to teach 
communities how to succeed, then to let the community make decisions and take action.  
Projóvenes II uses the Prevention Model to guide communities toward social cohesion by 
implementing specific activities designed by those municipalities. During an interview, INJUVE 
managing staff members presented a PowerPoint summary of the project’s goals, efforts, and 
initiatives that they deemed successful. During the presentation, they related that they monitored 
activities through reports that had been filed by target communities and accepted by the Mayors' 
Council. The Mayors' Council is comprised of the mayors of all 14 municipalities (counties) 
involved in Projóvenes II. Those reports document numbers of participants and types and 
locations of workshops. The INJUVE employees described the oversight and training process, 
emphasizing that the goal is to transfer knowledge to communities while leaving them 
responsible for the implementation of violence-prevention initiatives. When asked how they 
measured outcomes, the employees stated that it was difficult to quantify social cohesion, and 
they relied on the perceptions of each community’s members to gauge success. They compiled 
data from communities on activities for each community, number of workshops, number of 
participants, completion rates, and community feedback. One staff member reported, for 
example, a better than 90% completion rate for workshops.  
Workshops varied as to scope and timeframe. INJUVE staff gave examples of art and 
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culture workshops such as painting, acting, and singing. Some of those workshops were 
classified as entrepreneurial opportunities for self-employment, since the San Salvador culture 
has a market for street vendors and performers. Youth are particularly interested in performance 
art, such as posing as human statues; street performers receive payment from their audiences. 
Other workshops covered topics such as education, entrepreneurship, scholarship programs, and 
family strengthening. Most of these were viewed, directly or indirectly, as expanding options for 
employment and education, and producing the social cohesion missing from the lives of at-risk 
youth.  
The INJUVE employees said that each community decides its own initiatives; as 
mentioned above, they consider the communities to be the best informed about local priorities. 
Equally important, this helps to establish responsibility and investment in community growth by 
the community participants and volunteers. The staff explained that the authority for spending 
funds is determined by the mayor representing each municipal government. INJUVE collects and 
creates a summary report of the data based on information from the community and provides it to 
the Mayoral Council.13  
Communities are expected to lead and implement local initiatives and crime prevention 
strategies. Volunteers exchange their time and effort for an enhanced community and valuable 
training and experience in community service and work that may be applicable to future job 
opportunities. Focus group members were unanimous in reporting volunteer experiences 
resulting in growth and development that they perceived as a step toward uplifting community 
spirit. As an example, they identified workshops during which they had built a basketball court 
and soccer field as having been significant for their youth, giving them a place to play safely; 
being involved in sports occupied their time constructively and provided an alternative to gangs 
for youth from different communities to interact. An INJUVE team leader facilitates such 
workshops, providing materials and recruiting community volunteers.  
The staff and volunteers who further training and education are a promising catalyst for 
engaging community action and the concept of social cohesion discussed in the interviews. 
Those individuals have a greater understanding of the issues that are unique to their communities 
and presumably are better equipped to develop strategies that provide hope and opportunities for 
                                                 
13 A request for documents was submitted, but those had not been received by the completion of this study. 
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their youth. The number of program participants is an important outcome for assessment. 
Therefore, marketing the program to increase awareness, support and participation is important. 
Unemployment due to lack of job opportunities is identified as a major risk factor for 
vulnerable youth. The Projóvenes project creates unique training opportunities for its staff and 
volunteers, while encouraging social activity. Community technicians, volunteers and youth 
facilitators belong to the community they serve. They are in a position to identify factors and 
situations that put youth at risk and to conduct outreach efforts to intervene and encourage 
participation. The technicians receive training to organize activities in the Prevention Model: 
sports, health and environment, arts and culture, and family. Their knowledge of the community 
includes knowing the people with influence, such as church leaders or gang members. They are 
trained to promote and organize social activities seeking the support of other residents. They are 
selected to receive training through scholarships provided by INJUVE in specific areas such as 
painting, martial arts, or organized sports, then put this into practice in their communities.  
Youth facilitators are chosen from volunteers who have demonstrated cooperation with 
the Prevention Model and have experience in community work. They are recognized as social 
entrepreneurs and receive theoretical training for violence prevention and in areas such as 
holistic health, work orientation, life skills, sexual and reproductive health and drug use and 
prevention. Within their model, INJUVE provides technical support and training to guide the 
communities’ efforts through territorial coordinators, community technicians and youth 
facilitator scholarships. The process is designed to train and transfer responsibility for social 
prevention and violence to the municipality, local organizations and volunteers.14  
One of the more insurmountable issues facing youth at risk is the social and employer 
prejudice that attaches to those from certain communities that are known to be dominated by 
gangs (see also sections 3 and 6). During interviews with INJUVE employees and participants, 
those stakeholders expressed the belief that such discrimination was widespread. Rightly or 
wrongly, employers may fear infiltration and intimidation from gangs when hiring employees 
from those areas. Program initiatives that mention gangs or violence in their descriptions may 
even serve to reinforce the perception of violence associated with participating communities, an 
unintended consequence of violence prevention programs that might be counterproductive to 
                                                 
14 Savenije and Beltran, Conceptualization of a Social Model, 12. 
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their objectives. 
Effectiveness  
According to the Delegation of the European Union in El Salvador, the general objective 
of Projóvenes II is to promote social cohesion and mitigate risk factors for violence and juvenile 
delinquency in El Salvador. The intention is to strengthen the capacities for rehabilitation and 
prevention of violence in 14 municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador. The 
project is a multi-institutional effort to consolidate the processes initiated by Projóvenes I (2003-
2009). The following, quoted directly from Union Europa website, 15 are the four results sought 
as Projóvenes II launched:  
 Strengthening public institutions with jurisdiction in violence prevention and 
rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law. This is to be achieved through 
promotion of conditions for interagency coordination, improved quality of services, 
support for municipal councils for violence prevention, monitoring of agreements, 
and technical assistance to support the inclusion of the needs of youth at all levels of 
the political agenda. 
 Supporting the integration of risk groups in the life of the community. The intent is to 
improve conditions for different risk groups, to provide resources and opportunities 
for them to actively participate in the prevention of violence and crime in their 
communities and municipalities. 
 Provide economic opportunities for youth and their families. The project will create 
opportunities for job training and intermediation for employment, and will provide 
technical support for establishing companies that can especially help at-risk youth, the 
family, community and municipal development. 
 Recovery of physical/environmental conditions of the communities. This involves the 
development of activities that attempt to change habits and cultural patterns that 
hinder healthy physical environments, as well as the construction, maintenance and 
preparation of public areas to transform them into areas for civic coexistence. 
                                                 
15 Projovenes II. Social Violence Prevention with Youth Involvement in El Salvador. (n.d.): http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ 
el_salvador/eu_el_salvador/tech_financial_cooperation/social_cohesion/projovenes/index_es.htm. 
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Projóvenes II uses the prevention model to guide participating communities toward the 
goal of social cohesion, helping them to implement activities that they have chosen, using 
community volunteers. INJUVE has a staff of 148 employees, 50 of whom work as coordinators 
within the communities. The program provides (and teaches community members) project 
coordination and technical and troubleshooting skills. The efforts of the INJUVE staff and 
community volunteers are augmented where needed by some 100 additional volunteers from the 
National Youth Volunteer Network. The objective is to offer training, support, and experience, 
gradually transferring those skills and the responsibility for prioritizing, carrying out, and 
maintaining the projects to the communities. Examples of workshops selected by the 
communities included arts and cultural activities, some of which were considered to have 
entrepreneurial value in areas where street performance was a way to make a modest living.  
Spending authority is given to the council of 14 mayors who represent the municipalities 
within which the program operates. INJUVE monitors progress in each municipality by 
reviewing and compiling self-report data on numbers of workshops, number of participants, 
completion rates (which one staff member reported as typically being 90%), and community 
member feedback. Interviewees acknowledged that it is hard to measure social cohesion. These 
data are reported back to the Mayors' Council. 
European Commission's Final Evaluation Report (Projóvenes I & II) 
In the Final Evaluation Report prepared by the European Commission on the cooperative 
agreement with El Salvador (2010), evaluators found that Projóvenes stakeholders considered its 
projects relevant to the problems they were intended to address. The Commission's approval of 
the violence reduction policies and strategies in particular made those elements important to 
carry forward into the second phase. The report established that Projóvenes I was an interesting 
case of an intervention that initially contrasted with the repressive government policy toward 
juvenile delinquency then in effect. Projóvenes' strategy was based on prevention, rehabilitation, 
and integration. Repressive policies had been openly criticized by the United Nations and 
ultimately were deemed in El Salvador to be anti-constitutional. In 2005, the Salvadoran 
government proposed to emphasize prevention and an integrated approach to intervention 
strategies. Some attributed that public policy change to success of prevention-based Projóvenes 
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I.16 Overall, based on the achievements of Projóvenes I, the program proved to be an effective 
model for violence prevention.17 Since that time, the program appears to be continuing to 
improve and evolve in accord with individual community issues, establishing initiatives that 
reduce risk factors for youth by promoting social bonds, family, self-esteem, and education. The 
objective of social cohesion is in line with many existing crime theories that focus on juvenile 
crime prevention while improving opportunities for employment and social equality. The 
Projóvenes model has evolved since its implementation in 2002, and all sources examined for 
this study indicates that it will continue to be effective in the current environment as a violence-
reduction strategy. Its impacts on employability and job placement, however, are indirect and 
less clear. 
Projóvenes II Site Visit  
An assessment of a target Projóvenes II community was conducted through a site visit 
and group interview (focus group) in an impoverished San Salvador community. The location 
had a high number of gang members and a reputation for violence. The community had been 
involved with INJUVE for two years, engaging in several workshops. During my visit, a 
workshop to provide space to play sports was in progress. Volunteers were building a soccer 
field that would be used by more than 200 youth making up 40 teams, and a large number of 
youths already were eager to play on the teams. INJUVE had hired a contractor to assist with the 
project and community volunteers were supplementing paid construction workers.  
Overall, interviewees at the site were highly supportive of INJUVE and the motivation 
for their involvement in the community. Among the interviewees were youth participants who 
had won scholarships to attend college and to receive labor training. The scholarship winners 
would have had no other means of continuing their educations, and were clearly appreciative of 
the program's generosity and of the personal growth and learning achieved. They embodied the 
community's newly found social cohesion, expressing the desire to give back to their community 
by teaching and mentoring others; one had earned a college degree, yet wanted to remain in the 
community and teach. Another was able to obtain employment because of the labor training 
received and currently remained in the community, supporting a spouse and child. The money 
                                                 
16 ADE, Final Report, 67. 
17 Ibid. 
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provided by the grant scholarships was significantly greater than any funding that either could 
have earned on his or her own, the average income for the area being approximately $35 a week. 
The interviewees reported that the social cohesion-violence prevention objectives of 
Projóvenes II were met through education, sports and recreation, and community celebrations 
that promoted social bonds. The activity deterred violence by providing entertainment, 
motivation through competition, and a place to play sports. The communal center provided a 
gathering area for neighbors to meet to celebrate birthdays, holidays, and sports games.  
Projóvenes' Impact on Violence Reduction 
 Local workshops and celebratory gatherings fostered an atmosphere of community and 
safety, but they were subject to the violence inflicted by gangs. Gang members are often 
considered an authoritarian presence, and the neighborhood negotiates with them to allow 
activities to take place. This has been a challenge for coordinators, who sometimes have to stop 
working due to gang intimidation, but the situation has improved somewhat through 
communication and negotiations with gang members. Interviewees who had children were 
particularly appreciative of the value of having non-gang alternatives for their children safe and 
positive environments for them to play.  
Projóvenes tackles the problem of juvenile delinquency and violence. The foundation for 
its prevention model has its roots in social theory; the belief is that prevention and intervention 
practices within the community will develop social cohesion and the communal support needed 
to reduce and eradicate violence. The European Commission viewed the prevention model as a 
pioneering approach for juvenile delinquency strategies that was resulting in a decrease in 
juvenile delinquency in intervention areas.  
The European Commission did establish that there had been a reduction of violence and 
juvenile delinquency in one program during the timeframe for Projóvenes I, stating: 
Projóvenes I proposed an integrated approach based on prevention and 
improvement of opportunities for young people. It covered 13 municipalities 
(1,537,171 inhabitants) and 57 communities (179,949 inhabitants or 38,225 
families). There were 70,915 young people aged between 10 and 25 as direct 
beneficiaries according to the project’s final report (compared with 50,000 
envisaged in the financing agreement). Its action is being pursued by the follow-
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up program, Projóvenes II.18 
 
The project’s final technical report provided a summary of achievements from 2003 to 
2006: that is, a 25.2% reduction in the number of cases opened at Juvenile Courts, a 23.7% 
reduction in the number of detentions of minors carried out by the National Police, and a 70% 
reduction in child abuse and family violence reports.19  
The authority of gangs within communities is a safety and security issue that continues to 
challenge Projóvenes II. Gangs have confronted volunteers and staff. In one incident, gang 
members suspected program coordinators of being informants simply because of their contact 
with government officials. INJUVE staff saw such challenges as a need to establish better 
communication between government authorities, police, and the community to promote trust. A 
local media news outlet also reported that between September 2010 and February 2011, 14 
Projóvenes II volunteers had been killed by gang members who were working in their 
territories.20 Critics suggested that a weakness of the program was the lack of security to protect 
volunteers as they worked in the target communities, and that data were insufficient to determine 
whether Projóvenes was effectively influencing crime. 
Projóvenes' Impact on Youth Access to Employment 
Asked how the program might improve, interviewees requested more training and 
support aimed at generating income and employment opportunities. They believed that the 
community was working together to improve their environment—they had learned how to fix the 
physical environment and to be self-sustaining in that area—they now saw the need for outreach 
to improve employment opportunities with local companies. They recognized that positions for 
their children to attend schools were scarce, and that companies would not hire the youths 
because they lacked education and experience, and the few available jobs were highly 
competitive. They were certain that if they could get help training their youth, the employment 
potential would increase. The two priorities for this community were typical: Their children 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 ADE, Final Report, 31. 
20 David Marroquin, "14 Teenagers Murdered during Projóvenes II Program," Fusades (August 23, 2013): 
http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=6342&idArt=6121553. 
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needed community activities to constructively occupy their time, and they needed help breaking 
through the barriers to employment, including those barriers associated with the stigma of living 
in at-risk gang-connected communities. 
Interviewees described their community as violent, poor, and overrun by gangs, yet they 
were mistrustful of the local police. They knew that their youth were discriminated against 
simply because they lived in that area. An emotional discussion took place about how this 
discrimination affected the ability to be hired, regardless of having completed training 
workshops and having other qualifications that suited them for employment. They blamed the 
negative reputation of all residents on local authorities, including police. One remarked that it 
was “a crime to be young” in their community, describing incidents of police abuse toward youth 
from the community who were not involved in criminal activity. The sensitivity to issues of 
prejudice, distrust, suspicion, and lack of communication with police authorities found in 
INJUVE documents were confirmed by this discussion, and there was little doubt that qualified 
or not, youth from this community would have trouble finding jobs without assistance in 
overcoming cultural barriers, as well.  
Replication 
According to INJUVE, the Projóvenes project has become an international model for at-
risk youth development projects. The European Union, a major funding source for Projóvenes, is 
an international foundation geared toward volunteerism and projects that expand youth 
opportunities, such that a network for sharing youth projects and model programs is readily 
accessible. The long-term implementation of Projóvenes provides a vast array of experience and 
social diversity to draw upon and learn from. As a government institution, INJUVE has an 
abundance of resource materials that can be analyzed for replication purposes. The broad context 
of social cohesion through youth participation is a theory for crime intervention in which the 
most successful outcome is believed to be prevention. It may be difficult to effectively monitor 
socially applied initiatives, but promoting values, self-esteem, education, inclusion, and social 
bonds for youth is a globally accepted ideology.  
The Projóvenes model in its first phase began in 2003 and lasted for more than six years. 
Projóvenes II began in 2009, incorporating lessons learned from Projóvenes I, and is currently 
scheduled to end in 2015. According to INJUVE, Projóvenes II increased program support to 
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serve more than 100,000 youth in the target region and increased its maximum participation age 
from age 25 to age 35 years. Development of employment opportunities became a greater focus, 
addressing an issue that is likely to become an increasingly relevant in El Salvador for some time 
to come; communities considering replicating the Projóvenes model locally might give special 
attention to prioritizing employment support. 
Projóvenes II might be one of the better options for replication in locales with gang 
problems; the program model is based on long-term strategies that aim to reduce violence 
predominantly linked to gangs. Increasingly, Projóvenes is contributing to a youth and 
community environment that could be expected to mitigate that problem. The founding of 
INJUVE was a management evolution that supported continued progress toward that Projóvenes 
goal. Recent INJUVE leadership has had the benefit of lessons learned from both Projóvenes 
models, enabling them to continue improving. Evidence of Projóvenes’ success may not yet be 
available in the form of official data, but it is captured to a certain degree through community 
reports of initiatives, numbers and activities of participants, and the collective experiences of the 
individuals involved. 
The interviewees we spoke with during our site visit acknowledged that funding for the 
project in their community, and in any community in which it might be replicated, would be an 
ongoing issue for Projóvenes II and INJUVE. They provided examples of in-kind resources they 
had been given, such as paint, sports equipment, and the community center. They requested 
continued funding because they believed the program was offering positive solutions to improve 
opportunities and quality of life for their youth. They have increased the activity of their 
community members as volunteers and youth participants. That activity has generated 
community involvement, pride, and hope for their local environment. 
Communities are likely to be attracted to the Projóvenes II model because of INJUVE 
recognition that local residents can best prioritize and manage local needs. To be effective when 
transplanted, a program must be newly sensitive and relevant to improving the social and 
economic environments specific to those areas. Projóvenes' Prevention Model has that kind of 
flexibility. 
As mentioned above, Projóvenes is tied to public security associated with youth 
vulnerable to violence and gangs. Universally, gangs are engaged in criminal activity and 
recruiting members from at-risk environments. The street gang phenomenon in El Salvador has 
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succeeded somewhat in inhibiting youth participation in Projóvenes II in the 14 municipalities it 
serves. Gang dominance has been undeterred by ineffectual policing strategies, and it continues 
to be a public security concern. To protect youth participants, volunteers, and staff who work 
predominantly in high-violence areas occupied by gangs, far better law enforcement strategies 
are needed, but those strategies require careful consideration due to the complex relationships 
between gangs, communities, and police. In areas contemplating replication of Projóvenes, such 
strategies will require partnerships among the relevant actors within each community.  
INJUVE has gained some experience and insight into developing responses to gang 
violence perpetrated against youth participants in Projóvenes projects. INJUVE has tried 
negotiating directly with gang members to reduce the number of such incidents—a dangerous 
strategy to rely upon, perhaps, but it has been proven to work when initiated by other community 
members. This illustrates the kinds of dangers that the Prevention Model is aimed at reducing. 
Currently, police simply are neither trusted nor capable of offering a solution.  
Social and economic factors associated with other communities are likely to be different 
than those found in San Salvador. Wherever the Projóvenes prevention model might be under 
consideration for replication, it would be necessary to examine closely the social conditions that 
undermine youth opportunities in order to develop effective goals, strategies, and outcome 
measures. Social inequality in El Salvador is an obstacle for employment and education 
opportunities. INJUVE has the benefit of funding sources to support both Projóvenes projects, 
but it was still essential to competently communicate project details, monitor initiatives, and 
capture data to illustrate progress in order to obtain continued funding. The Projóvenes II budget 
was more than 14 million euros (USD$16.4 million), provided by the European Commission and 
the Republic of El Salvador. To replicate this project would require similar funding, government 
support, and the ability to monitor and report program outcomes accurately and effectively. 
No independent final evaluation of the project has been conducted to date, and little 
objective information is available for verifying those data or attributing outcomes directly to 
Projóvenes. The question posed for the examination of the program's local impact was whether it 
had potential for replication and expansion. The final official program evaluation concluded that 
although that potential had not yet been realized, Projóvenes’ influence on changing the direction 
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of public policy to fight violence was highly significant.21  
Vocational training, access to employment, and support of self-employment were 
identified as areas in need of improvement as Projóvenes II was unveiled. At the time of this 
study, very little objective information was available on other monitoring and evaluations of the 
Projóvenes II programs; however, our analysis of the documents, interviews, and research 
available suggested that it is an effective model for violence prevention and intervention 
strategies. The depth of violence in El Salvador is well established and acknowledged by the 
nation’s government. In addition, the government focus on youth at risk through lawful mandates 
and the creation of institutions like INJUVE to plan and implement youth strategies is indicative 
of the government’s priorities, and the support of government-external organization partnerships 
is a critical for long-term sustainability. The available data suggested a reduction in violence due 
to Projóvenes initiatives. There is potential to replicate those outcomes at a national level. The 
measure of success is difficult to quantify, but the interviews conducted suggested a common 
theme of positive outcomes and synergy that is necessary to create social cohesion as an element 
for recovering social and economic opportunities for the youth in El Salvador.   
Sustainability 
Stabilization requires continued funding, engaged external partners, and volunteers. The 
damage caused by violence and gangs in the community is significant and not easily repaired. 
INJUVE staff provided recommendations to improve strategies through “lessons learned.” They 
talked about wanting to include youth in communities that were not at risk as well as those with 
risk. They believed that advancement of youth opportunities would be furthered by the inclusion 
of all youth to improve relationships and to extend the program’s impact. They believed that 
INJUVE’s position as an advocate for youth should be separated from outside political influence. 
As the voice of youth, INJUVE would work to improve their status, to better understand youth 
issues, and to create proactive solutions on their behalf. An example of the type of issue they 
wanted to address is the prevalent mistrust between youth and the police. INJUVE could credibly 
defend the identity and adverse stereotypes of young people. The marked presence of gangs is 
another dominant issue that inhibits their access to areas to complete their work. INJUVE can act 
as a negotiator to communicate with the gangs. Finally, they realized, the eradication of gangs 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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from the community would be a holistic solution that could significantly improve the liberties of 
the youth. An integrated approach would be needed. INJUVE would like to invest and generate 
opportunities to confront this issue. The interviewees acknowledged that a complete solution is 
not likely to be achieved in the next five years, but the problem should be openly discussed 
among citizens, church, and government institutions with the objective of deflecting the gangs’ 
authority and penetration in communities. 
Projóvenes is an evolving long-term initiative. The sustainability of this ambitious project 
would require an ongoing constant stream of resources, including funding, government support, 
and staffing. The priority given to Projóvenes through National Youth Laws and the National 
Institute of Youth (INJUVE) suggests stability. The ultimate goal for Projóvenes is to promote 
social cohesion and mitigate risk factors for violence and juvenile delinquency in El Salvador. 
The second phase of the Projóvenes project offers us some insight into the requirements for 
sustainability. Projóvenes I funding was more than 11 million euro ($12.8 million) over a period 
of six years. Projóvenes II funding is over 14 million euro ($16.4 million), also for a period of 
six years, due to end in 2015. The success of Projóvenes is evidenced by increased participation 
in community activity. Projóvenes II continued the emphasis on increasing local volunteer 
participation. More resources would be needed to keep up with the momentum of growth 
expected if the project were to continue.  
INJUVE staff had been told that they would receive funding to continue Projóvenes for a 
third phase after its 2015 conclusion, but they did not know the funding source. They do believe 
that their model is highly regarded by the European Union and their own government. The 
support of external partners and the government is critical for long-term financial and policy 
continuity. If the continuation of the program becomes a reality, the Projóvenes II staff expects 
to continue to offer improvements and updated initiatives to remain relevant to the current social 
and economic environment.  
Conclusion 
The level of violence in El Salvador is a cultural reality attributed to the aftermath of its 
12-year-long civil war. The environment of El Salvador continues to be affected both socially 
and economically. Although the Republic of El Salvador, in cooperation with the European 
Union, has implemented strategies to improve conditions, much more work is still to be done. 
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The Salvadoran government has focused on increasing opportunities for youth as an effective 
means to create positive change. Communities have made progress through the Projóvenes 
Project, implemented as a result of the National Youth Policy and managed by the National 
Youth Institute known as INJUVE. Projóvenes emphasizes a social model of violence prevention 
with youth participation. The aim of the model, according to INJUVE, is to promote social 
cohesion and mitigate risk factors of violence and juvenile delinquency in El Salvador.22 At the 
time of this study, Projóvenes, which began in 2003, has continued through two project phases 
over the past 12 years. Long-term vision, focus and reliable funding are required to accomplish 
the outcomes established by the European Union and Republic of El Salvador. 
The project continues to work toward improving social cohesion as a means of deterring 
violence among youth. Feedback from those directly involved is a significant source of 
information about whether that outcome is being achieved through the project's initiatives. A 
more comprehensive method for monitoring and evaluating program results, however, will be 
needed to more effectively measure and communicate those outcomes. Such evaluation data 
would be useful for monitoring, analyzing, and improving the program for future applications, as 
well as for justifying continued investment of resources.23  
The best currently available source of information for evaluating this program resided 
within the communities’ own assessments of improvements in their residents’ quality of life. 
There was some criticism that external partners should become more visible in the discussion 
and solutions for their specific localities. The Projóvenes project relies on the transfer of 
knowledge to members of at-risk communities, who then come together in applying that 
knowledge, a process that should help establish local social cohesion. Overall, however, the 
interviews conducted for this evaluation clearly supported the communities’ need for 
intervention programs designed for their youth at all ages. One remaining unsolved problem is 
the impact of the prevalence of gangs in the participating communities; this will continue to be a 
challenge for violence prevention, public security, and participation in community activities 
where gangs are located. Many interviewees believed that security strategies should be adopted 
so that residents will continue to volunteer to work on initiatives that contribute to social 
                                                 
22 Savenije and Beltran, Conceptualization of a Social Model. 
23 According to the CRE Final Report, CRS to USAID (June 30, 2014, 43), average annual cost per participant for programming was 
$2,353.   
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cohesion. Additionally, the stigma of gang-related violence associated with specific areas is a 
barrier for employment and a source of social prejudice among those outside these communities. 
INJUVE recognizes that it should take the lead in strengthening external partnerships and 
speaking on behalf of youth rights to improve communication in order to make progress towards 
resolving such problems; the conversation needs to include employers, law enforcement and 
community members.  
Projóvenes II has considered itself to be in the business of fostering an environment and 
social context that ultimately will support more employment opportunities for youth, rather than 
being a direct employment services program. The stakeholders we interviewed were in 
agreement, however, that their youth of a certain age needed more opportunities to generate 
income now. Projóvenes II has responded by offering workshops to help improve education self-
employment and job placement, to the extent possible. The stigma of violence and the reputation 
associated with impoverished and gang-ridden communities has been difficult for those youth 
who live in those communities to overcome. A greater effort to advocate for those who have 
demonstrated high values and skills with employers is a step forward in this process. INJUVE 
staff also recommended that the organization separate itself from political interests so that it 
could have a stronger voice with which to represent youth rights. It is this developing 
commitment to working more directly to resolve problems that inhibit the employment of even 
trained and well-qualified youth from troubled communities is what earns Projóvenes II a place 
among the employment programs studied for this report. 
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Section 8. Project Sustainable Communities: 
Entrepreneurship and Employment Generation 
 
Rafael Artiga Gudiel 
 
 
The Sustainable Communities Project: Entrepreneurship and Employment Generation 
began as the initiative of a single leader from the business sector.1 The 2010 completion of the 
construction of the Torre Futura located in Colonia Escalon offered business opportunities and 
challenges that stimulated his thinking and eventually led to the initiation of this project. He was 
convinced that the completion of the Torre Futura would boost economic activities in the area 
and that those opportunities could be identified and addressed. He was also aware of the 
significant challenges related to the territorial-commercial system, traffic, the area's appearance, 
and the need to ensure a safe environment.  
Security issues in particular would be complicated. According to the security office of the 
City Hall of San Salvador in December 2012, the security levels of eight of the area's 
communities—Cristo Redentor, San Diego, la Pedrera, Nueva Esperanza, Nuñez Arrue, Las 
Lajas Oriente, Corazon de Maria, and El Prado—were classified by the Civil National Police 
(CNP) as "red code, highly dangerous" due to the presence of the gangs MS and 18, which 
resulted in increased murder statistics, the sale and consumption of drugs, and gang controlled 
housing. Two communities, Cecilio del Valle and El Carmen, were classified as "yellow code;" 
gangs in those locations had been dismantled by the army, but the sector still experienced high 
rates of extortion and the sale and consumption of drugs. Seven other communities at that time 
did not present major problems2 and were classified as "green code:" San Valle de Oro 1 and 2, 
12 de Octubre, Rosalinda, Lajas Poniente, San Pablo, and La Paz.  
Another difficult situation would also require alternative solutions:  the Centro Escolar 
                                                 
1 This individual served as Chairman of the Board, AGRISAL Group; Chairman of the Board, Fundación Empresarial para la Accion 
Social (FUNDEMAS); and Secretary of the Board, Fundación La Escalon. 
2 AGRISAL Group, Descriptive Document of the Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and Job Creation. 
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Concha viuda de Escalon was losing students before they graduated. Nearly 400 students had 
dropped out over three years, lowering the school's enrollment from 1,700 to 1,300 students. 
Without prospects of completing high school, students from seven other area schools also were 
giving up their formal education. Lack of education would affect their chances for employment, 
potentially making them vulnerable to becoming gang members.3 
An inclusive project design was needed, one that would become an agent of change for 
the communities in which it was implemented and that would take into account the ideas and 
abilities of the group of entrepreneurs, national and international institutions of education, and 
residents of Colonia Escalon (who later formed the Asociación La Escalon) who would influence 
the general development of the area's communities.4 That would assure the relevance of the 
project, as it responded to the concrete and specific needs of various segments of the population 
that occupied their distinct geographical areas. 
Three agencies became involved in giving life to the Sustainable Communities Project, 
AGRISAL, the Asociación La Escalon, and FUNDEMAS, each fulfilling a specific and 
complementary role. Their contributions in terms of experience and knowledge were critical to 
the success of the project design, its fluid and inclusive implementation, and its generation of 
results and impacts. To that end, one stakeholder explained, there were no written agreements 
between the agencies; everything was accomplished by discussion and oral agreement, which 
was highly effective. With other strategic partners, such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), written agreements were signed.5 
The AGRISAL Group is one of El Salvador's business conglomerates. It began 
operations in 1953 and now manages several major industry projects, shopping centers, and 
automotive and corporate centers, with operations in Central America and (more recently) South 
America. Its flagship project is the World Trade Center San Salvador, the most important 
corporate complex in the country. AGRISAL has been the main developer of design and project 
positioning, and the one that managed the first project funds and invited companies located in the 
area of Colonia Escalon to be part of the Asociación La Escalon, in order to generate a more 
favorable environment for the project's development. 
                                                 
3 Interview with stakeholder. 
4 AGRISAL Group, Descriptive Document of the Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and Job Creation.  
5 Interview with stakeholder. 
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FUNDEMAS is a nonprofit organization that was born on May 25, 2000 from a group of 
businessmen who saw the need to establish an organization dedicated to promoting the adoption 
of values, policies, and practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Salvadoran 
business sector, to achieve business competitiveness and sustainable economic and social 
development in El Salvador.6 FUNDEMAS already had a suitable methodology for the 
development of the project, so it became a strategic ally and was primarily responsible for the 
execution of project activities for five years. 
Asociación La Escalon is a group of residents, businesses, educational institutions, trade 
associations, cooperatives and professionals, incorporated on March 30, 2011 with financial 
support from USAID and management support from other companies of the AGRISAL Group, 
allowing the association to expand and consequently to invest in the area. The association places 
a strong emphasis on ensuring sustainable development in and surrounding the area of Colonia 
Escalon. Its objective is to make the area into a neat, attractive, safe, inclusive place, capable of 
representing a new model of urban quality of life, all of which is in complete harmony with the 
objectives of Project Sustainable Communities.7  
The association's creation coincided with the start of Project Sustainable Communities, 
and one of its primary purposes has been to follow up that project. The project is embedded in 
the association's strategic plan, which is oriented towards four actionable measures: (1) improve 
social inclusion in area communities, (2) improve area safety, (3) improve traffic flow in the 
area, (4) and renew the urban image of the area to attract and maintain activity. Asociación La 
Escalon reportedly has a membership of 23 large companies. Initially, it also received support 
from organizations such as the nearby Fundación Meza Ayau. Further financial resources were 
received from USAID and the Fund for Educational Development Initiatives of El Salvador 
(FIDES), administered by FUNDEMAS. 
FUNDEMAS is an organization that has developed methods for enabling development 
project participants, both owners and workers, to acquire practical tools and entrepreneurial skills 
to improve income. The organization began with challenges to economic development, originally 
identified in 2010, and the strategic vision to generate entrepreneurship through empowerment 
for work, to create new self-employment opportunities, and to strengthen existing micro-
                                                 
6 See http://www.fundemas.org/quienes-somos/que-es-fundemas. 
7 See http://www.laescalon.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=8&Itemid=111. 
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businesses. The project was born not as an approach to violence prevention, but with a focus on 
job creation; therefore, according to a stakeholder, the initial support of USAID was for 
economic growth and not for violence prevention, public safety, or promotion of peaceful 
coexistence and social cohesion. To achieve its institutional objectives, since the year 2000, 
FUNDEMAS has been presenting EMPRETEC workshops. According to a project stakeholder, 
EMPRETECH, a pioneering program of the United Nations, was established as an international 
franchise and now has a presence in more than 30 countries. It was created with the aim of 
helping small and medium-sized entrepreneurships to put ideas into action, as well as to develop 
and strengthen their businesses.8  
Project Sustainable Communities initially was focused on developing area 
entrepreneurships and businesses, according to one stakeholder. That project element was 
organized by FUNDEMAS. One could say that the project was built upon the accumulated 
experience of FUNDEMAS, which develops entrepreneurial behaviors, using EMPRETEC 
workshops, in order to create new employment, to create new jobs in existing companies, and to 
teach skills necessary for new and existing ventures that have the requisite potential and 
characteristics to thrive. 
To fine-tune the project's goals and objectives, a number of relevant tools were used— 
market research, supply and demand, census of communities, and a poverty map—to provide a 
baseline and analysis of those inputs for a market study. Market research was conducted to get a 
realistic understanding of the conditions in the communities near Colonia Escalon. At least two 
additional efforts were made to increase what was known of the area: a door-to-door community 
and business census (that is, where entrance was permitted), and research by Glasswing to 
inventory the existing infrastructure (e.g., recreation centers). In La Colonia Escalon, 865 
companies were surveyed. Most were service companies; some did not practice CSR.9 All of 
those inputs helped to inform project organizers about the health, education, risk mitigation, 
security, and recreation situations of the communities, which facilitated decision-making in the 
design of the project. AGRISAL and FUNDEMAS jointly defined objectives, activities, 
indicators, and the intervention area, which was delimited by the criteria of business partners and 
                                                 
8 EMPRETEC workshops are also known as Development of Entrepreneurial Behaviors. 
9 Herrarte Marketing, Marketing Research, in the Frame of the Project Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and Job Creation 
(December 2011). 
132 
 
then retaken from the development strategy of Colonia Escalon as part of the Asociación La 
Escalon.  
Once the general area of intervention was defined, two specific criteria for selecting 
communities for project participation could be decided: proximity to businesses and 
vulnerability. Work began in nine communities, but over time, fourteen were served. Eight 
schools were thought to have potential for working with the project, although initially that work 
was concentrated in the Centro Escolar Concha viuda de Escalon, the only school in the area 
offering classes up to high school level. 
The initial target group included young women aged 16 and older. The upper end of the 
age range was left open so that initially the project could not only focus on youth, but could 
extend its reach to the adult population, with the intention of having training examples to show to 
others. Thus, calls went out in general for anyone who wanted to participate. Throughout, project 
implementation evolved in accord with demand; today, the target population is youngsters. One 
stakeholder reported that statistics showed that most of those involved, or who are beneficiaries, 
are young, and that has encouraged still more young people to become involved. The population 
served includes gang members, as the project does not discriminate against anyone.  
Given that some gangs are predominant in the area, the project was forced to move from 
general calls for participation across the entire area to sectorial calls, in order not to expose 
participants to unnecessary risks. Reportedly, the schism of the gang "18" has caused that 
duplication of resources; now two courses have to be given for any training, one for each sector, 
rather than one, to maintain order and safety. 
The strategy for entering into the communities involved some trial-and-error efforts 
before the best way was found. For example, the work began with the Municipality of San 
Salvador (MSS), but that was quickly put aside for political reasons; the bias that could be 
generated usually associated the AGRISAL Group and FUNDEMAS with right-wing sectors, 
according to one stakeholder. However, the MSS has always been a strategic partner; the 
classifications of violence used by the project were developed by that agency. Likewise, the 
project tried to work with or enter communities through the Community Development 
Associations (CDA) or boards of directors. Finally, access to communities was accomplished 
through churches and even with the support of several political parties. 
A stakeholder told us that participation and full availability of the business sector has 
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made all the difference, since from the beginning of the project, a business representative had 
been meeting once a month with the association (initially, once a week), permitting timely 
redirection of the course of the project, if necessary. Besides, that stakeholder explained, that 
business is focused on the market, which has helped to have a well-defined job horizon. 
The Project 
The Sustainable Communities Project: Entrepreneurship and Employment Generation 
began in January 2011 with a deadline of five years (giving it one more year of operation at the 
time of this study). It has an overall budget of $1.13 million.10 FUNDEMAS administers the 
project with financial support from USAID ($500,000), the AGRISAL Group ($125,000), 
Fundación Rafael Meza Ayau ($125,000), FIDES ($250,000), and the contributions of 
FUNDEMAS itself ($130,000).11  
Project Sustainable Communities supports people living in communities located near 
Colonia Escalon with technical assistance related to issues that have been identified and 
prioritized through studies conducted in the area (e.g., projects, costing, sales, English topics, and 
computer and life skills) in order to facilitate the process of obtaining a job, creating a micro-
business, or strengthening an existing business. All of this has occurred in three phases, seeking 
to improve quality of life in the area as well as to decrease the number of youngsters who engage 
in violence. The project's purposes are to: 
 Contribute to employment generation, allowing participants to improve income and 
living conditions for this vulnerable sector; 
 Contribute to preventing the population from engaging in violence-generating 
activities; 
 Implement a methodology that articulates actual demand with supply; 
 Strengthen people in their entrepreneurial behaviors; and 
 Generate employment opportunities, creating and strengthening the competitiveness 
and sustainability of micro and small businesses (MSB), with a focus on the value 
chain. 
                                                 
10 All monetary amounts are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified. 
11 Since this study ended, three new donors, Cooperation GIZ, Cooperation of Canada, and the Fundación Gloria de Kriete, have made 
further contributions. 
134 
 
Project Sustainable Communities aims to contribute to employment generation in an 
environment of gender equality by promoting employability and creating and improving the 
competitiveness of micro and small businesses in support of the population of 14 communities in 
the area of La Escalon: Comunidad Asociación Francisco Nuñez Arrue, Comunidad La Pedrera, 
Comunidad Las Lajas Oriente, Comunidad Las Lajas Poniente, Comunidad Nueva Esperanza, 
Comunidad Rosalinda, Comunidad Valle de Oro I, Comunidad Valle de Oro II, Comunidad San 
Diego, Comunidad 12 de Octubre, Comunidad El Prado, Comunidad San Pablo, Comunidad 
Cristo Redentor, and Comunidad Cristo Paz. The target population located in those 14 
communities has the following characteristics:12 
 Education: 40% of the population attended school until 9th grade and 60% have a 
high school education; they attended area schools. 
 Income level: The average household income is less than $200 a month; households 
average four or five individuals with one person employed, typically in the informal 
sector. 
 Work experience: 28% of people seeking employment have formal experience; 72% 
have no work experience. 
 Employment: Only 37% of the population has formal employment; 18% have 
informal jobs (below legal minimum wage, no benefits), and 37% are unemployed; 
8% own a small business. 
 Health: Access to preventive primary health is quite limited; most go to the Health 
Unit Gerardo Barrios or Clinicas Parroquiales for healthcare services. 
 Risk mitigation: In terms of vulnerability, 60% of the population of five of the six 
communities lives on the banks of streams and in overcrowded areas in conditions of 
risk. 
Also in these communities, youth gangs have created an informal power structure. 
Members must authorize the entry of technical equipment and any outside persons who may 
have set up schedules to enter those communities. 
The project has three work areas:  
 Enabling and employment: Youth are prepared to enter working life, receiving 
                                                 
12 AGRISAL Group, Descriptive Document of the Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and Job Creation.  
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technical training and learning, among other things, how to prepare a resume, behave 
in an interview, dress professionally, and speak while at work. 
 Starting new businesses: Youth are coached while developing business ideas; they are 
trained in business skills such as costing, marketing, sales, helping in branding 
creation, and more. 
 Strengthening existing micro or small businesses: Expertise is made available through 
consultancies and professional advisory services to help the micro or small business 
grow (and become another source of employment); to help increase sales, they are 
also linked commercially with other companies. 
FUNDEMAS is responsible for project execution with a small technical team consisting 
of seven members: 
 A coordinator, responsible for managing and administering the project team, 
seeking project support from companies, and tracking participants in their 
communities. 
 Two employability technicians, a psychologist who is responsible for teaching life 
skills and a human resources administrator of companies. 
 An entrepreneurship technician, responsible for the creation and monitoring of 
enterprises, associative groups, and the development of EMPRETEC, as well as 
for commercially linking companies through partnerships; s/he is also involved 
with monitoring results in the communities. 
 A technician for strengthening companies, responsible for monitoring and 
developing businesses and associations. 
 A Management Information System technician, responsible for data entry to track 
the progress and results of project beneficiaries; also, for supporting calls 
community members for participation in project activities. 
 An office staff person, responsible for office organization and cleaning, and 
supporting call issues. 
Local staff are hired to help ensure smooth work flow. Members of local churches who 
are paid by the project accompany those making home visits and calls. Staff members organize 
job fairs in order to collect resumes and conduct other activities to promote the courses being 
taught. The Asociación La Escalon is responsible for tracking and monitoring all activities 
136 
 
performed by FUNDEMAS. 
Methodological Process 
The methodologies adopted by the project were consistently fitted to the needs of the 
population. Those needs were taken into account if, for example, someone had learning or 
behavioral difficulties or other special needs. Alliances and relevant funding were sought 
accordingly. Staff also took into account the community profile when defining workshop content 
and training approaches. In the entrepreneurship workshops, young people and adults were 
mixed together, as adults can travel elsewhere to market their products if an opposing gang 
dominates in their community of origin. Unlike in many areas, polygraphs are not used to screen 
applicants; only psychometric tests and interviews are conducted. (Some companies outside the 
Colonia Escalon require the use of the polygraph; we cannot control that.) 
Initial studies showed that of those who were age qualified, 50% were unemployed but 
wanted jobs; 20% did not wish to be employed; and the remaining 30% were already employed. 
In this regard, during the first two years, an effort was made to reach that half of the population 
that was involuntarily unemployed. The next objective was to promote employment among those 
who did not want jobs, mostly youth, using methods such as instilling the values of education, 
life planning, and so forth. 
A baseline is set whenever the project begins in each community by collecting basic 
information about each person and storing it in a database (Management Information System); 
this functions as the information database for employment. 
Also, the courses given prepare individuals to work as customer service staff, 
receptionists, secretaries, salespersons, office keepers, cooks, various service workers, 
operatives, maintenance staff, and in other positions that are in demand by the 865 companies 
located in La Colonia Escalon. 
The methodological intervention process used in the field consists of the following four 
steps: 
 Call on community members, accompanied by community leaders, to encourage 
participation in the project in any of the three modalities. 
 Invite potential participants to an EMPRETEC workshop where employee or 
entrepreneurial preferences or vocations are discovered, applicants are prepared, 
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and support is offered that matches applicants' strengths. 
 Depending on the area of participation, provide training for employment, or 
provide support in workshops for creating a micro or small business, or provide 
support for strengthening an existing micro or small business. 
 Monitor participants regularly to check progress; collect feedback from 
companies that have employed individuals from the communities. 
Strategically, these steps are organized into three phases of intervention: 
 Phase I 
o House-to-house visits or calls 
o Life skills and EMPRETEC 
o Psychometric tests 
o Resume creation 
 Phase II 
o Courses on how to obtain a job 
o Courses for entrepreneurship 
o Training, technical assistance, and mentoring 
 Phase III 
o Job placement 
o Bonding and financing 
o Constitution and insertion of micro and small business 
 Projection for possible next project phase: 
o Strengthening the entrepreneurship (25, five at a time) 
o Monitoring the other ventures 
o Cluster service for La Colonia Escalon and/or networks 
o CSR practice with area's small hotels and restaurants 
In practice, an ongoing effort remains oriented to strengthening companies created during 
the execution of the project, as well as to the creation of new ventures or companies, taking into 
account the inclusion of high-risk groups from communities. The project tries to secure financing 
through loans for beneficiaries through a Guarantee Fund and partnerships with financial 
institutions, and trade linkages for goods and services among participating companies, with other 
external companies, and with potential markets. 
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Effectiveness 
The development of the project has generated results that allow one to draw conclusions 
about the effectiveness of its formulation, implementation, and outcomes. Data are updated 
monthly. The project has set different indicators to measure different types of outcomes. Impact 
indicators measure participant income, employment, and security; performance indicators 
measure numbers of jobs created, business ideas generated, new businesses established, micro- 
and small business strengthened, and individuals trained. 
The goal for employment generation was 450 jobs; for newly created companies. it was 
75 companies.13 Since the beginning, the project has had an impact on more than 1,000 people, 
men and women, young and old. It has trained 920 individuals for work with technical and 
entrepreneurship courses (230% compliance rate), built or strengthened 202 area 
entrepreneurships and businesses (269% compliance rate), and generated 502 new jobs, 232 as 
positions obtained through partnerships with companies and 270 as self-employment positions 
generated in 228 new enterprises (a 112% compliance rate).14  
According to one stakeholder, member companies of the Fundación La Escalon generated 
some of those jobs, but companies or enterprises outside of the Colonia Escalon created at least 
30% of them. Another route used to place staff in jobs is outsourcing, using Al Empleo, the 
digital employment agency (database) generated by the project. At least 12 companies provide 
continuous employment by soliciting personnel for the project; also, several companies outside 
Colonia Escalon request people trained by the project because of its reputation for quality and 
commitment.  
Project effectiveness is also demonstrated by the strengthening of 13 micro and small 
businesses, the creation of Al Empleo, and the consolidation of 25 permanent partner entities, 
including businesses, churches, municipalities, schools, and others who facilitate the 
implementation of activities and expand their own scope. 
Other important project achievements include the following: (1) the successful 
integration of technical equipment in intervention communities, (2) no defections in the bakery 
                                                 
13 Consolidated project results from 2011 to November 2014. 
14 "FUNDEMAS Launches Digital Employment Agency 'Al Empleo,'" El Diario de Hoy, Monday (December 8, 2014): 
http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=47861&idArt=9303655. 
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workshops, (3) access to credit for community residents, (4) consolidation of small companies 
(e.g., bakeries, restaurants, candy stores, craft outlets, recycling), (5) at least 25 companies of 
202 enterprises with potential to grow, a potential second phase goal working with five 
companies at a time, (6) formation of associations, (7) 228 enterprises that created 1.8 jobs each, 
and (8) a more inclusive community, with improvements in quality of life for all area residents. 
When evaluating the project, I also assessed other scenarios that could have occurred, as 
well as the ones that did. For example, one stakeholder reported that FUNDEMAS had been 
asked whether it would have been better to initiate the project with activities meant to promote 
peaceful coexistence rather than taking a formative approach that focused on entrepreneurship. 
The response was that it had been much more effective to begin by bringing forward training and 
technical assistance related to entrepreneurship, until the project was inserted in the areas where 
communities most needed violence prevention.   
Another stakeholder reported that the demand for resources and services from the general 
population would always exceed what the project could deliver, such as investment in 
community spaces and basic construction work. In order to be effective and to generate 
solutions, project staff negotiated new resources, starting with an effort to profile each 
community. In that way, financial support and donations were capitalized from at least 25 
businesses (e.g., Dermalogica, Arqco Outsourcing, TIGO, Crowne Plaza15, Hotel Mediterraneo, 
Gourmet Express, Pizza Hut, MD, Cid Gallup); from churches, schools and ADESCOS; and 
from nonprofits (e.g., GIZ, Fundación Gloria Kriete, Canada Fund, Exporsal). With funding 
from the Fundación Gloria Kriete, for example, a vocational technical center is being established 
within the Centro Escolar Concha viuda de Escalon, and another will be located outside a school 
in a different area, where youth can attend once they reach 9th grade, without the risk of being 
harmed by members of territorial gangs. In total, there are four vocational-technical centers.  
In order to meet its objectives and as a feature of its effectiveness, project organizers have 
spared no effort, relying on external resources and technical tools such as consulting and advice 
from professionals, so that beneficiaries are placed in good jobs, and micro and small businesses 
grow or partner with other companies to increase employment opportunities in the communities. 
In addition, they are linked commercially with other companies to increase their sales. Thus, the 
                                                 
15 See http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2013/12/03/graduacion-del-centro-escolar-concha-viuda-de-escalon. 
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AGRISAL Group uses its trade and business links with Exporsal (a Salvadoran company 
founded in 1974 to export handmade goods) 16 to promote and market product ventures abroad.  
 
Table 8.1.  Project interventions (2011-2014). 
INTERVENTION 2011-2014 (3 YEARS 10 MONTHS)17 
Nº Activity developed Amount 
1 Technicians and for work courses 36 
2 Entrepreneurship courses 43 
3 Number of hours taught in courses for beneficiaries 4,054 
4 
Average hours in technical assistance to beneficiaries 7,360 
 
The document describing Project Sustainable Communities: Entrepreneurship and 
Employment Generation identifies the following as being among the direct benefits for the 
communities in the project area: 
 Attitudinal changes: Residents feel safer, more prepared, have new knowledge, know 
how to approach companies and how to behave with entrepreneurs.  
 Improved self-esteem: In conjunction with new techniques learned, better income for 
their families; jobs, technical support for creating small businesses, and advice for 
strengthening their micro and small businesses; improved quality of life in the 
communities; tools for self-sustainability. 
 Generation of income for owners of micro and small businesses. 
 Increased trade options for residents and their competitors, a generator for more jobs 
for neighbors in the area. 
 Generation of commercial networks between companies in the same area; among all 
companies, not exclusively among large ones. 
 Improved quality of life for residents, as well as economic and growth opportunities. 
 Prevention of youth engagement in criminal acts, even in families of gang members 
(although legal system has freed several gang members who continue to commit 
                                                 
16 See http://www.exporsal.com/us.php?lng=0&s=1. 
17 Consolidated project results, 2011 to date (Nov. 2014). 
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crimes in the area); decrease in the number of youngsters joining gangs.  
 Reduced idle time; people now spend that time in jobs and workshops, enabling 
young people to stop dwelling on negative situations. 
 
Direct benefits identified for area businesses include: 
 Commercial growth through the strengthening of micro and small business. 
 Increased trade options, due to the number of new businesses created, allowing 
purchase of products and services in the area. 
 Trained applicants for positions, with the working tools necessary to meet their needs; 
reliable, prepared, punctual employees, due to their living in the immediate vicinity. 
 Reduction in transportation costs incurred for employees; employees live nearby. 
 
Difficulties overcome: 
 The entry of technical equipment to communities seeking support from ADESCOS, 
community leaders, schools, health promoters and churches; one of the conditions for 
entry to the communities is to be accompanied by a community leader. 
 Inability to mix benefited individuals from communities in conflict during project 
activities; disputes between communities, including deaths, have resulted from these 
conflicts. The project has had to duplicate opportunities and/or activities in various 
areas to overcome this difficulty. 
 Companies that marginalize and deny employment to people in the area, only because 
they live in these communities and so are feared and considered dangerous. Some 
companies have opened their doors; others have employment policies that prevent 
hiring residents from "code red" communities. 
 Companies that will not hire area residents because of the social stigma (see also 
sections 3 and 6 of this report). Some companies now rely on applicant selection and 
preparation by FUNDEMAS. Currently the project has earned the confidence of 12 
companies who support it as much as possible. 
 Most individuals, even after training, do not pass company screening procedures, 
such as interviews and polygraphs (see also section 4), not necessarily because they 
have committed a felony, but they come from areas classified as unsuitable for 
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recruitment, or because during the evaluation process they become nervous about 
questions like "are you related to persons related to or members of gangs?" 
Inevitably, they have neighbors and relatives who are involved in gangs; they cannot 
be isolated from that in their environments. That, combined with recruitment policies, 
often shuts out technically qualified candidates. 
 Some start-up businesses did not thrive because of a lack of market connections or 
unattractive, poor quality products for which there was a low or no demand. Business 
associations and attractive, quality products are needed for a business to survive.  
Replication 
The intervention strategy has evolved according to the emerging needs and realities of the 
targeted communities, an ongoing evolution made possible in part because of effective, 
consistent coordination between AGRISAL, the Asociación La Escalon, and FUNDEMAS. The 
project began working with nine communities, and is now reaching fourteen more. The gang 
"18" operates in the original participating communities; Mara Salvatruche accounts for the gang 
presence in five of the new ones.  
Although it has not yet been replicated, the project model thus far has generated a wealth 
of "lessons learned" about what should and should not be done. One stakeholder reported that the 
project could be improved by focusing on employment activities that will enable young people to 
find jobs, and to take further actions to promote social cohesion. The project team identified 
additional actions that could improve project outcomes: 
 Communicate better about the project from the beginning, not to gain leadership, but 
to encourage more companies to join the cause; also, gain the trust of the 
communities from the beginning by letting them know that the work being done is for 
their benefit. 
 Seek to better understand the communities affected by the intervention; in each area, 
every community has its own distinct characteristics, needs, and lifestyles. All of this 
information is important to know before starting, through studies that measure the 
demand for services, to give more meaning and sustainability to the project, and so 
the intervention strategy is prepared and staff are trained to offer the valuable 
proposition to surrounding businesses. 
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 Research and know the target prior the intervention, and identify the needs to be 
emphasized, because sometimes those needs considered by the implementing team to 
be important are not the ones considered important to the beneficiaries. 
 Do not try to change the ideas and projects that communities already have; instead, 
try to improve the existing ones, and by this people will empower their businesses. 
 Do not underestimate programs aimed at attitudinal improvement of people, since in 
most cases it was found that they are their own obstacles; those who are marginalized 
feel less valued because of the differences found in living between large buildings. If 
support is shown and they are given a sense of equality, people will gain confidence. 
 Accompany the workshops and training on technical issues with the full support of 
psychologists and training in life skills, allowing participants to acquire new tools for 
dealing more easily with problems encountered along the road and to build self-
esteem. 
 Seek allies within communities to gain the openness and trust of their people and to 
strengthen partnerships with the business sector, from the beginning of the project. 
Look for support from companies that will benefit from having access to trained 
personnel and from communities that will benefit from income generation. 
 
Something that was done in this project, and a recommendation to companies wishing to 
work with similar issues, is to "seek support from those who know," as the successful results that 
have been obtained so far have been due to the expertise and methodology brought to the effort 
by FUNDEMAS. AGRISAL sought support in this regard from an organization that had 
expertise in project implementation. For now, AGRISAL, the Asociación La Escalon, and 
FUNDEMAS understand clearly the need to continue this valuable effort. There is already talk 
of possible actions to be taken, such as strengthening the 25 leading enterprises, five at a time, 
through image consulting, marketing, and purchasing equipment, tools and/or machinery needed; 
the funds have been made available for this from Canada Cooperation. There are similar plans 
for the remaining enterprises, going forward progressively in blocks of 25. 
It is anticipated that the project will develop a model for public-private partnerships for 
the creation of companies dedicated to produce recycled products and employment generation so 
that this practice of CSR can be replicated at national and regional levels through entities and 
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businesses that promote CSR. 
Another new element to include in the project is the involvement of small hotels and 
restaurants in the area, with financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
focused on improving the performance of micro and small businesses through CSR. This action 
is designed from the perspective of the sustainability of the project actions. 
At the community level, in a possible second phase of the project, organizers have 
considered investing in basic construction in communities such as risk mitigation works, some 
houses, drains, and so forth, for which it is expected to have strategic partners who can 
contribute the necessary funding and experience. 
Sustainability 
The involvement of the business sector in Project Sustainable Communities has been its 
key to success until now, and that will ensure that the project and its outcomes continue.  
FUNDEMAS has an agreement with the La Asociación La Escalon that resulted in 23 local 
companies having a major role in project implementation. That partnership now is part of the 
Monitoring Committee of the Project of Sustainable Communities-Entrepreneurship and 
Employment Generation. 
Steps are currently being taken to further assure the project's sustainability and 
replicability. As mentioned above, the co-financiers of the work accomplished thus far have been 
AGRISAL, la Fundación Meza Ayau FUNDEMAS, and USAID. They have joined with other 
supporters, forming strategic partnerships with the private sector to strengthen trade links, among 
other things. Private companies have participated through the commitment to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) that supports different elements of the project. Direct and permanent 
connections have been formed with companies from AGRISAL Group, Crowne Plaza, 
CONAMYPE, Dermalogica, Sirama, Carana, among others. There are also agreements with the 
private sector to promote employability. Companies such as Pizza Hut, MD, Arqco Outsourcing, 
Cid Gallup, Crowne Plaza, Gourmet Express, to name a few, have entered into agreements to 
recruit individuals who have participated in the project. 
Three major actions are currently underway, the results of which are expected to generate 
further stability:  
 Strengthening the 25 companies with image consulting, marketing, and the purchase 
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of equipment, tools, and/or necessary machinery. The funding source has already 
been found for this action. 
 Clustering services for Colonia Escalon and/or networks. Area residents will be 
offered a series of multiple services, already ordered, and commercial networks are 
being generated between companies in the same area. The commercial networks are 
being generated among all companies, not only among large enterprises. 
 Bringing small hotels and restaurants to the area. An initiative funded by the IDB 
focused on improving the performance of micro and small businesses through CSR. 
Small hotels and restaurants are good additions, from the perspective of CSR, to the 
other small businesses that have been created in the community and that will hire area 
residents. Again, the funding source has been found for this action. 
 
Since the beginning of the project, actions have been taken to assure the sustainability of 
the enterprises and small businesses that it has fostered. These include: 
 Follow up of beneficiaries through the Management Information System, designed to 
measure impacts in terms of income, education, and improved quality of life, and to 
document investment per person. Staying in contact with project beneficiaries to see 
whether they are ready to advance to the next stage of specialization makes them feel 
valued, and strengthens their commitment to themselves, their families, the project, 
and to the community and society in general. 
 Continuously searching for market-to-market products, improving their quality and 
presentation through image consulting and marketing promotion. 
 Transferring needed equipment, tools and/or machinery, expecting gradually to reach 
all enterprises that require it. 
 Generating job offers, which will be promoted through the Fundación La Escalon and 
other project partners, such as corporations and other institutions in the sector. 
 Clustering services to Colonia Escalon (several trades), which are also promoted 
through the Fundación La Escalon. 
 Generating networks for technical assistance and ongoing training according to 
specific needs. 
 Specific actions to raise visibility: 
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o Bimonthly newspaper 
o Application of Fundación La Escalon for smartphones 
o The FUNDEMAS website  
o Development of the Week for CSR 
o Annual event or nationally on CSR 
o Reports in various media 
 
The plan is to systematize and document the entire project, providing a summary of the 
FUNDEMAS and Fundación La Escalon intervention strategy. This document will include a 
model for public-private entrepreneurship and job creation, enabling this CSR approach to be 
replicated at national and regional levels by organizations and companies that promote CSR.18 
Conclusion 
The Sustainable Communities Project has the distinction of being an initiative arising 
from the business sector. Traditionally, such programs are formulated, developed, and 
implemented by the government sector, through international cooperation, or as religious 
charitable initiatives. This program instead exemplifies how private enterprise views such 
problems, understanding and assuming that comprehensive economic and social development 
can be transformed into direct and sustained benefits for everyone. 
Business sector participation in Sustainable Communities brought a different vision and 
philosophy to this project, as well as strategic perspective, the ability to manage all types of 
resources, business connections and strategic alliances, and the ability to understand and adapt to 
the environment. For those reasons, those who have been involved with the project or who know 
it firsthand share the view that key to this project's success has been the active participation of 
the business sector. 
The founding organizations are responsible for the design, implementation, and 
monitoring of Project Sustainable Communities. The AGRISAL group, la Fundación La Escalon, 
and FUNDEMAS coordinate closely, but without written agreements; instead, they communicate 
                                                 
18 The estimated total cost of the program was to be $1.13 million for 933 participants. If accurate, this would result in an average 
program cost per participant of about $1,211 and an average cost per person employed or self-employed of $2,251. See Presentación Proyecto 
Comunidades Sostenibles-FUNDE, 2, 12. (These figures are estimates based on results to date; the project is still in operation.) 
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by word of mouth to manage the endeavor. The lack of written contracts and agreements permits 
optimal flexibility for changing course and making strategic decisions quickly, as needed. The 
fact that everything is done consensually enables all of those involved to know how the project is 
developing, leaving little or no room for surprises or the emergence of difficult situations to 
handle. 
Strategic alliances with other companies, institutions, and donors have been the chief 
means of achieving and even surpassing the project's goals and objectives. During the project's 
execution, international and nonprofit donors such as USAID, GIZ, Fundación Gloria Kriete, and 
Canada Fund have contributed. A group of businesses were also willing to cooperate in various 
ways, among them companies from AGRISAL Group, the Hotel Crowne Plaza, Hotel 
Mediterraneo, Dermalogica, Gourmet Express, Pizza Hut, MD, and Cid Gallup, and others. So 
did institutions or organizations such as CONAMYPE Sirama, Carana, churches, schools, 
ADESCOS, and more. A concrete example of the possibilities opened up by such strategic 
alliances is the linkage of AGRISAL with Exporsal to promote and market products overseas, 
ventures created and consolidated by this project. Likewise, companies outside The Colonia 
Escalon (the intervention area) are requesting employees trained by the project due to their 
reputation for quality and commitment. 
Project staff track and monitor program activities and participants. The status of the 
project's entrepreneurs and employees is monitored monthly to track their progress and to 
provide assistance, if needed, to optimize their development and the project's results. This 
information is entered and updated in an Excel spreadsheet. 
Cross-monitoring also occurs, through a management information system that is updated 
every three to six months. The software system was designed specifically for this project to 
measure its impacts in terms of income, education, costs, quality-of-life improvements for 
beneficiaries, and other indicators. This is a second database, which incorporates data from the 
Excel spreadsheet. This system makes it possible to visualize the investment per person and to 
compare that with other variables in order to perform a cost-benefit analysis, which helps to 
identify "best practices" in terms of job stability, consolidation of enterprises, and profitability, 
among other things. The scope of data it provides is extensive, although it only became 
operational in 2013, two years after the start of the project. 
In addition to customized software for information management, other ad hoc tools have 
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been acquired according to the project's needs. For example, specialists are hired to provide 
technical advice or mentoring, workshop facilitation, product and image consulting, and other 
necessary professional services. Personnel residing in the intervention area are hired, assuring the 
best possible access to the communities and improving the overall impact and scope of project 
calls. Such specialization ensures that the personnel hired are trained using the best possible 
methods for their functions. 
Project Sustainable Communities believes that micro and small businesses created by the 
project can grow and become another source of employment for communities; they can also 
partner or form business connections with other companies to increase sales. The project has not 
been hesitant to rely on external technical staff for professional consulting and advisory services, 
nor to purchase tools, machinery, or equipment (for 10 of the 25 companies) when necessary. 
The project uses best practices that already exist and have proven effective, such as 
methodologies for developing entrepreneurial behaviors (e.g., EMPRETEC), and existing 
infrastructure and managerial resources that are made available by project allies (e.g., 
multipurpose rooms, trained staff, additional funding). 
In sum, Project Sustainable Resources focuses on the promotion of entrepreneurship and 
job creation. The prevention of violence emerged as a necessity in order to work in area 
communities and therefore has been an added value generated. Invitations to participate in 
project activities are issued from the perspective of employment generation, not for the 
prevention of violence or for peaceful coexistence, but in the end, they are having an impact on 
those, as well. This avoids the stigma or stereotypes involved when addressing issues of violence 
or crime directly, and facilitates everyone's involvement, including that of young people who are 
already involved in gangs. 
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Section 9.  Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities 
 
Rafael Artiga Gudiel 
 
 
The main objective of Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities is defined as follows: 
"To design and implement a proposal for the prevention of violence and the insertion of young 
people and their families who live in high-risk regions into the nation's socioeconomic life."19 
According to the project coordinator, "The objective is not only to promote employment among 
young people to prevent violence, it is to establish a permanent implementation model.”20 The 
purpose of that model, according to technical staff with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), is to instill within those young people personal and work skills that will 
enable them to have productive lives and to generate income for themselves and their families in 
a dignified manner. Achieving that goal would also align with El Salvador's national, regional, 
and local political interests, as it would contribute to the reduction of homicides and risk factors 
that generate violence at the local level. Project Young Entrepreneurs began in Sonsonate in 
January 2013 and ended in September 2014. At the time of this study, the project was phasing 
out.21   
Program Description 
Project Young Entrepreneurs defined as its client population 100 youngsters who resided 
in the municipality of Sonsonate, in the community of Sensunapán, who were neither in school 
nor employed (similar to targeted populations in other programs, e.g., see also sections 3 and 
6.)22 The Sensunapán community was selected because it met the following criteria: 
                                                 
19 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities,” project document (2012).   
20 Stakeholder interview (November 22, 2014).  
21 This is relevant data; at the end of the intervention, it allows verification of the mechanisms and sustainability agreements with the 
Municipality, aspects that will be reviewed later in this study.  
22 For the purpose of this study, we considered only program activities undertaken with youngsters not involved in gangs. According 
one stakeholder, however, the project included another 135 youngsters who were gang members (Barrios 18 and MS-13) "since a good 
percentage of them are part of the young population that does not study or work, and that is involved in violence in the country. However, it is a 
typical population in urgent need of intervention to prevent violence." 
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 High indexes of social exclusion and violence  
 Large number of youth at high risk of violence and social exclusion, without access to 
education or employment  
 Citizen security programs23  
A group of youngsters exposed to gang members' activities had approached the 
community's board of directors in need of such assistance. It is important to note that the project 
worked with young people who at one time or another had been connected with gangs in the 
municipalities of Sonsonate and Sensunapán, but who were inactive when they enrolled in the 
program. Nonetheless, the fluidity of individuals' gang membership status means that any given 
moment, youngsters in the program might be a mix of gang members and non-gang members.24 
The focus group members and interviewees described five program priorities: 
 Social insertion, providing specialized, personalized attention to youngsters and their 
families to help them strengthen their life skills and to confront issues such as work, 
leadership and teamwork, dialogue and negotiation with others, self-esteem, conflict 
resolution, and sexuality and HIV. A service project was conducted by which those 
who had participated in damaging the social bonds of the community participated in 
restoring them.  
 Educational insertion and retention, using flexible education models to encourage 
school attendance including tutoring, financial assistance and scholarships, 
accelerated programs, and other options. 
 Labor insertion by employment, identifying potential areas for professional 
development that related to the community's labor demands, and offering technical 
preparation, scholarships for the first job experience, and support during the search 
for employment. 
 Labor insertion by entrepreneurship, guiding the development of an entrepreneurial 
endeavor, with support from a team specializing in establishing entrepreneurships and 
an experienced entrepreneur who is sensitive to the challenges and knowledgeable 
about practical strategies for successful self-employment. 
 Model construction, structuring a project model for inserting at-risk young people 
                                                 
23 For more than a decade, supported by UNDP, the municipality of Sonsonate has promoted citizen safety projects in communities in 
Sensunapán. 
24 UNDP, “Young Entrepreneurs," 2. 
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into the social, educational, and employment systems of El Salvador, ensuring that 
the model was systematic (i.e., could be replicated) and that it incorporated measures 
and processes for evaluation. 
 
Project Young Entrepreneurs had a clear mission to develop, document, and demonstrate 
a model for systematically helping young people at risk for violence and social exclusion to gain 
access to the social, educational, and employment institutions of the country—a model that could 
also inform public politics. Although listed as the final priority in the project's official 
documents, UNDP technicians and the youngsters in the focus groups understood model 
construction to be a clear priority.25 
With all of those priorities in mind, Project Young Entrepreneurs initially was considered 
for communities within the municipalities of San Salvador and Santa Tecla. It ultimately was 
established in Sonsonate, in close collaboration with the municipal government, in the 
community of Sensunapán, a subdivision of San Antonio. A previous citizen security group had 
identified youth employment as a security issue and had made specific recommendations that 
gave project organizers a place to start. In order to maximize their results, project organizers 
decided to take advantage of the mutual employability and entrepreneurial interests and diverse 
resources and methods of the various institutions, civil society, and governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations across the country. Among them were the program for the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador (CCIES), Development of Suppliers 
program; the Labor Ministry-City Hall, Employment Program; Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 
the Young Builder program; and the Municipal Offices, employability. Project partners were 
selected according to their specialty areas:  
 UNDP coordinated the project, with financial support from the World Bank.  
 CRS developed social and community reinsertion methods, including the use of 
psychosocial and life skills elements similar to those in its Young Builders program. 
 The municipality of Sonsonate established the Municipal Coordination Committee to 
support the project's insertion activities and student retention. 
                                                 
25 The project included an evaluation component with the goal of building a program delivery model. During implementation, various 
activities were conducted to compile information with the purpose of “systemizing the experience,” according to the members of the focus group 
held in the community of Sensunapán de Sonsonate (November 15, 2014). 
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 CCIES developed the strategy for labor insertion (the employment-related program 
elements) through its Development of Suppliers program. 
 
UNDP was in charge of convening regularly scheduled meetings of the partners to 
oversee and monitor progress towards the development of activities. The meetings also 
facilitated the exchange of information and coordinated planning. To maintain organizational 
coherence, UNDP appointed four working groups: 
 The Advisory Council, composed of representatives from local and central 
government institutions, worked toward strategic and political alignment and guided 
political strategies. 
 The Technical Committee, with representatives from each of the partners, ensured 
compliance with agreements made with the Advisory Council.  
 The Coordination Committee, consisting of representatives from local institutions, 
was responsible for developing the work plan, establishing alliances for its 
implementation, and monitoring its progress. 
 Implementation Team members represented the city halls, the various partners, and 
UNPD, and were responsible for ensuring that planned activities were carried out. 
UNDP gave technical and financial support to the project through combined programs, 
the Reduction of Violence and Construction of Social Capital (RVCSC) and the program for 
Local Governability, Rule of Law, Justice and Public Safety. Funding for the entire project 
amounted to $235,00026; of that, only 15% was destined to finance activities that directly 
benefited at-risk youngsters in Sonsonate.27 
The project ultimately was justified by a significant reduction in the number of homicides 
documented for 2012. From March through September of that year, 552 fewer homicides were 
reported than during the same period in the previous year, representing a 56.8% reduction. That 
reduction was associated with the dialogue and truce that occurred between members of the 
Pandilla 18 and Mara Salvatruche gangs, a process that was initiated in March under the 
                                                 
26 All amounts in this report are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated. 
27 This information was not reflected in a way that immediately benefited the youngsters, according to comments from the focus 
group. Many of them saw opportunities limited by the intermediation of the municipality and its bureaucratic processes. Some of them got better 
jobs on their own and others continued waiting for help from the project and the municipality and the support of the promised job. Focus group 
with benefited youngsters in the Community of Lotificacion San Antonio, Sensunapán, Sonsonate (November 15, 2014). 
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leadership of the Catholic Church and civil society, with support from the government of El 
Salvador. The reduction in homicides provided an opening to promote integral strategies for 
security and development focusing on the territories and population groups that were suffering 
conditions that left them highly vulnerable. 
In this context, the President of El Salvador requested international cooperation in 
reorienting existing or identifying new resources to help sustain those homicide reductions 
observed during 2012, highlighting the need to take action locally in the municipalities and to 
promote reinsertion of young people living under high-risk conditions into the socioeconomic 
life of the country. That solicitation is framed in the proposed Pact for the Employment and 
Security.28 
The development and expansion of projects directed towards reducing violence by 
generating employment were becoming increasingly justifiable. For this reason, UNDP 
considered it appropriate to demonstrate a model project comprised of cooperative strategies 
developed by expert organizations, setting out the components needed to achieve the 
socioeconomic reinsertion of young people residing in at-risk communities.  
Project Young Entrepreneurs defined one of its main objectives as the design, 
implementation, evaluation, and systemization of a proposal for the socioeconomic reinsertion of 
youngsters and families who live under conditions that placed them at risk of crime and violence. 
As of the close of this study, the project had completed a preliminary version of the evaluation of 
its results and processes conducted by Don Bosco University; however, the project had not been 
concluded and for that reason, the systematization experience had not yet been completed. 
Results for the other components were reported, as follows: 
 At-risk young people had developed skills for building positive relationships with 
their families and communities, for being productive, and for having a lawful and 
dignified life. 
 At-risk young people and family members of school age had been reinserted into 
formal schools or a flexible education modality.  
 At-risk young people and family members had been reinserted into the labor force 
through jobs. 
                                                 
28 This pact was announced by President Funes as part of the support for the gang truce process, which was developed in collaboration 
with Minister Munguia Payes. 
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 At-risk young people and family members had been reinserted into the job market by 
self-employment (entrepreneurship). 
The activities of the project were developed for each component in accord with the 
specific results expected of it. That is, the young person who would benefit from the project in 
the area of employment would participate in the activities designed to achieve reinsertion into the 
labor force through jobs. The main activities developed to achieve that outcome were the 
following: 
 Workshops to prepare the participant for the job search: learning how to prepare a 
resume, how to interview, how to keep a job, appropriate work behavior, and worker's 
rights. 
 Workshops of vocational formation to develop competencies and capabilities 
sufficient to become inserted in the labor market, in accord with the job opportunities 
in the local municipality. 
 Support for youngsters during the process of searching for employment and labor 
reinsertion, according to their job skills and labor demands. 
Those activities were given a budget of $44,334 intended to benefit 70 young people, of 
whom 25 developed their first labor experience (i.e., an average investment of $1,773 per first-
time employed youth), backed up by ten national companies with a local presence or local 
businesses that supported programs of socioeconomic reinsertion. 
The project started from the finding that young people at risk lacked the necessary skills 
to obtain a job, and it focused its attention on actions that would prepare and train them to be 
capable of entering the labor market. Other than being a positive experience for the majority of 
the participants, the project did not generate the external conditions to ensure labor insertion, 
because "the work done with the companies that could offer employment opportunities to the 
young people was not effective enough," according to one young person in the focus group.29 
From the beginning, the project was designed to focus on entrepreneurship, as indicated 
by its name. By the design of the model and the selection of the program to support it (PDP), the 
project focused its efforts on the self-employment scheme, leaving the search for employment as 
a second choice in which little effort and few resources were invested; that assessment was 
                                                 
29 That person completed all of the steps in the employment insertion process, yet could not get a job; the project should have a firm 
agreement with companies that such participants can be guaranteed employment. 
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confirmed by project documents, the comments of the project beneficiaries, and the evaluation of 
the experience.30 
In the strategy developed for that intervention, the role of the municipality was important, 
as were local efforts to generate employment. The labor fair and the municipality's office of 
employment support were ineffective, in part because their selection criteria and priorities often 
did not coincide with the personal options of the benefited youngsters. Some other critical 
aspects, such as the availability of funds and the time needed for bureaucratic processes, can 
have a counterproductive impact on the implementation of programmed activities; those are 
important to take into account when working in a participative way with the local government. 
Effectiveness 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the project, we collected two types of information: a 
subjective type, taking into account opinions from benefited youngsters, and an objective type, 
based on the conclusions of the UNDP Evaluation of Results and Processes (preliminary results). 
During the focus group, the youngsters were asked to identify the positive aspects of the project. 
They offered comments such as the following:31 
 A good idea to help young people that need job opportunities. 
 Learned many things that we need to find a job. 
 Meeting other youngsters from the community with similar interests or in the same 
situation related to job searching. 
 A very emotional experience in which we obtained a lot of knowledge that allowed us 
to clarify our goals. 
The majority of the comments that were offered by the youngsters concerning the positive 
aspects of the project referred to opportunities that were generated and what was learned. All 
expressed thankfulness for having been given the opportunity and recognized its benefits; 
however, when asked about aspects of the project that could be improved, we obtained responses 
that would greatly benefit future project planning:32 
                                                 
30 One conclusion from the project evaluation was stated this way: “The project should add a management component for employment 
positions, such that the participant youngsters would have the option to pursue either an entrepreneurship or a labor experience that will allow 
them to increase their employability.” Results of the process and evaluation report, preliminary version (September 2014). 
31 The young people in that focus group were from Lotificación San Antonio, Sensunapán. 
32 Positive opinions from the youngsters about the project tended to be too general, but references to needed improvements and 
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 Long and tedious training. 
 More constant communication is required and dosage of the content of the training. 
 The help from the Labor Ministry did not work well; many young people were not 
placed, a few found work on their own without the help of the employment office. 
 In the entrepreneurship cases, it took too long between training and the handling of 
work equipment. This caused the abandonment of the project by some youngsters. 
 To be trained to search for a job is not enough; the project should negotiate the hiring 
of the youngsters, since in many cases the businesses hired by recommendations and 
not for competencies. 
 
When asked if the project and job opportunities had demonstrated any contribution 
toward violence prevention in the community, the youngsters replied as follows:33 
 In the community, there is a gang control, and when encountering unknown people 
they ask for the Legal Country Identification known as DUI (Document of Unique 
Identification). However, in this case, gangs did not oppose [the project] and allowed 
us [the benefited youngsters] to take part in the activities without opposition. 
 Without these opportunities to learn and work, we will be more exposed to violence 
and delinquency. So this project helps to prevent that from happening. 
 Having a decent way of earning income, a job, it’s the most important way to prevent 
young people from thinking of searching for illegal ways to make money. 
 
Regarding assessment of the project, the following are some important findings related to 
the employment strategy:34 
 The youngsters participating in the project were less susceptible to quitting their 
studies or work while being active in the project. However, more than a third (36%) 
of the participants were not studying or working 15 months after the project started. 
 Sixty-four percent of the youngsters in the intervention group said that they obtained 
                                                                                                                                                             
changes tended to be quite specific. 
33 These responses were documented in the evaluation. 
34 The evaluation established an intervention group and a comparison group, statistically exploring aspects such as study and work for 
the youngsters. The results are preliminary; the evaluation of this document is under revision by the UNDP. 
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their actual job, thanks to the project. 
  The employment rate of the youngsters in the intervention group (37.5%) was higher 
than that of the comparison group (28.6%). 
 To maintain a job is the harder option to access and keep. Also, only a minority (9%) 
simultaneously pursued educational and work insertion activities successfully during 
the project. 
 A high percentage of young people in the intervention group (50%) said that they 
were certain to be attending university studies in the future, compared with those in 
the comparison group (37.5%). 
 
The annual average costs associated with preparing youth for future employment varied 
with the options that were most appropriate for them:  Supporting the return of a youth to school, 
including retention, averaged $489; preparing a youth to become reinserted into family and 
society averaged $903; preparing a youth to gain access to a job averaged $$328; and preparing a 
youth for self-employment through establishing a successful entrepreneurship averaged $1,400.35      
In conclusion, the evaluation showed that the youngsters in the intervention group 
considered that the project had helped them in an indirect manner to find a job or an occupation 
by developing their capabilities for becoming employed. One group of youngsters from the 
intervention group, with the help of the project, also achieved the start-up of entrepreneurial or 
self-employment activities, particularly in the area of sales; however, this happened in a smaller 
number of cases.36 
The main recommendation of the project evaluation regarding the employment strategy is 
to increase the ways in which job placements can be achieved, to assure that participating 
youngsters have the opportunity to obtain a work experience that will increase their chances of 
finding a job. At the same time, it is fundamental to ensure follow up with these youth, since the 
timely response to challenges they encounter along the road can be as important as the planned 
actions.37 
                                                 
35 UNDP, Evaluation of Results and Processes 
36 UNDP, Evaluation of Results and Processes, 32. 
37 UNDP, Evaluation of Results and Processes, 33. 
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Replication 
With the purpose of contributing to the replicability of the model, as requested by UNDP, 
the evaluation showed some interesting aspects that need to be considered as "lesson learned":38 
 In relation to the implementation of the program, it is imperative that teamwork 
building includes members from all of the different parties involved. 
 Simultaneously pursuing academic and labor insertion is probably an exhausting 
effort that ends in the abandonment of one of the activities or, worse, of both. Hence 
the project should place more emphasis on the preference and profile of each of the 
participating youngsters in the program. (Also see this finding in section 3 of this 
report). 
 The efficiency and related cost-benefit ratio of the project must be improved before 
moving into replication and dissemination; the vast majority of young people want to 
work—basically, to find a job that provides the stability and security that comes from 
regularly producing income. 
 Reformulate the role of the municipalities to improve territorialization and to focus 
collective efforts and local resources that can be made available for use for project 
activities. 
 Working with members of the community and families of the youngsters can 
maximize and amplify the results obtained, since these groups are part of the primary 
network of social support to young people who are capable of extending and 
receiving direct benefits from experimental changes in their lives. 
All of these recommendations were verified as being necessary and accepted by the focus 
group of youngsters participating in the employment strategy of the project. According to the 
Technical Project Manager, the following also should be listed among factors necessary for 
future replication: the identification and training of local supporters who work consistently in the 
community and the direct attention, day by day, of each of the project's different operating 
parties to the youngsters in their communities.39 
                                                 
38 UNDP is negotiating new funds with World Bank and other sources to replicate the model in the municipalities of Zacatecoluca 
(Depto. La Paz) and Ciudad Delgado (Depto. San Salvador), beginning in January 2015. 
39 Interview with project stakeholder (November 10, 2014). 
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Sustainability 
Project Young Entrepreneurs has been carried out with expectation of becoming 
replicable and sustainable. For that to be achieved, local partners must be strong, technically 
competent, and politically aware. Also, the model must be systematized and stable. UNDP 
continues to work on that second quality, but with respect to the first, there are still challenges to 
overcome to attain sustainability.  
In the words of an unemployed young girl who was trained by the project, "The UNDP 
should supervise the purchases by the City Hall with respect to equipment and processes, since it 
took so long to do it and to be delivered to the youngsters."40 The UNDP, in its role as 
coordinator, and the partners should minimize the administrative processes so they do not have a 
negative effect on project results, especially when the main effort is to effectively achieve an 
opportunity for the youngsters to be inserted into the labor market, overcoming threats to their 
safety in their communities and without having to face bureaucratic obstacles. 
It is necessary that City Halls invest in technical personnel who will consistently follow 
up the diverse actions and actors of the program. The transition of local governments and 
ideological agendas of the political parties in power are important themes that have to be planned 
for and given attention, since on many occasions the support and/or continuation of the initiative 
will depend on that. Other critical aspects, such as the availability of funds and the pace of the 
bureaucratic processes, can have a counterproductive impact on the implementation of 
programmed activities; that is important to take into account if we want to work in a 
participatory manner with local governments. 
Conclusion 
Project Young Entrepreneurs' design coordinates a series of actors to achieve the 
objective of caring for the participating youngsters in the best way possible. The theoretical 
model of the cooperation scheme to implement its actions is solid, although testimonies from the 
young participants show that in practice, performance on the implementation measures of the 
model could be improved. One key aspect for the model's operation is the role assigned to 
municipalities. Even though the participants identified some deficiencies in the implementation 
                                                 
40 Declarations of project participants during focus group (November 15, 2014). 
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of the actions carried out by the municipalities, that they are in fact the public institutions that 
can best offer support to the participants in these kinds of projects.  
The trainings provided to the youngsters in order to help them improve their capabilities 
for entrepreneurship and employment were effective, helping to develop in them a more 
aggressive attitude in searching for job opportunities, and strengthening their knowledge of the 
labor market. This will probably become more important over the rest of their lives than the fact 
of having obtained a job.  
Finally, the project proposed as its main objective the development of a model for social, 
educational, and labor insertion for youngsters at risk—a model that would be systematized and 
evaluated, both of which were accomplished in its last stage. During this investigation, the time 
came when we no longer had access to the results, but we do know that the UNDP, as the 
organization responsible for the project, will be in charge of publishing the model, improving it, 
and allocating the funds to replicate it in other municipalities.  
Recommendations 
The following recommendations reflect those set out in the project evaluation conducted 
by Don Bosco University. That evaluation points out key aspects of the project that must be 
modified in the future for it to reach its goals and to have a more positive impact on the 
youngsters. First, in the model, the participation of the central government institutions was weak. 
Coordination between the municipalities and the Ministry of Labor had been proposed to 
improve jobs offers at the local level, but in practice that did not work as expected. Thus, it is 
necessary for the project to strengthen the participation of central government institutions to lend 
greater capability and the necessary resources to effectively support the municipality and other 
partners involved in the project. 
There is need for direct management between the project, companies, and institutions that 
offer job posts to young people, so that once they have finished their training, the opportunities 
become effective and they can gain access to the job posts for which they have been trained. The 
several successes in managing job placements for the youngsters taking part in the project, 
although not many, could be consolidated as job management procedures, improving their 
possibility of being instituted.  
In most cases, the youngsters participating in the project come from high-risk 
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communities in which gang presence is a constant threat. The municipality in collaboration with 
the UNDP and the rest of the partners should implement security measures to ensure that young 
people participating in the project do not suffer any kind of difficulties or retaliations from gangs 
solely because of their or as a result of the visible benefits they are able to achieve (i.e., access to 
legitimate jobs.) 
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Section 10.  Conclusions 
 
 
Many researchers and practitioners have made convincing cases for the relationship 
between chronic unemployment and societal violence. The dynamics of that relationship have 
been widely discussed; several of those studies and discussions, particularly as they pertain to 
youth, are cited in the studies above. The purpose of this report has been to explore what is being 
done to change those dynamics in El Salvador, in locations where the magnitude of the youth 
unemployment problem has moved the national and local governments, international and local 
nonprofit and charitable agencies, and private enterprise to respond. The authors have studied 
seven programs that have attempted to improve the prospects of the current generation of young 
Salvadoran workers so that they can support themselves and their families without resorting to 
crime or leaving their homeland. They have described those programs’ organizational structures 
and their operational goals and strategies. Having reviewed program records and reports and 
listened to the observations and insights of numerous interview and focus group respondents, the 
authors have collected data and perspectives on the effectiveness, replicability, and sustainability 
of those programs. They have also documented those stakeholders' critiques of and aspirations 
for their programs, along with their advice to others who might consider pursuing similar 
ventures.1 
Youth Employment as a Goal  
Each of the programs examined claimed to have an interest in and impact on improving 
youth employability, although in varying ways and at varying levels. Five of the seven programs 
approached employability issues directly, with differing combinations of job and/or 
entrepreneurial skills training, job development and placement services, continuing education, 
and other program components intended first and foremost to prepare youth to support 
                                                 
1 Formal evaluation of measurable outcomes and cost-effectiveness comparisons were beyond the scope of this report. Such 
evaluations are resource and data intensive; the sources needed for such analyses were not consistently available at the time of this study. Future 
research along those lines could be of considerable value.  
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themselves and their families through the dignity of legitimate work. For example, Jóvenes 
Comprometidos, one of USAID’s Improving Access to Employment programs, matched 
businesses who were suffering from a shortage of trained, reliable workers with recruits from its 
classes of formerly under-educated, unskilled young workers from severely disadvantaged 
communities, now trained and prepared to work. Jóvenes Constructores, a program modeled on 
its U.S. counterpart and adapted for El Salvador by Catholic Relief Services (aided by local 
partners), sought to divert at-risk rural youth from gang involvement by engaging them in nearly 
full-time training and job-seeking activities, preparing them for traditional work or 
entrepreneurial ventures. Project HOPE, sponsored by AGAPE and other partner foundations, 
recruited promising young men and women from poor rural areas, then trained them for jobs; 
because the number of accessible jobs was always smaller than the number of those who were 
eligible to be trained, those recruits were also prepared for entrepreneurship (self-employment).  
Project Sustainable Communities matched youth and women from nearby communities 
with the companies that conceived, designed, financed, and executed that project. Those 
companies were prepared to place program participants in jobs in their own and partnering 
companies, or to help them develop their own small businesses. Young Entrepreneurs served at-
risk youth and their families, engaging them in activities that included sports and recreation, 
academic support, and vocational and business training to assure that those youth were prepared 
for and had access to the social, educational, and work-related aspects of community life. 
For most of the programs, at-risk youth employment was an activity related in some way 
to another overarching purpose. In 2008-2009, for instance, government-sponsored PATI 
(Programma de Apoyo al Ingreso) was created primarily to offer limited financial relief to the 
most vulnerable poor during a difficult economic period in the country’s recent history, 
providing direct payments to individuals in exchange for their participation in community service 
and basic job training workshops; PATI did not engage in job placement per se, but offered 
career counseling (e.g., resume writing, interviewing) and job and entrepreneurial skills 
courses—in other words, PATI equipped its enrollees with the basic tools needed for making job 
searches on their own.   
Each of those programs was directly or indirectly engaged in diverting at-risk youth from 
poverty and crime, enabling their access to legitimate, gainful employment. All, to some extent, 
included complementary components that had wider-ranging impacts—for example, reinsertion 
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into social institutions such as family, school, community—or even into their home country, as 
the programs sought to prove that Salvadoran youths’ futures could be found in El Salvador, 
without their having to migrate to other countries such as the United States.  
To varying degrees, the stakeholders who were interviewed emphasized (sometimes 
passionately) the growth in personal and interpersonal attributes that enriched individuals and 
communities that participated in the programs. They spoke of gaining self-confidence, respect 
for diversity, and pride in making a difference, all of which contributed to social cohesion, 
community efficacy, and the beginnings of a cultural shift toward attitudes of peace in place of 
revenge. Projóvenes II, an INJUVE-managed program formally known as the Project of Social 
and Violence Prevention with Youth Participation, placed a high value on such outcomes. It 
prepared youth for legitimate employment by first addressing societal/cultural, personal, and 
interpersonal obstacles, often specific to local communities. Although during this study, that 
program's job and educational assistance components were less developed than some, more 
recently, Projóvenes has begun to make an effort to incorporate and strengthen employment-
based components.  
Clientele 
At-risk youth made up the targeted client population for all of the programs studied. Most 
defined “youth” as those in their mid-teens to mid-twenties, although variations occurred; 
Projóvenes, for example, served “youth” into their mid-thirties and even beyond. The programs 
all made exceptions; they all cited reasons for not excluding anyone in need who met the general 
criteria, were close in age, and badly needed employment. On the other hand, for the most part, 
the programs recognized their limits. Few had resources to accommodate mentally deficient 
youth or those whose criminal records made them security risks. Across the board, “at-risk” 
meant that an individual was not in school, did not have a job or prospects of finding legitimate 
employment, and was vulnerable to becoming a perpetrator or victim of violence without 
intervention. In some, but not all cases, at-risk might mean that the individual was already known 
to law enforcement; in at least one program, the inability or failure to determine where to draw 
that line for the safety of other participants and staff became a serious, program-ending security 
issue.  
Sometimes, recruits who were otherwise qualified and needful were left out of a program 
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because they were unlikely to help meet its particular goals. Jóvenes Comprometidos, for 
example, had promised to place all graduates, and therefore could take in only at-risk youth who 
could fit within potential employers’ “profiles” of requirements. If tattoos or those with 
community connections to gangs, for example, were going to be absolutely unacceptable to 
employers regardless of the applicants’ other qualifications, then tattooed youth or those from 
communities known to have widespread gang activity were unlikely to be recruited. This 
distressed program staff, but they had to balance such discriminatory practices against the need 
to successfully place as many as possible of the graduates in whom they were investing.  
Employer discrimination, even when associated with legitimate concerns, challenged all 
of the programs that made an attempt to match participants with real jobs. After having gone 
through training for a job, Sustainable Communities and other programs' participants found the 
experience of being interviewed and forced to take polygraph tests anxiety provoking and 
objectionable. Because they had come from areas considered dangerous, most were asked 
questions such as "are you related to gang members?" Truthful answers could disqualify them, at 
best, or expose relatives or neighbors, at worst; rejection would be the outcome, either way. All 
of those factors that made them need the program's help in the first place would come together to 
set them up again for failure. 
Above all, because the programs were locally sited, “at risk” youth were considered those 
unemployed and unemployable youth who were heavily concentrated in El Salvador’s most “at 
risk” communities, mostly rural, but some urban. At-risk communities were widely known for 
their poverty and violence, and for the absence of recreational, educational, and especially 
legitimate employment opportunities that would allow youth to envision and build towards real 
futures. Some of these communities were within the metropolitan area around San Salvador; 
Projóvenes II and the private-enterprise administered programs served in these areas, for 
example. More often, at-risk communities were rural, far from legitimate jobs and dominated by 
one or more warring, uncontrolled gangs. Employers routinely discriminated against job 
applicants from those communities, not only because the applicants were almost certainly ill 
prepared, but because they could not transport them home at the end of the evening shift, or out 
of the fear of inviting infiltration or extortion by gang members who might be relations or 
acquaintances of those applicants. The programs, in their varied ways, had not only to help such 
youth transform themselves into competitive job applicants, but they had to find, persuade, and 
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prepare the employers who would hire them. 
Primary Program Outcomes 
The programs that set standards by which to measure success reported meeting or 
exceeding them, for the most part. A considerable amount of that success was reported 
anecdotally. Some of those perceptions of accomplishment and value tended to be strongest 
during or immediately after the program, and then faded after reentering the world without the 
day-to-day intense support of their former staff and peers. Participants who were prepared to 
search for jobs, but not helped to actually find and obtain them, were most prone to experiencing 
this. In all cases, however, there was enough lasting pride of accomplishment and visible 
evidence of success to infer that, measured or not, some good was accomplished.  
PATI was one of those programs that could provide researchers with numbers. As of 
October 2014, of the 75,581 individuals expected to receive $6002 each in government payments, 
nearly 66,000 had been paid; 68% of them were of the targeted gender (female heads of 
households) and 38% were in the targeted age range (16-30 years old). To receive the full $600, 
recipients had to remain in the program for six months, working on community service projects 
and learning job search skills. Retention rates were reported to be above 90%; dropouts included 
individuals who had lost interest, moved away, or found employment. When asked, the 
recipients expressed gratitude for the added income, but they talked more about personal growth, 
new relationships and community improvements that had improved their lives and given them 
the vision and confidence to find work. 
The Projóvenes programs (I and II) had the most diffuse goals, and thus the most varied 
and location-specific outcomes. Projóvenes seemed to view its long-range purpose as fostering 
local conditions under which youth would eventually have access to good employment, rather 
than facilitating immediate job prospects. The program's stated purpose was to promote social 
cohesion and to mitigate factors of violence and juvenile delinquency. Our clearest indicator of 
success, within the limited time and resources available for the study, was the European 
Commission’s assessment that the program was an effective model for violence prevention. 
Stakeholders in general attributed improvements in local quality of life to the program. 
Projóvenes is increasing its programming for youth employment, but we had no means of 
                                                 
2 Monetary amounts in this section are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated. 
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assessing its impact at the time of this study.   
Project HOPE set out to provide job and entrepreneurial training to marginalized youth, 
and to intervene to aid job placement. Here, the shortage of clear goals, measurable outcomes, 
and data made it impossible to evaluate whether or not any program goals were met. In addition, 
the program was a complex assortment of partners, each of which operated a unique version of 
the model, making it still more complicated to recognize and track progress toward overarching 
goals and outcomes. Some evidence suggested that various HOPE programs may have deviated 
significantly from the model’s established protocols. Overall, while the program undoubtedly did 
some good, convincing evidence that it fulfilled its purpose was not found.    
Jóvenes Constructores aimed, among other things, to reduce violence and criminal 
activity in the communities; with its highly structured and disciplined schedule of activities, the 
program was successful in keeping its trainees off the streets and productively engaged. As with 
many of the other programs, little or no objective quality data was available for analysis of the 
program’s economic outcomes. Participants reported other highly valued benefits, regardless of 
its employment outcomes; they talked about gaining the motivation and means to continue high 
school or college educations, a sense of security, confidence and self-esteem, a vision of a viable 
career path, and a general knowledge of employment practices.  
The purpose of Jóvenes Comprometidos was to facilitate employment for thousands of 
youth in El Salvador, and over the two years of its existence, it did that for almost 2,000 youth. 
This program demonstrated the ability to learn from early mistakes and to make adjustments in 
order to raise its success rate. According to stakeholders, in the first group only one of 20 
graduates found a job. Program staff responded quickly by redesigning the trainings to be more 
relevant to actual jobs available, and the rate of graduate hires rose to somewhere “between 70% 
and 100%.” Stakeholders considered their measure of success to be that the number of youth 
eventually employed exceeded the number they had expected. Some evidence suggested that 
perhaps as many as half of the newly employed youth did not stay in their jobs for long, but there 
were also reports that those youth, armed with their new confidence and skills, went on to find 
other employment unaided.  
The conclusions drawn from the available program reports and stakeholder interviews are 
tenuous, at best. It appears that many were served, and of those, through a mix of new 
confidence and skills, many were able to find jobs or to start self-employment enterprises, 
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whether or not program-aided. Others returned to school. Still others fluctuated between jobs and 
school, as opportunities and finances allowed. The promise of such programs is deserving of a 
more disciplined effort to set sound, measurable goals and to collect the data needed to evaluate 
progress, given the need for such data from governmental agencies and other funding sources 
that would like to support cost-effective, evidence-based efforts. 
Secondary Program Outcomes 
Four of the five programs studied indicated that employing at-risk youth was either their 
goal or their strategy for reaching another goal (e.g., reducing violence). The fifth, PATI, was 
created to provide temporary financial relief to those hardest hit during the 2008-2009 economic 
downturn, although it also equipped recipients somewhat for job seeking. Several other outcomes 
were sought and/or attained by the programs, among them increased business productivity 
(providing trained, prepared workers from a previously untapped labor pool); social cohesion 
(bringing together at-risk youth of varying backgrounds, community members, and volunteers to 
work towards common goals); improved intergovernmental coordination and empowerment of 
local governments (consulting them about local needs and practices, encouraging financial 
participation); improved community self-efficacy (involving local volunteers in activities and 
decision-making); reinsertion of youth into social structures such as family, school, and 
community; and hope for youths seeking a future at home rather than migrating to the U.S. and 
other countries. For the participants themselves, the most-often discussed and most highly valued 
outcomes tended to be personal and interpersonal gains – the development of confidence, trust, 
appreciation for diversity, resilience, and having alternatives to violence for handling anger and 
frustration, among others.  
Intergovernmental Coordination 
One of the least talked about, but more interesting observations was that government 
entities at various levels found in these programs the need and the means for communicating and 
collaborating in ways that had not been tried before. Although stakeholders had relatively little to 
say about this, some evidence was found that the experience gained by some agencies and 
organizations can be expected to continue to benefit Salvadorans for years to come. 
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Replicability  
In the strictest sense, most of the programs were replicated as their projects were sited in 
more than one community; thus, their successes and failures could be taken as an indication of 
their replicability elsewhere. The Improving Access to Employment program, Jóvenes 
Comprometidos, ended in 2013; however, the model was provided to others, including 
INSAFORP, which has adopted many of its elements. In spite of that program’s short life, its 
stakeholders judged the model’s replicability as good because (1) its practices were simple and 
were modeled on those of successful evidence-based programs, (2) employers had helped to 
inform those practices, and (3) its curriculum was consistent and clear.  
Jóvenes Constructores represents a different replication experience. The first program 
established was replicated at least seven times in other communities; however, at the time of this 
study, only one program was still in operation. One had been closed down when security 
precautions proved inadequate to keep staff and participants from being harmed; the reasons for 
the other closures were not entirely clear, but lack of stable funding was inferred. Several 
obstacles were encountered when trying to involve municipalities in the program; the sponsor is 
now attempting solve those problems by scaling the program to dimensions that could be more 
readily funded by local partners and managed by municipalities, while not degrading program 
effectiveness; it is also, of course, exploring ways of improving safety and security. 
Not all of the programs were intended to be models for replication. PATI, for example, 
was a relatively quick and direct governmental response to a particular critical situation. The 
outcome could certainly be studied in more depth for lessons learned, but it was unique in its 
purpose, time, and place. The replicability of the other programs varies, depending in large part 
upon the amount and quality of documentation and advising that could be accessed. Without 
cost-effectiveness data and analyses, however, the advisability of replication in other locations or 
for other situations cannot be adequately assessed.  
Cost Effectiveness 
The current studies were not designed to draw conclusions about cost effectiveness. The 
seven programs examined shared some broad long-term goals and certain short and medium-
term objectives, but their emphases differed in accord with the varying philosophies and 
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priorities of each program's organizers and funding agencies. In addition, the programs faced 
different challenges, in part depending on territorial resources and conditions. Cost-effectiveness 
may be affected by the sufficiency or insufficiency of financial resources available to carry out 
programs, and this also differed among the programs studied. Finally, to study cost-effectiveness, 
researchers would have needed access to primary data sources—that is, official budgets, funding 
documents, information about planned and actual expenditures, and others. Very few of those 
kinds of data were offered, even when requested.  
Rather, the authors were provided with secondary resources, such as reports prepared for 
funding agencies and program-generated public announcements. The information found in those 
sources proved useful for understanding approximately what it might cost, for example, to 
prepare youth for finding employment in certain fields (e.g., see section 3), or to provide a 
temporary income supplement to the most vulnerable Salvadorans during an economic crisis, 
along with some skills and advising for pursuing future income generation (e.g., see section 4).  
In some respects, Jóvenes Comprometidos was the program most directly and 
aggressively focused on ensuring youth access to employment. Staff forged working 
relationships with employers to provide trainees with work experience and then matched trained 
graduates with actual job openings. Depending on job type, the cost of training the individuals 
who obtained jobs upon graduation ranged from an average of $320 per person (for catering) to 
$630 per person (for accounting assistance); when recalculated to include only those individuals 
still employed three months after graduating, those average costs became $517 to $840 per 
person.3 
PATI, on the other hand, was an emergency response to the economic crisis that provided 
individuals with a monthly income supplement ($100 for six months) in exchange for 
community service and attendance at workshops designed to build skills and confidence for a 
future job search. The program was meant to be a one-time effort, relieving the burden on El 
Salvador's most vulnerable individuals through the worst of the financial disaster. The average 
cost per person has been estimated at $817, $600 in direct payments and the rest for other 
programming.4 
Like Jóvenes Comprometidos, Jóvenes Constructores placed significant emphasis on 
                                                 
3 See section 3, "Jóvenes Comprometidos," in this report. 
4 See section 4, "PATI," in this report. 
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directly preparing youth for employment, although it attempted to serve a wider range of at-risk 
youth. In a CRE Final Report, CRS to USAID (June 30, 2014, 42), the cost per youth, including 
technical assistance, averaged $1,210;5 this could be compared, perhaps, with the cost reported in 
that same document (p. 43) of simply feeding and housing an inmate in an over-crowded prison 
for a year, $1,142—a situation which, it is hoped, would be prevented by assisting youth with 
programs such as the ones studied here. The above examples illustrate the range of services and 
some approximate unit costs of program delivery. 
The last two programs studied for this report differ from the others in that they are 
organized primarily by private businesses and associations, funded and executed through public-
private partnerships. In addition, they do not focus on alleviating social ills, but on regional 
economic viability, with beneficial social outcomes becoming a potential side effect. The 
economic motives and constructs are complex. Still, proceeding in a way that encompasses 
marginalized local populations (including at-risk youth, although both projects emphasize that 
they do not characterize individuals as such nor do they target youth exclusively) and that 
attempts to include rather than displace them, these projects have something important in 
common with the others.  
As with the other five programs, researchers again did not have access to primary source 
documents, but for purposes of comparison, a FUNDE presentation of Project Sustainable 
Communities estimated that the average per-person cost of providing support for some 933 
individuals to enhance their earning potential through education, training, advising, and other 
assistance, as needed, averaged $1,211 (pp. 2, 12); that project is ongoing.6 Similarly, Project 
Young Entrepreneurs aims to develop self-employment opportunities for youth by encouraging 
them to finish their educations (estimated at $489 average annual cost/person), teaching life 
skills for reintegrating with their families and communities (estimated at $903 average annual 
cost/person), and helping them to establish successful entrepreneurships (estimated at $1,400 
average annual cost/person).7 
Across all of the programs mentioned above, the numbers provided are consistently 
identified as "estimated averages." Still, they tell us something about the investments needed to 
                                                 
5 See section 5, "Jóvenes Constructores," in this report. 
6 See section 8, "Project Sustainable Communities," in this report. 
7 See section 9, "Project Young Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities," in this report. 
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achieve the kinds of goals those respective programs are pursuing. Much more research is 
needed to determine the cost-effectiveness of the various approaches to mitigating the closely 
related problems of youth poverty and violence, and still more is needed to enable meaningful 
comparisons among them.  
     Sustainability  
Objective assessments of the programs’ potential for sustainability proved elusive. The 
programs all had start-up funding of varying amounts, but longer-term funding streams were 
harder to come by. Some relied on partner organizations, including businesses that were 
benefitting from the training programs; others looked toward local governments to provide 
resources for the programs at their sites. Projóvenes was unique as the only program studied that 
had been underwritten for a long-range, multi-dimensional plan; after the first six years, deemed 
successful by its sponsors, it was funded for another six years. Projóvenes intentionally cultivates 
and relies heavily on local governmental and citizen participation; given the length of time that it 
could be present while transferring skills and responsibility to local entities—a condition for 
lasting change—that program may have the best long-term prospects for sustainability of the 
nonprofit and government-sponsored programs studied.  
Jóvenes Constructores was more typical. The program was funded for start-up in part by 
Catholic Relief Services, but it relied on implementing agencies at its various sites to carry some 
of the financial burden of operations, as well. That apparently was not enough; of eight programs 
that were initiated, most closed within a couple of years or less. The one program that remained 
in operation at the time of this study also relied on its implementing agency; Glasswing/ 
SolucionES projects that its funds are adequate to operate for another four to five years, as long 
as its trainees’ employment rates remain high. Catholic Relief Services had also attempted 
unsuccessfully to solicit financial investments from municipalities. In addition, CRS has applied 
for program funding from a national bank; that outcome was still uncertain at the time of this 
report. 
Sustainability was not a goal for every program. At the other end of the spectrum, PATI, 
for example, was created to provide short-term economic relief for a specific number of 
disadvantaged individuals through a period of national hardship. Participants were compensated 
for community service projects and for attending job-search training workshops. After two years, 
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with its program goals met, PATI closed.  
Lessons Learned 
Perhaps the most important lesson drawn from this study, although only time will tell 
whether or not it was a lesson “learned,” is that any program in need of stable funding from 
international, governmental, nonprofit and/or for-profit organizations would do well to have 
clear goals, a well-developed strategy drawn at least in part from the evidence-based successes of 
others, outcomes that can be measured and indicators that can be tracked, a sharp and sustained 
focus on those goals and measures, and an independent evaluation plan for assessing and 
reporting its achievements (and failures, and responses to failure). Anecdotal information and 
stakeholder perceptions are of great value, but they don't measure everything that is important. 
The lack of such program planning and inconsistent (or inaccessible) data impeded the 
researchers’ ability to make valuable comparisons between various strategies and outcomes, 
including the relative cost-effectiveness of the respective programs. 
One of the more important questions that went unanswered by all of the programs is 
"What happens to those youth who invest time, effort, and hope in the program's activities, but 
still do not achieve sustainable employment?" Those programs that did claim to follow up with 
participants had little or no focused purpose or strategy for that follow up; few documented the 
results of follow up contacts, and many did not have the resources to even attempt them. 
Therefore, we could find no answer to that question. At every level—individual participants, 
program staff, communities and local governments, national government, investors—the stakes 
are high, and this is information that should be sought, documented, analyzed, reported, and 
acted upon. 
Not surprisingly, programs in which private businesses and associations were active 
reported better employment, and possibly even self-employment, outcomes for their participants. 
All of the programs, formally or informally, sought in some ways to ease impoverishment and 
reduce violence. Those programs that focused most aggressively on business alliances and 
participant employment did so at some cost to those who did not or could not meet those 
employers' stringent requirements, and may have done less to reduce violence. Programs that 
focused more on quality of life, social/cultural issues, and life skills as a means of promoting the 
conditions for economic improvement or violence reduction (or both) seemed to make a 
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difference, but forfeited the potential for more quickly crossing the sustainable "job" or "self-
employment" finish line with the majority of their participants. Researchers and practitioners 
differ on the ranking in importance and the causal relationships of the various elements of the 
economic and social hardships that the programs studied here chose to address, but there is little 
disagreement that those relationships matter. It would be worth thinking about what kinds of 
organizational mergers or collaborations might be able to more efficiently and effectively set 
priorities and cover that ground more comprehensively. 
Apart from those above, many other valuable lessons were learned from the programs’ 
successes and shortcomings. Some are recorded here as the best of the advice offered by the 
stakeholders:8 
 In choosing a client population and communities to serve, stay within your resources 
and abilities to serve well and safely. Be realistic about security issues when 
qualifying applicants and when siting programs; be knowledgeable about local gangs, 
their conflicts, and their potential impact on the program and enrollees.  
 Expect to invest; the cost to prepare a disadvantaged youth for employment can range 
from about $700 to more than $2,200.  
 Know the community and the population well, and involve them in planning from the 
beginning, in as many ways as possible.  
 When asked, most applicants said they had chosen to enroll in the first program (of 
several they had inquired about) to contact them. PATI went one step better: it used a 
data-driven “poverty map” to locate individuals in need, rather than waiting for them 
to ask for help. 
 Involve stakeholders in decision-making—local governments and agencies, potential 
employees, enrollees, community members and volunteers, and others; this builds 
social cohesion and community efficacy, leading to greater independence, and helps 
to assure that the outcomes pursued are desired by and feasible for those most 
affected.  
 When building relationships with employers, do not appeal to their social 
consciences; rather, be prepared to talk about the productivity and financial benefits 
                                                 
8 Since the same advice was heard repeatedly from several different sources, we have not attempted to identify all of the contributors; 
they know who they are, and we thank them. 
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of hiring screened and trained employees from a previously untapped labor pool. 
 Remain current on the skills that the job market wants, and remain flexible enough to 
adapt training courses accordingly. Train not only in job-specific technical skills, but 
also for developing job search strategies, interviewing techniques, responding to 
difficult questions, and behavioral protocols on the job. 
 “One size fits all” trainings, while initially economical, are relatively ineffectual in 
the long run compared with age and ability-appropriate trainings focused on hard 
skills and tailored to the immediate economic needs of local employers.  
 Align the number of trainees at a given time to the number of likely vacancies; 
otherwise many graduates will be spending considerable time trying to find a job or 
may simply give up. 
 Because jobs are never as plentiful as applicants, train for starting and managing 
one’s own enterprise, as well. Include entrepreneurial management practices and hard 
skills, such as computer repair, baking, contract building, and others, matched with 
local needs. 
 Invest in highly qualified instructors for the best results; when available, give 
preference to regional native instructors and staff; they will possess invaluable 
knowledge, insights, and connections that outsiders cannot match. 
 Build ways of getting early feedback into the plan in order to make timely course 
corrections and enhance the chances of success. 
 Follow up graduates for a reasonable period to help troubleshoot obstacles and 
celebrate successes; also, to measure and document the project's longer-term impacts. 
 Do not overlook the business community as an ally, for reasons that may have little to 
do with their social consciences (although some will care about that); most business 
people are likely to see mutual interests and opportunities in places that may not be as 
apparent to those in nonprofit sectors. 
 The proposition suggested by Sustainable Communities is an interesting one: that 
defining programs and their goals and participants using the language of disadvantage 
may serve to stigmatize and perpetuate those disadvantages, and that it may be 
possible to rehabilitate places toward health and functionality, with the intention of 
including and enabling their existing populations rather than displacing or segregating 
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them. That program is still a work in progress, but it is an effort worth watching. 
 
Some of the lessons learned were unexpected. One in particular kept coming up in the 
conversations researchers had with stakeholders across all of the programs studied. We might 
imagine that youth employment programs such as these would be narrowly focused on numbers 
and regimented in their approach, focused on the bottom line. Instead, the programs and their 
recruits were far more values driven (internally, even informally in some cases) than data driven, 
and most programs were as least as developmental as they were disciplined in their approaches.9 
Projóvenes II stakeholders were outspoken about the need and means for increasing social 
cohesion in the communities it served, and its staff went to great lengths to develop community-
based volunteer investment and participation towards that end. The HOPE program held fast to 
the “culture of peace” context within which its employment activities took place, to inspire and 
instill attitudes in its trainees and their families and communities that could overcome intolerance 
and violence. Even stakeholders across roles in the more pragmatic and tightly structured 
Jóvenes Constructores program were adamant that its life skills and community services 
components, two strongly human-value-laden program elements, were indispensible if the direct 
employment and entrepreneurship efforts were to succeed over the long term. When asked about 
outcomes, stakeholders expressed sincere gratitude for the opportunities afforded them, but then 
passed quickly over dollars earned and jobs obtained to talk about matters of personal and 
community growth and aspirations for the future of El Salvador. Jobs matter, but apparently they 
matter most in the context of family, community, and country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Jóvenes Comprometidos was an exception, focusing more narrowly on employment. That was noted by some stakeholders as a lost 
opportunity. 
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